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ABSTRACT 
 
WILLIAM HENRY EWELL: Partisanship, Inter-institutional Bargaining, and the Appropriations 
Process in American Government 
(Under the direction of Dr. Thomas Carsey) 
 
   
This dissertation examines the effect of partisanship on stages of the appropriations 
process in American government. In the American separation of powers system, three 
policymaking institutions with differing constituents and decision-making structures bargain 
to determine budget outcomes. The central theory posits that institutional actors are strategic 
in constructing appropriations requests indicating that they base their decisions on both their 
institutional preferences, but also on the preferences of other veto-wielding actors. An 
accommodating bargaining strategy, structured by partisan control of each institution, results 
in appropriations requests that account for the policy preferences of other veto wielding 
institutions.  Two unique data sets at the national and state-level are analyzed to gain a 
broader understanding of the effect of partisanship and strategic bargaining on the 
appropriations process. Pooled time-series regression analysis is utilized to examine the 
relationship between partisanship and appropriations requests and outcomes, controlling for a 
series of institutional and economic characteristics. The study results indicate that partisan 
institutional control structures the bargaining process, appropriations requests, and final 
budget outcomes. This study advances our understanding of the role of partisanship in 
shaping the appropriations process in American government.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Lasswell (1936) suggested that the fundamental question of politics is how resources 
are distributed among members with differing and sometimes conflicting preferences. 
Nowhere is the issue of resource distribution more palpable than in the appropriations 
process in American government. The budget process represents an intensely complex 
system based on a combination of constitutional, statutory, and historical precedents. The 
methodical and prescriptive nature of the process has led to a predominant view among 
political scientists that appropriations are governed by institutional rather than partisan 
mechanisms   (Lowery et al 1985; Wildavsky 1964; Fenno 1966). Seminal studies by Fenno 
(1966) and Wildavsky (1964) emphasize the institutional norms and roles as the driving force 
in determining budget outcomes (Lowery, Bookheimer, and Malachowski 1985).  Numerous 
scholars have gone so far as to conclude that party is not central to understanding the 
appropriations process (Wanat 1978).     
This view belies the centrality of political parties in American politics. According to 
Schattschneider (1942) democracy is unthinkable save in terms of political parties. Political 
parties are institutions created and maintained by politicians to achieve electoral and policy 
goals and represent the central mechanism holding politicians accountable to their 
constituents (Aldrich 1995). Political parties are vital to maintain the electoral connection 
between constituents and their elected representatives (Mayhew 1975; Erickson et al 1989). 
Without politics parties, it is difficult to conceive of a method for representatives to be held 
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accountable for their appropriations decisions. The apparent contradiction between political 
parties’ fundamental role as democratic organizing agents and the lack of empirical evidence 
of their influence in the appropriations process constitutes the central problem of this 
analysis.  
In this study, I argue that partisanship has a direct effect on domestic institutional 
appropriations proposals along a unidimensional ideological scale with Democrats requesting 
higher levels of spending than their Republican counterparts. I also argue that partisanship 
has an indirect effect because party shapes the inter-institutional bargaining process. In other 
words, strategic actors possess incentives to take into account the preferences of other veto-
wielding actors in the appropriations bargaining game. Appropriations requests, therefore, 
represent a combination of that institution’s sincere preferences and the perceived 
preferences of the other actors in the bargaining process.  
Previous studies have focused on the structural process by which appropriations move 
incrementally through the branches of government and, in a few cases, the direct influence of 
partisan control on appropriations outcomes. Within the structural appropriations process, 
there exists a strategic bargaining game both within and between policymaking institutions 
(Marshall 2007). I propose two additional research strategies largely absent from the 
empirical literature to test the potential impact of partisanship. First, rather than observe only 
appropriations outcomes, I focus on the influence of partisanship at each step in 
appropriations process. This research strategy considers the proposition that partisanship has 
countervailing effects at different stages in the budget cycle, therefore, resulting in a false 
negative in tests of partisanship. Second, I consider the impact of indirect partisan effects. 
Given that institutional actors have numerous incentives to cooperate, I test whether 
3 
 
institutional actors behave strategically.  If institutional actors behave strategically, this 
would result in an indirect effect of partisanship on appropriations requests.   
The fundamental assumption of strategic behavior in the bargaining between 
policymaking institutions has vital, but previously ignored, implications for explaining the 
role of political parties in shaping the appropriations process in American government. In the 
American separation of powers system, the three policymaking institutions each possess veto 
authority. That is, all three institutions must agree on an appropriations bill in order to make 
it law.  The rare exception to this rule is if both chambers have the two-thirds vote to override 
an executive veto. Policymaking necessitates some level of bargaining and compromise; 
institutional actors possess significant incentive to consider the preferences of other actors 
who control veto authority. In other words, the structure of policymaking necessitates that 
actors account for the preferences of those institutions that control influence over their policy 
objectives.  I argue that institutional actors strategically construct appropriations requests to 
account for the preferences of other institutional actors. I also propose that institutional actors 
use an accommodating strategy by moving their proposals closer to those of other veto-
wielding actors. This accommodating strategy maximizes institutional actor’s electoral and 
budgetary goals by reducing the probability of their worst outcome, legislative gridlock. .  
The evidence to support this argument comes from two different newly constructed 
data sets. First, I examine federal appropriations requests from the U.S. president from fiscal 
year 1948-2006.  Analyzing a detailed time-series of agency-level appropriations request 
changes from the previous year’s final budget to the president’s appropriations request, I 
demonstrate that changes in the partisan configuration of Congress produce substantial 
changes in appropriations request levels. The pooled time-series findings indicate that 
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political variables, rather than institutional or economic factors, structure presidential 
appropriations request levels.  
Second, the American states provide both institutional and partisan variation that the 
national government data lacks.  The state data provides the variability necessary to isolate 
the impact of partisanship in the appropriations process. Using a new data set of 
gubernatorial, State House, and Senate appropriations requests across 10 states representing 
over 1,200 agency-level budget proposals, I find a strong relationship between the partisan 
configuration of government and appropriations request levels, but one that is conditioned by 
economic factors. The study results indicate that partisanship frames inter-institutional 
bargaining in the appropriations process. A swing in partisan control of Congress or state 
legislatures dramatically alters the appropriations requests of national and state executives. In 
each stage of the budget process, partisanship influences the magnitude of the institution’s 
structural role. Not all institutional actors react identically to all other actors.  The next actor 
in the appropriations process was a critical factor in influencing appropriations request levels. 
For instance, the Senate reacts to the partisan composition of the House, the next actor in the 
budget process, but not to partisan control of the Executive Branch.  The findings also 
suggest that institutional actors are strategic in their approach to appropriations requests.  The 
variation in requests across various partisan configurations of government indicates that 
institutional actors accommodate the preferences of other veto-wielding actors in the 
appropriations process to achieve electoral and policy outcomes. Most of the statistical 
findings were consistent across national and state governments, increasing the 
generalizability of the results.  
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This study fills these research gaps and contributes to the American politics literature 
in several ways.  First, the analysis combines studies of bicameralism and executive-
legislative relations to provide a more unified theory of the appropriations process (Cutrone 
and McCarty 2007; Heller 1997, 2001, 2005, 2007).  Previous studies include only two 
actors, either two chambers in a legislature or single executive and a single legislature. This 
study incorporates all three policymaking institutions to achieve a more comprehensive 
understanding of inter-institutional bargaining. Second, by implementing a research design 
that uses changes in appropriations requests at each stage in the budget cycle, rather than 
appropriations outcomes, I am able to examine the influence of partisanship on various 
institutions throughout the entire appropriations process.  Final outputs may mask the 
potential offsetting influence of partisanship on appropriations proposals as they move 
through the budget process. Third, the theory has representative consequences. Political 
parties are the primary mechanism for holding representatives accountable for their 
decisions. If partisanship plays no role in determining appropriations outcomes, then 
constituents lack a means for holding their representatives responsible for their actions. This 
breakdown would constitute a serious problem in democratic governance.  Fourth, this study 
collects two unique data sets that allow for an in-depth examination of the appropriations 
process. Finally, this analysis is the first study to examine appropriations at the national and 
state-level simultaneously.  By studying multiple levels of government, I am to control for a 
broader range of control variables and increase the generalizability of the empirical findings.  
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AN OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS 
The appropriations process in American government represents a complex process 
that has evolved over the past 200 years (Oleszek 2004). Figure 1 illustrates the federal 
budget process that consists of four main phases. First, after receiving agency funding 
requests, the president submits a budget request to Congress. Second, the House of 
Representatives and Senate Budget Committees authorize budget resolutions that identify the 
fiscal year’s total government receipts, budget authority, outlays, budget deficit and debt 
limits. Third, the House of Representatives and Senate Appropriations Committees allocate 
budget authority and outlays amongst the 13 appropriations bills and revise the bills on the 
chamber floors. If differences exist between the House and Senate appropriations bills, either 
one or both chambers reconsider their appropriations recommendations or the differences are 
reconciled in a conference committee or . Finally, the president either signs or vetoes each 
appropriations bill. Each of the phases and the numerous actors and procedures that 
constitute each stage are described in further detail in the following section.  
The appropriations process in American government begins with an executive budget 
recommendation. The president requests budget recommendations from all executive 
agencies.  These budget requests are based on the previous year’s agency budget and 
commonly include a healthy increase in funding.  The Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB), a Cabinet-level office created by the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, reconciles 
the agency requests with the president’s policy priorities to construct an annual budget 
recommendation. This recommendation is nonbinding. In other words, the Congress is under 
any obligation to agree with or even consider presidential requests. However, the president’s 
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budget recommendations are regularly the starting point for authorization and appropriations 
negotiations in the Congress.  
The 1974 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act institutionalized the first 
phase in the Congressional budget process, namely the House of Representatives and Senate 
Budget Committees’ preparing of annual concurrent budget resolutions (Oleszek 2004). The 
official responsibilities of the House and Senate Budget Committees are threefold. First, the 
committees prepare an annual budget resolution that prescribes the total amount of federal 
spending and spending allocations among 20 functional categories (Wildavsky 2004). These 
budget authorizations do not correspond specifically to the 13 appropriations bills or 
numerous programs determined by the Committees on Appropriations; rather they set 
overarching spending, deficit, and debt goals in an effort to restrain deficit spending. Second, 
the committees review the impact of existing or proposed legislation on federal expenditures. 
The policy committees retain authority to approve legislation, however, until the Budget and 
Appropriations Committees allocate program funding, the legislation does not reach its full 
potential impact. Third, the committee oversees the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and, 
by extension, monitors the revenue and spending actions of the House and Senate (Oleszek 
2004). The House and Senate Budget Committees represent the principal source of federal 
budget information in Congress and, therefore, wield significant influence in the 
appropriations process.  
 Once the House and Senate Budget Committees have completed and voted on the 
budget resolution, the budget process moves to the House of Representatives Committee on 
Appropriations. The House Committee on Appropriations is charged with allocating budget 
authority and outlays. In other words, the committee translates the overarching authorizing 
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legislation into specific program and agency allocations. The Appropriations Committee 
represents a powerful entity in legislative deliberations and therefore, the House majority 
leadership assigns a large partisan majority of members to the Committee. While the 
Committee on Appropriations retains some autonomy, the House leadership possesses 
numerous sanctions to keep them aligned with the preferences of the full House. Once the 
Committee on Appropriations completes their recommendations and votes on them by 
majority rule, the appropriations bill goes to the full House. The full House makes 
adjustments to the bill and puts it to a floor vote.  
Once the House of Representatives approves appropriations legislation the 
recommendations are forwarded to the Senate Committee on Appropriations.  The Senate 
constructs its own budget bill; however, historically the Senate builds its recommendations 
on those proposed by the House of Representatives. The Senate, much like the House, has a 
number of formal and informal sanctions to ensure the Committee on Appropriations 
considers the preferences of the full Senate in their budget deliberations. The Senate, 
however, provides far greater autonomy to individual Senators than the House in keeping 
with the historical record of independence promoted in the Upper House. The Committee on 
Appropriations votes the bill out of Committee and it proceeds to the full Senate for a floor 
vote. The House of Representatives and Senate also have the option of proposing 
reconciliation legislation to bring existing law into conformity with the appropriations bill 
(Oleszek 2004).  Reconciliation, however, does not address funding included in annual 
appropriations bills.  
If the House and Senate versions are not identical, the House and Senate can either 
reconsider their appropriations proposals or join in a conference committee to reconcile the 
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bills. The conference committee includes members of both Appropriations Committees and 
House and Senate leadership. The conference committee approved bill is submitted to the 
chief executive at which time it is either signed into law or vetoed.  Several states possess 
line-item veto authority that provides governors with the ability to cut specific provisions 
from appropriations bills. Other states and the national government boast only the ability to 
veto entire appropriations bills. If the chief executive vetoes the bill, the appropriations 
process begins again in the House followed by the Senate. If the chief executive signs the 
bill, it becomes law.  
If Congress and the president unable to complete action on any of the 13 
appropriations bills by October 1, the start of the new fiscal year, a continuing resolution can 
be used to provide temporary funding to federal agencies (Schick 2000). During the past 30 
years, the U.S. has witnessed dramatic increases in continuing resolution usage. Continuing 
resolutions generally employ the previous fiscal year’s spending allocations, the typical 
reversion point in budget negotiations. The status quo, therefore, becomes a critical 
component of inter-institutional bargaining as members know the previous year’s budget 
allocations are the typical reversion point in budget negotiations.  
Beginning in the 1980’s, omnibus legislation, an appropriations act that bundles 
together numerous spending bills, has gained prominence since they allow committee and 
party leaders to bury controversial provisions (Oleszek 2004). These so-called megabills 
bundle diverse spending bills into a single legislative vehicle that can be voted up or down in 
the House and Senate. Party leaders have used such initiatives to increase their influence on 
the process and as a method to pass controversial amendments. Omnibus legislation grants 
considerable influence to the few committee members and majority leadership that construct 
10 
 
the bill.  While these bills were not generally used before 1980, there increased usage since 
creates some potential problems for the empirical analysis. First, these bills are not 
completely independent observations since they are bundled together. Since omnibus 
legislation is constructed at the floor-level, committee-level requests remain independent 
observations.  The floor-level bills require some means of controlling for omnibus versus 
non-omnibus appropriations bills. Second, omnibus legislation provides increased power to 
the committee and majority party leadership. Therefore, I expect that omnibus legislation 
may increase partisan influence in the appropriations process. The influence of omnibus 
legislation is examined in detail in the empirical analysis sections that follow.  
 
NATIONAL-LEVEL BUDGET PROCESS REFORMS  
During the past 35 years, the national budget process has witnessed numerous 
reforms that fundamentally altered the inter-institutional bargaining constraints and 
relationships. By far the most dramatic of these reforms was the 1974 Congressional Budget 
and Impoundment Control Act. (CBICA).  The CBICA established the House of 
Representatives and Senate Budget Committees as well as the Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO). The act significantly altered the budget process. Prior to 1974, the federal budget 
process was similar to state-level budget processes. The executive budget proposal was 
delivered directly to the House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations before 
moving to the House floor, Senate Committee on Appropriations and the Senate floor, and to 
the president’s desk for signature. The 1974 CBICA fundamentally altered this budget 
process. Presidential budget requests now go directly to the House and Senate Budget 
Committees before proceeding through the House and Senate Appropriations Committees.  
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The Congressional Budget and Impoundment and Control Act was created to hold 
down government expenditures and increase Congressional influence in the appropriations 
process (Oleszek 2004). Experts believed that the inability of Congressional members to 
contain increases in federal expenditures was due to the fragmentary nature of the budget 
process and the Appropriations Committees failure to coordinate spending decisions amongst 
the legislative committees. Members also feared that Congresses fragmented budget process 
was yielding too much fiscal authority to the Executive Branch. Therefore, the CBICA was 
specifically intended to shift the balance of budgetary power away from the Executive 
Branch to the Legislative Branch.  
The establishment of the House of Representatives and Senate Budget Committees 
altered the budget process sequence, but also altered the relationship between the Executive 
and Legislative Branches as well as the relationship between Congressional committees. 
First, the establishment of the House and Senate Budget Committees altered the relationship 
between the Executive and Legislative Branches. The Budget Committees now coordinate 
budgetary decisions through the annual budget resolution. The budget resolution is composed 
of aggregate budget totals and subtotals for 20 functional budget categories. These functional 
categories do not correspond directly with the specific federal departments. For instance, the 
budget resolution sets budget targets for agriculture spending, but this does not correspond 
directly to spending for the Department of Agriculture. Therefore, the budget committees do 
not specifically dictate how the appropriations committees allocate resources amongst the 
various departments and programs; however, Budget Committees do have a significant 
influence over setting aggregate spending limits and functional categories. The act also 
created the Congressional Budget Office so that Congress members would no longer need to 
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rely on the Executive Branch for fiscal and revenue projections and expenditure scoring. 
Experts argue that this fundamentally shifted budgetary authority back towards the 
Legislative Branch by increasing the coordination and information resources of 
Congressional budgeting.  
Second, the 1974 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act altered the 
relationship between committees within the House and Senate. Prior to 1974 Appropriations 
Committees possessed singular authority to determine annual appropriations decisions. The 
creation of the Budget Committees placed significant constraints on the Appropriations 
Committees. While the Budget Committees possess several enforcement mechanisms such as 
scorekeeping and monitoring to keep overall Congressional spending in check (Wildavsky 
2004).   
In 1985, the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act was revised to 
include the Byrd Rule (Smith, Roberts, and  Vander Wielen 2006). Named after prominent 
West Virginia Senator Robert Byrd, the rule stipulates that budget reconciliation provisions 
must reduce the deficit (Oleszek 2004). Reconciliation is an optional step in the budget 
process that brings existing law into conformity with the current budget resolution. It had 
become common practice for Senators to include amendments to Senate reconciliation bills 
that were not germane to the appropriations legislation. The Byrd rule was intended to 
exclude measures from reconciliation bills that do not reduce the federal deficit. This act 
further constrained the ability of Senate members to alter appropriations legislation and 
increase federal spending.  
Due to increasing federal deficits during the 1980’s, further efforts were made to 
restrict Congressional spending and alter the federal budget process. First, the 1985 Balanced 
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Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act (BBECA), otherwise known as the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings Act, established annual statutory deficit reduction targets for the purpose 
of balancing the federal budget (Oleszek 2004). If Congress failed to achieve the stipulated 
budget reduction targets, then the Comptroller General would have to enact across the board 
spending cuts. The bill failed to achieve its original purpose after Congress exempted more 
than 70 percent of federal spending (Oleszek 2004).  
Second, in 1990 the Congress passed the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA). The BEA 
was intended to shift Congressional focus from deficit reduction to spending limits. The 
provision reduced the threat of across the board cuts in agency spending if economic 
conditions resulted in increased national deficits, while simultaneously placing spending caps 
on discretionary spending. The BEA also stipulated that tax reductions and increases in direct 
spending must be offset by equal reductions in spending programs or tax hikes (Schick 
2000). This so called “pay as you go” provision sought to cap the insatiable desire of 
Congress members to increase federal spending. This act also failed to achieve significant 
reductions in federal spending and was allowed to expire in 2002.   
Another federal budget reform that has received widespread attention by scholars as 
well as the media is the rise of omnibus legislation. Omnibus legislating is the practice of 
combining numerous measures from disparate policy areas into one massive bill (Krutz 
2000). Omnibus legislation is generally used to pass initiatives that face uncertainty in 
Congress. The concept behind the omnibus bill is the multitude of issues contained in the bill 
increases the number of member votes and the likelihood of success. The bills generally 
decrease member participation and concentrate decision making power in the hands of the 
Congressional leadership (Krutz 2001). Opponents of omnibus legislation argue that their use 
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subverts the democratic process by burying important issues in massive bills that otherwise 
could not achieve majority support. Alternatively, proponents argue that omnibus bills are a 
method for getting things done in a fragmented federal political system.  
The rise of omnibus legislation in the appropriations process started in fiscal year 
1981. Since that time the use of omnibus legislation has varied from all 13 appropriations 
bills falling into omnibus legislation and no bills in other years. While only a small portion of 
Congressional bills fall into omnibus legislation, the practice has become common in the 
appropriations process. Omnibus legislation is constructed after the appropriations bills have 
passed out of Congressional appropriations committees. In other words, in the appropriations 
process omnibus bills are a tool used by party leaders to combine and alter appropriations 
bills after they have passed the committee stage.  
During the past 35 years, budget reforms have significantly altered the landscape of 
the federal budget process It is necessary, therefore, to control for these changes in the 
empirical analysis to test the impact process changes on shifts in appropriations allocations. 
The following analysis includes an examination of institutional appropriations requests 
before and after the 1974 Budget Act to test for the effects of this institutional change in the 
overall budget process. The empirical analysis also includes dummy variables to control for 
the impact of the BBECA, the BEA, and omnibus legislation.  I expect that these changes 
will have a significant impact on total federal spending, but will not significantly influence 
the appropriations allocations or the influence of partisanship on this process.  
The vast majority of federal budget reform provisions have been geared towards 
reducing overall federal spending or deficit totals. With the exception of the 1974 
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act, these initiatives did not significantly 
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alter either the distribution of power amongst the policy-making institutions or provide 
significant incentive to alter appropriations allocations. The CBICA did shift budget 
responsibilities from the president to the Congress and, therefore, should result in a change in 
the dynamic of inter-institutional appropriations negotiations. These expectations are 
examined further in the empirical analyses.  
 
AN OVERVIEW OF AMERICAN STATE BUDGET PROCESSES 
While the basic structure of the state budget process is similar to the federal budget 
process, several expectations exist. First, nearly all states, with the exception of Vermont, 
have constitutional or statutory balanced budget requirements (Gray and Hanson 2004). This 
budgetary restriction places significant emphasis on accurate and continual economic 
forecasting by state budget organizations.  Economic forecasting influences the adjustment of 
appropriations legislation throughout the budgeting process and can have wide-ranging 
influence on appropriations decisions.   
Second, the preponderance of state governments, including all the states included in 
this study, follow the national executive budgeting model. There are several states including 
Arizona, Colorado, and Texas that have a budgetary process dominated by the legislature 
where gubernatorial recommendations carry less weight. The lack of available data from 
these states precludes further examination of shifts in executive agenda setting authority.  
Third, gubernatorial veto authority varies among the states.  Forty-three state 
governors possess line-item veto authority while the other seven possess blanket veto 
authority. Line-item veto authority is expected to provide governors with an increased 
influence in the appropriations process.  In 1996, North Carolina enacted gubernatorial veto 
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authority.  This occurred in the middle of the North Carolina budget time series and provides 
a test case of the impact of veto authority on inter-institutional bargaining. 
Despite these differences, comparison of national and state-level budget processes 
offers the ability to utilize institutional, partisan, and economic variation in the study of 
appropriations politics. The appropriations process in American government is both a 
sequential and cyclical process. First, it is sequential in that there is a standard process by 
which appropriations bills work their way through policymaking institutions. The sequential 
nature of the appropriations process provides a consistent and predictable pattern of 
bargaining interactions both within and across policymaking institutions.  Second, the 
process is cyclical in that the proposed budget in any given fiscal year is largely based on the 
previous year’s budget. Given the limited staff, time, and resources of the Executive and 
Legislative Branches, the previous year serves as the starting point for budget requests. The 
research strategy employed, therefore, must take these systemic characteristics into account 
to achieve an accurate measurement of the influence of partisanship on the appropriations 
process.  
 
NATIONAL AND STATE-LEVEL STUDY 
This study is the first examination of both national and state-level appropriations 
processes in a single analysis. The purpose of examining both levels of government is 
threefold. First, this unique research design takes advantage of strengths of both government 
levels.  The national appropriations process provides access to committee level as well as 
floor level decision-making.  This allows for a deeper vertical examination of the 
appropriations process. This analysis includes examination of the relationship between the 
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House Committee on Appropriations and the House of Representatives and the Senate 
Committee on Appropriations and the Senate. These vertical relationships provide unique 
insight into the internal workings of the appropriations process. The national government, 
however, represents a sample size of one. Therefore, I turn to the American states to improve 
my horizontal examination of the appropriations process. Partisan, institutional, and 
economic factors vary significantly across the states. This analysis utilizes this variation to 
control for the myriad of factors that influence bargaining between policymaking institutions 
generally and appropriations negotiations specifically. Second, utilizing national and state 
data increases the generalizability of any findings that are found to be consistent across 
government levels. 
 
DATA  
The data for the study come from two main sources. First, a unique data set of federal 
appropriations was collected from the Senate Budget Estimates document printed annually 
by the United States Senate. Second, a unique data set of state appropriations was collected 
from state budget documents.  These two complementary data sets were collected at the 
agency-level to allow for comparison across government levels.  
 The basic decision governing the collection of the federal data was to select agency-
level appropriations that could be traced through each stage in the budget process over an 
extended period of time.  Annual federal budget data was collected for appropriations bills 
from 1948 through 2006.  Appropriations bills change slightly over the course of the time 
series and this resulted in an unbalanced panel. The data includes previous year, presidential 
requests, House Committee on Appropriations proposals, House of Representative floor 
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proposals, Senate Committee on Appropriations proposals, Senate floor proposals, and final 
authorized appropriations allocations by bill. The previous year appropriations request were 
necessary to construct the dependent variables, measures of change in agency-level 
appropriations at specific steps in the appropriations process. The data set does not include 
Budget Committee total or policy area spending limits. Since the Budget Committee 
recommendations refer to general spending areas and not to specific agencies or 
appropriations bills, the data cannot be examined in my larger data structure.  
At the state-level, a group of ten states were selected, with annual observations 
available on average for 10 years for each state.  The data selection criteria for the states were 
almost exclusively based on data availability. State budget data is exceedingly difficult to 
unearth.  The difficulty of this data collection effort was exacerbated by the fact that I needed 
appropriations request data from each of the three policymaking institutions – Executive 
Branch, House, and Senate.  The data collection process included emails, phone calls, and 
web searches for all 50 state libraries, executive budget offices, and legislative appropriations 
committees. Once the data was identified it was necessary to obtain the information through 
interlibrary loan, U.S. mail, or personally driving to the location.  Finally, the data needed to 
be coded into a format that was comparable to the national data.  The data collection effort 
included nearly 2,500 state-year-agency appropriations data points over a dozen government 
entities for nearly 180 years of appropriations negotiations.  The total data collection process 
took approximately a year.  
 The annual appropriations process allocates only about 30 percent of federal spending 
(Oleszek 2004). The other 70 percent consists of mandatory spending through entitlements 
such as Social Security and Medicare or interest payments on the federal debt. At the 
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national-level, this study examines the change in appropriations requests among the 13 
federal appropriations bills passed by Congress annually. These appropriations bills represent 
all annual domestic and military discretionary spending allocated by Congress each year. 
While the 13 appropriations bills possesses some mandatory spending through appropriated 
entitlements such as food stamps and unemployment compensation, any shortfalls must be 
covered by supplemental appropriations (Oleszek 2004). The mandatory spending contained 
within the 13 annual appropriations bills is relatively small. While these funding streams 
technically are not influenced by the annual inter-institutional bargaining between the 
policymaking branches, any mandatory spending should serve to reduce the likelihood of a 
false negative. In other words, the minimal amount of mandatory spending within the 
discretionary spending bills should reduce the probability of finding significant results.  
This analysis does not distinguish between discretionary and mandatory spending 
within the 13 annual federal appropriations bills. While ideally the analysis would isolate 
discretionary spending to measure the partisan effect on the appropriations process, the data 
structure does not allow it. Several of the years the federal years do not break out 
discretionary versus mandatory spending. Therefore, in order to make appropriations 
comparable over time it was necessary to include both discretionary and mandatory 
spending. The inclusion of mandatory spending should have little impact on the study results. 
First, mandatory spending represents a small portion of total funding in the 13 annual 
appropriations bills. Second, I do not expect mandatory spending to vary with changes in the 
partisan configuration of government. Mandatory spending is not determined within the 
annual appropriations process that is the focus of this analysis. Therefore, this analysis 
examines overall domestic agency-level domestic expenditures.  
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OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION 
In the next chapter, I develop a partisan theory of the appropriations process, placing 
this theory in the larger literatures on appropriations and the general role of parties in policy-
making, respectively. From this, I generate a series of hypotheses that I later test empirically.  
The purpose is to explain the theoretical framework for the study, describe the relationships 
between the three policymaking institutions and their subsystems, and lay out the study 
hypotheses that are generated from the theory, and determine the conditions under which 
partisanship structures the appropriations process.  
Chapter 3 examines the first step in the appropriations process, the Executive 
Branch’s budget request. The chapter provides an overview of the appropriations process, 
lays out the theoretical expectations and model hypotheses, and empirically tests the partisan 
theory of the appropriations process as it relates to executive behavior.  This chapter reveals 
that executives display strategic behavior accounting both for their preferences, but also the 
preferences of the other veto-wielding actors in the bargaining game. Partisanship is 
identified as the mechanism through which these direct and indirect preferences influence 
executive decision-making in American government.  The evidence indicates that at both the 
national and state-level, executives are exceedingly strategic actors. I suggest the reasons are 
threefold. First, executives represent the first step in the budget process and, as a result, I 
expect their appropriations proposals to incorporate to a greater extent the preferences of the 
other two actors. When the House and Senate consider appropriations, they are reacting to 
proposals that already incorporate the preferences of the executive. Second, by choosing an 
accommodating strategy, they minimize their least favored outcomes. Finally, executives 
have limited influence in the appropriations process once they make their budget proposal. 
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To reduce the risk of appearing inconsequential in light of legislative appropriations changes, 
they move towards the preferences of the legislative chambers.  
Chapter 4 investigates the second and third steps in the appropriations process, 
namely at the national-level the House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations and 
the House of Representatives floor appropriations proposals. At the state-level, the data set 
includes only floor appropriations for each legislative chamber. The chapter explores both 
the relationship between House committees and their parent chamber, as well as the 
relationship between the House and the other policymaking institutions. Partisanship again is 
identified as the mechanism structuring both internal and inter-institutional bargaining 
strategies in the appropriations process.  The results indicate that within the structural role, 
House chamber’s appropriations requests are influenced by direct and indirect partisan 
effects. Interestingly, at the national-level, House Committees appropriations are influenced 
by the indirect effect of executive partisanship, while the House floor appropriations are 
influenced by Senate Committee partisanship. The magnitude of the partisan effects is also 
smaller than those measured for chief executives.  
Chapter 5 explores the fourth and fifth steps in the appropriations process, namely the 
Senate’s Committee on Appropriations and the Senate floor’s proposed appropriations 
proposals.  Again, the Committee-level data is available only at the national level. I examine 
the difference in representation between the two chambers and the chamber structural roles 
and the impact of both on appropriations proposals. The results indicate that Senate 
appropriations are influenced by the indirect effect of House partisanship, but not by 
executive or Senate partisanship. The magnitude of the influence of partisan factors is also 
smaller than those identified at the executive or House level changes.  These smaller changes 
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are not surprising given that we find that the executive and the House take into account the 
preferences of the Senate chamber in constructing their appropriations proposals.    
Chapter 6 summarizes my findings and provides concluding remarks. The findings 
indicate that partisanship has a significant influence on the appropriations process both 
directly, through the partisanship of the institution making the appropriations request, and 
indirectly through a strategic decision by institutional actors to move appropriations in the 
direction of other veto-wielding institutions.  The empirical results largely support the 
theoretical framework. The evidence indicates that partisanship influences the strategic 
behavior of institutional actors in the bargaining game known as the appropriations process. 
While the national and state findings yield largely the same findings, there are clear 
differences. Partisanship clearly impacts national more than state actors. State appropriations 
processes are influenced by economic factors while national actors are influenced by federal 
spending and debt measures.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
A PARTISAN THEORY OF APPROPRIATIONS 
 
The framers of the U.S. Constitution created a fragmented government through the 
separation of powers system for the express purpose of reducing the threat of tyranny. The 
separation of powers also resulted in significant barrier to legislative productivity. Inter-
institutional bargaining is the method the three policymaking institutions – Executive Branch, 
House of Representatives, and Senate - utilize to overcome legislative gridlock. Scholars 
have long held that political parties bridge the gaps between institutional divisions. While the 
primacy of political parties in the organization of government and in determining legislative 
policy outcomes has been well documented, the literature is mixed concerning the influence 
of partisanship in the appropriations process. This contradiction raises several questions at 
the heart of American politics. How do political actors of disparate institutions achieve 
compromise in the appropriations process? What incentives drive actor motivations in the 
appropriations process both within and across institutions? What factors influence 
appropriations outcomes at the state and national-level?  
I theorize that political parties play a central, but previously overlooked, role in 
overcoming this political fragmentation by binding representatives across disparate branches 
and levels of government to advocate for common policy positions to advance their electoral 
fortunes. Most budgetary theories focus on the structure of the appropriations process rather 
than partisanship to explain appropriations outcomes (Wildavsky 1964; Fenno 1966; Wanat 
1978; Auten, Bozeman, and Cline 1984). Studies that measure the impact of partisanship on 
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the appropriations process, generally limit the analysis to the direct impact of partisanship.  
For example, scholars measure the effect of Democratic Party control on changes in 
appropriations requests or final appropriations. This theory expands on previous partisan 
based theories such as Kiewiet and McCubbins (1988, 1991) and Cox and McCubbins by 
examining the specific stages in the federal budget process. Previous studies have focused on 
final appropriations outcomes. While this research design isolates the overall budgetary 
effect of partisanship, it fails to consider the specific intra-institutional and inter-institutional 
bargaining that determines appropriations outcomes. This study advances our current 
understanding by isolating the influence of partisanship at each stage in the appropriations 
process. In other words, the study focuses on the micro-level bargaining process rather than 
simply the macro-level results.  
I argue that this limited theoretical scope misses a key effect of partisanship in the 
context of inter-institutional bargaining, namely the indirect effect of partisanship.  I argue 
that partisanship influences the appropriations process indirectly through the partisanship of 
other veto-wielding actors in the separation of powers system. Previous studies generally 
assume that appropriations requests represent sincere preferences of institutional actors and 
measure the impact of partisanship on the distance between proposed and final appropriations 
outcomes (Wildavsky 1964; Fenno 1966; Sharkansky 1966; Thompson 1987). Alternatively, 
I argue that appropriations requests represent strategic documents constructed based both on 
the actors policy preferences and the preferences of other veto-wielding institutions.  
I make the case that actors choose an accommodating bargaining strategy, meaning a 
strategy that moves towards the preferences of other actors in the budget process, in order to 
maximize their electoral and policy goals (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991).  According to the 
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accommodating strategy, appropriations requests are strategically designed to move towards 
the partisan policy preferences of other veto-wielding actors. The electoral connection 
provides legislators with the incentives to care about policy content and consider constituent 
preferences in the policymaking process. Failure to compromise and pass annual budgets has 
both negative electoral and policy consequences. Policymakers risk negative electoral 
consequences when budget negotiations result in gridlock both because they appear 
ineffective to constituents and they lack the ability to credit claim for the distribution of 
public goods. Policymakers who fail to compromise also risk negative policy consequences 
as veto-wielding actors are likely to ignore appropriations requests that are significantly out 
of line with their policy preferences. Given legislator’s incentive structure, I expect 
institutional bargaining and compromise in an effort to work with potential veto players 
necessary to deliver budgetary outputs (Heller 2007). In this way, partisanship has both a 
direct influence, through the agency of the institutions political party, and an indirect 
influence, through the agency of other veto-wielding institution’s political party.  
This theory is empirically testable by examining appropriations requests at each stage 
of the budget cycle across various partisan configurations of government. If partisanship has 
a direct impact on institutional actors, I expect to find difference between institutions of 
differing partisan control at each stage in the budget cycle. If partisanship has an indirect 
impact on institutional actors, I expect to find differences in institutional appropriations 
requests across different partisan configurations of government that move towards the 
preferences of the other actors.  
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SPATIAL THEORIES OF INTER-INSTITUTIONAL BARGAINING 
Inter-institutional bargaining is a necessary consequence of the separation of powers 
systems. The system of checks and balances requires that all three policymaking institutions 
– executive, House, and Senate - compromise to achieve policy outcomes. According to 
formal theoretical models, institutional structures and actor preferences drive the bargaining 
process between institutions (Hinch and Munger 1997).  Each institution, based on member 
preferences and internal preference aggregation procedures, constructs a ranking of budget 
priorities.  Institutional actors are motivated both in improving their probability of reelection 
and achieving their budget priorities. As a result, institutional actors engage in a bargaining 
process seeking to achieve their highest priorities and make concessions on lower ordered 
priorities. 
 There exists a well developed national inter-institutional bargaining literature 
(Cameron 2000, Romer and Rosenthal 1978, Kiewiet and McCubbins 1985, 1988, 1991, 
Krehbiel 1991, 1999).  The Romer-Rosenthal model represents the most basic and commonly 
applied inter-institutional bargaining game in the political science literature. The Romer-
Rosenthal model assumes the proposer, Congress, provides a take it or leave it offer to the 
president (Cameron 2000). The proposer has two options, pass the original version of the 
proposed bill or a revised version. The president then has the choice of signing or vetoing the 
Congressional bill. The model assumes full information for all actors. Congress acts 
strategically by anticipating the president’s legislative preferences and passes a bill that both 
falls within the possible win set, a bill the president will sign, and is the closest to the 
Congresses ideal point. If the president and Congress are on opposite sides of the status quo 
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or the existing legislative position, then the model predicts gridlock.  The reasoning is that 
either Congress or the president will be worse off from passage of the bill and the process 
results in veto or Congresses failure to present a bill to the president.  
 Cameron (2000) expands on the basic Romer-Rosenthal model by incorporating a 
sequential veto bargaining game. The model includes two rounds of bargaining between the 
president and Congress with a possibility of break down in bargaining after the first round. 
Congress uses whatever information it has learned about the president’s ideal point in the 
first round to adjust their position in the second round. In the first round, Congress is 
expected to pass a bill closest to their ideal point that still has a decent chance of presidential 
acceptance. If the president is accommodating, then he will accept the bill rather than allow a 
break down in negotiations or a return to the status quo. If the president chooses to veto the 
bill, Congress has the incentive to construct a revised bill that contains presidential 
concessions. Therefore, president’s have the ability to extract policy concessions from 
Congress and are willing to veto some bills even when they prefer them to the status quo.  
 Krehbiel (1998) constructs an interinstiuttional bargaining game that arrays the 
president, House membership, and Senate membership along a unidimensional space. This 
model incorporates both the presidential veto point, but also the median member of Congress 
and the Senate filibuster pivot. The median member of Congress is assumed to choose 
between constructing a new policy or the status quo. The filibuster pivot then decides to 
sustain a block of the bill or block the filibuster attempt. Finally, the president decides to veto 
the bill or not. If the president vetoes, then the override pivot has the opportunity to override 
the veto if they have the votes. This model suggests that moderate policies will result in 
gridlock because they fall within the gridlock region. During transitions to new 
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administrations or Congresses, the various pivot players change and therefore we should 
expect less moderate policy changes. However, after the initial transition to the new 
ideological alignment, the model predicts that gridlock will largely prevail.  
 
A SPATIAL MODEL OF BARGAINING IN THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS 
 Kiewiet and McCubbins (1985, 1988, 1991) construct a model of inter-institutional 
bargaining applied to the appropriations process. They model the game as a bilateral 
negotiation between the president and a unicameral legislature. Actor motivations are based 
on electoral constituency preferences. Both actors are also assumed to act strategically based 
on the perceived actions of the other actor.  The president makes the initial proposal, the 
Congress modifies the proposal, and then the president decides to veto or sign the proposed 
appropriations bill. If the president chooses to veto the bill, the second and third steps of the 
bargaining game are repeated. Kiewiet and McCubbins (1985, 1988) assume an 
accommodative strategy in order to minimize political risks related to legislative impasse.  
 Kiewiet and McCubbins (1988) further argue that presidential influence on 
Congressional appropriations is asymmetric. Presidential veto authority is limited by 
constitutional restrictions. In other words, the presidential does not have the authority to alter 
Congressional appropriations bills, simply to veto or sign them. Therefore, the president is 
restricted by the reversion point or status quo.  If the president prefers the status quo to the 
appropriations bill, he has incentive to veto.  If appropriations are closer to the president’s 
ideal point than the status quo, then he has little incentive to veto. The model considers the 
preferences of three legislative members, the median voter, the one-third legislative member, 
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and the two-thirds legislative member. The one-third and two-third legislative members 
represent the veto override points.  
The model predicts that the president vetoes appropriations only when he prefers 
lower spending than Congress. If the president prefers higher spending, then vetoing the 
appropriations bill does the president no good because the reversion or status quo point is the 
previous spending level. When the president prefers lower levels of spending then a veto or 
the threat of a veto will induce the Congress to incorporate the president’s preferences.  
 Game theoretic models provide specific and testable propositions for the 
appropriations process. Several key assumptions are worth reiterating. First, the models are 
based on the notion of a proposer offering a take it or leave it offer, in this case the Congress, 
to the president. It is this proposal power that is theorized to provide the Congress with 
asymmetric budget power. Second, the reversion point is critical to understanding the game 
sequence. In legislative game theoretic models, the reversion point is either the status quo or 
no legislative enactment. In either situation, the proposer has tremendous leverage because 
they can offer a take it or leave it offer that other institutional actors must accept or reject. In 
the appropriations process, the previous year’s budget is not necessarily the reversion point. 
Continuing resolutions are generally based on the previous year’s budget, however, each 
year’s appropriations process is unique. The central point is that all institutional actors in the 
appropriations process are more or less on equal footing. This is based on the notion that the 
threat of a budgetary allocation of zero is not credible since such an outcome would leave all 
players worse off in terms of public perception and electoral goals. Therefore, the advantage 
provided to the proposer in game theoretic models of legislative bargaining, do not provide 
the same asymmetric power in the appropriations process. Third, both the legislative and 
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appropriations games assume a bilateral negotiation between the president and a unitary 
legislature. Bargaining games with three veto players change the game dynamic. In a three 
player system, compromise from each player is necessary to achieve viable outcomes. The 
critical takeaway is that the constraints placed on the appropriations process increase the 
need to compromise for each player in the game making accommodation a necessary strategy 
in most instances.  
The presence of a three veto player in the separation of powers system should induce 
greater budget stability and increasing incremental appropriations changes (Heller 2007; Alt 
and Lowry 1994, 2000; Bottom et. al. 2000; Bradbury and Crain 2001; Hammond and Miller 
1987; Riker 1992). Each veto player also influences the bargaining process because they add 
an additional ideal point to the process. Since any veto player has the ability to choose the 
status quo to the budgetary changes rather than the preferences of the other institutions, I 
expect the status quo to have a powerful impact on budgetary politics. Even weak institutions 
possess some political leverage to maintain the status quo and therefore it represents the 
default position in inter-institutional bargaining.  In other words, institutional actors must 
choose between the proposed level of spending for any individual budget category and the 
previous year’s allocation.   
Formal theoretical models provide valuable insights into the dynamics of multiple 
veto players in a policymaking system of shared powers (Hinch and Munger 1997). Formal 
modeling insights suggest two theoretical shortcomings of the existing empirical literature. 
First, budget studies fail to account for the multi-organizational nature of the policymaking 
process. This compartmentalization results in the failure to capture the sequential process of 
this complex political process. The vast majority of national and state appropriations studies 
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treat the legislature as a unitary actor.  Recent empirical research, however, suggests that 
inter-branch conflict may better explain legislative productivity than intra-branch conflict 
(Binder 1996, 1999). Treating the legislature as a unitary actor fails to account for the 
complex, sequential bargaining game that occurs in inter-institutional appropriations 
negotiations. Legislative chambers generally construct separate budgets, possess asymmetric 
institutional powers, and are motivated by different political goals and policy preferences 
(Heller 2007).  Not surprisingly, studies modeling the legislature as a unitary actor provide 
mixed findings (Dye 1984). Formal modeling studies (Heller 2007; Tsebellis 1995; Baron 
and Ferejohn 1989) suggest that bicameral legislatures alter the policymaking framework by 
advantaging the status quo through the division of power across chambers.  Any veto player 
who prefers the status quo to a proposed budget has the ability to thwart budget deviations in 
legislative negotiations.   
Second, studies generally restrict their focus to the size of the budget or the deficit 
rather than consider the disaggregated budget composition appropriations process (Kamlet 
and Mowery 1987, 1993; Hicks 1984; Lowery and Berry 1983; Pack 1987). This research 
design fails to capture the complex interaction of spending patterns within federal and state 
budgets and the budgetary tradeoffs necessary to achieve compromise in an inter-institutional 
bargaining process. The few studies that have analyzed sequential, disaggregated budget 
process assumed fiscal and economic concerns trump political processes and policy 
objectives (Kamlet and Mowery 1987, 1993; Auten, Bozeman, and Cline 1984; Domke, 
Eichenberg, and Kelleher 1983; Fischer and Crecine 1981; and Russett 1972).   
Third, the reversion point in legislative negotiations is generally considered to be no 
legislation.  This provides a tremendous strategic advantage to the proposer, Congress, over 
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the receiver, the president. However, in appropriations negotiations the reversion point is 
generally considered to be the previous year’s appropriations level. This changes the 
dynamic in the bargaining game. In legislative matters, there is generally little consequence 
for failing to compromise on a particular issue. For instance, if the Congress and president 
fail to compromise on amnesty for potential illegal immigrants, then some or all actors are 
politically advantaged by inaction. In the appropriations process, no actions, otherwise 
known as the nuclear option, is not a politically viable option. In other words, all players are 
worse off by a failure to compromise. This provides each veto player with significant 
influence in appropriations negotiations. The Congress is more likely to account for 
presidential preferences since the president could potentially veto both Congressional 
appropriations that are greater than his ideal point as well as appropriations that are lower 
than the reversion level. The combination of the restrictions imposed by three veto players 
and a reversion point of the previous year’s appropriations levels significantly alters the 
strategic bargaining game and provides incentives for institutional actors to take into account 
the preferences of other veto-wielding actors.  
The formal theoretical literature suggests that institutional structures and actor 
preferences drive the inter-institutional bargaining process. Policymakers, however, require a 
mechanism for bridging the structural gaps that exist within and between institutions.  
Political parties have long been considered the primary mechanism for overcoming the 
fragmented American political system.  
 
THE CENTRALITY OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 
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Political parties help overcome institutional fragmentation and join representatives 
within and across disparate branches to advocate for common policy positions (Wiggins, 
Hamm, and Bell 1992; Barrilleaux 1986, 2000). Parties are institutions created and 
maintained by politicians to assist them achieve their electoral and policy goals (Aldrich 
1995; Coleman 1999). They represent coalitions of diverse partners attempting to appeal to a 
majority of constituents in any given political geography. In this way, they are endogenous 
institutions created by office seekers and designed to suit their needs (Schlesinger 1985). The 
party label reduces voter information costs by providing a cue about the proximity of the 
candidate’s ideology and policy stances to citizens. The electoral value of the party label 
should provide sufficient incentive for unified legislative chambers and branches to seek to 
avoid policy conflict (Cox and McCubbins 1993). Political parties also represent the 
mechanism by which policymakers can be held collectively accountable for policy decisions 
by voters.  
Parties serve both an electoral function and assist officials to organize power within 
the government and promote broad public policy goals. Once in office, political parties are 
institutions designed to promote the achievement of collective choices (Aldrich 1995). 
Competing parties within the organization of the legislature creates default issue cleavages 
along partisan lines (Wright and Schaffner 2002). These cleavages result in a strong tendency 
to view policy in ideological terms based on the prior policy positions of the disparate 
parties; party majorities, therefore, form positions along uni-dimensional, conservative to 
liberal, policy spaces (Wright and Schaffner 2002).  The polarization along a single 
dimension and the bundling of policy issues associating them with a particular ideological 
position provides a political connection between the party label and the specific policy 
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positions. This polarization along a single policy dimension also has representation 
implications as constituents can more clearly evaluate if representatives have chosen a policy 
position in-line with their preferences (Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz 2006).  
Partisan theories of national legislative institutions posit that political party leaders 
possess rewards and sanctions necessary to achieve party unity. Legislative cartel theory 
(Cox and McCubbins 1993; Bowling and Ferguson 2001) argues that parties use rewards and 
sanctions to keep members in line with the party platform. According to this partisan model, 
party reputation is a collective good and party leaders are responsible for protecting the 
electoral value of the label. One method of achieving this goal is to appoint committee 
members that represent the larger party caucus. If both party committees are representative of 
the party caucus, then the committee should be representative of the larger institution. 
Therefore, party leaders are able to maintain policy cohesiveness within the complicated 
legislative committee system. 
Political parties also unite government and constituents as they work to aggregate 
diverse interests. In this way, political parties are a mechanism by which policymakers can be 
held accountable for collective actions (Aldrich 1995; Brady and Sinclair 1984).  Voters 
generally make electoral decisions with limited information (V.O. Key 1949).  The party 
label allows voters to reduce information costs while identifying a particular group of 
representatives with a particular ideological position and policymaking decisions. In this 
way, voters can hold a group of elected officials, joined together under the party label, 
collectively responsible for policymaking decisions. This collective responsibility binds 
elected representatives together across political institutions.  
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Evidence from the state politics literature supports the centrality of political parties in 
determining policy outcomes (Aldrich and Battistia 2002; Wright and Schaffner 2002). 
Wright and Schaffner use a quasi-experimental design to study the influence of party by 
comparing the Kansas Senate and the non-partisan Nebraska unicameral legislature. They 
find that political parties structure policymaking by creating a low-dimensional ideological 
space as a by-product of legislators’ efforts to bundle issues under the party label to achieve 
electoral gains. Aldrich and Battistia (2002) study the effect of political parties on 
policymaking in state legislatures. They find that competitive party systems result in highly 
polarized legislative parties that lead to committees that are representative of the parent 
chamber. These state-level studies use the variation found in state legislative settings to test, 
confirm, and expand our understanding of Congressional theories of political parties. The 
national and state evidence convincingly demonstrates that political parties structure the 
policymaking process in American government.  
 
THE INFLUENCE OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS 
The following section outlines the existing state and national appropriations literature 
and its theoretical and empirical contributions and shortcomings. State budgeting research 
focuses on the primary actors in the appropriations process and largely concludes that the 
legislature plays a secondary role to the governor (Anton 1967; Sharkansky 1968; Thompson 
1986). Most of the early appropriations literature failed to model political parties as central to 
the appropriations process (Anton 1967; Sharkansky 1968; Thompson 1986).  Those studies 
that focus on partisan factors found that when the executive and legislature were controlled 
by different parties, the legislature was less likely to follow the lead of the governor; 
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however, even these studies treat partisanship as a secondary factor to the structural 
appropriations process (Fenno 1966; Moncrief and Thompson 1980, 1992; Sharkansky 1968; 
Thompson 1987). These studies generally employ final budget data to measure legislative 
appropriations preferences.  Given the difficulty in obtaining appropriations requests at each 
stage in the budget cycle, this is not surprising.  This research strategy does pose significant 
limitations. Employing final budget data ignores the complex bargaining and tradeoffs that 
define the appropriations process. Failure to account for this step-wise appropriations process 
distorts the strategic actions and incentives of actors in the bargaining process. This static 
research design is incapable of isolating the partisan, institutional, and economic factors at 
each stage in the budget process.  
The state budgeting literature that does include a consideration of parties has 
produced little evidence connecting political parties and appropriations outcomes. Dye 
(1966) found that political variables had no independent effect on a number of government 
expenditure measures.  A number of scholars attempted and failed to establish a link between 
political parties and redistributive policies in state governments (Fry and Winter 1970; Jones 
1974; Winters 1976).  The early research also indicated that not only do political parties and 
partisan turnover have minimal impacts on welfare policy, but that economic variables are a 
much stronger predictor of state policy outcomes (Plotnick and Winters 1985; Hwang and 
Gray 1990).  Dye (1984) examines the effect of changes in partisan control on changes in 
state welfare expenditures and found that mixed and noncompetitive states show no clear 
pattern between party control and welfare spending.   
Single state studies also play an important role in the state budgeting literature 
(Moncrief, Thompson, and Cassie 1996; Gosling 1985; Caiden and Chapman 1986; Clynch 
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1986, 1991; Lauth 1987; Whicker 1986).  Again these studies focus on relative balance of 
institutional power between the executive and legislative branches.  The case studies, 
alternatively, find a more substantial role for legislatures in the budget process and focus on 
classifying states as executive or legislative dominant states. Budget processes are viewed as 
static based on the particular state government structure.  
While budget research constituted a robust portion of the state politics subfield from 
the 1960s through the 1980s, little research has been completed in this area since 1990 
(Clucas 2003). One of the few exceptions is Alt and Lowry’s studies (1994, 2000). Their 
findings suggest that liberal party strength in legislatures leads to higher levels of budget 
revenues – in other words more liberal policies.  The shortcomings of research include a 
theoretical frame that focuses only on the direct impact of partisanship on appropriation 
levels and data sets that include only final budget data.  
National-level studies have largely characterized the appropriations process as a form 
of institutional rather than partisan process (Lowery, Bookheimer, and Malachhowski 1985). 
This theoretical approach has focused on the structure of the budgetary process with 
partisanship playing at best a secondary role. Incrementalism theory dominates the national-
level budgeting research. The theory holds that the composition of any given budget is 
largely driven by the previous year’s budget and characterized by small, consistent spending 
increases (Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky 1966; Sharkansky 1968; Thompson 1987; 
Lindblom 1963).  Incrementalism is based on the notion that policymakers limit their 
decision-making process to their current interests. Decision-making is limited by time, 
information, and costliness of information.  Policymakers consider only a subset of policy 
alternatives that differ incrementally from the status quo (Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky 
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1966). The assumption that the status quo functions as a baseline of decision-making places 
significant emphasis on past experience.  Empirical tests of the theory indicate that changes 
occur incrementally because of sunk costs and entrenched political interests (Lindblom 1959; 
Wildavsky 1966, Wildavsky 1992).  
While empirical evidence lends support to the incremental approach, the theory fails 
to fully incorporate the complex interplay of competing institutional actors, preferences, and 
strategic behavior. The shortcomings of the incremental literature include the notion that 
budgeting is characterized almost exclusively by incremental changes.  While short-term 
patterns generally indicate few sizeable shifts, the long term pattern of budgeting suggests 
much greater variation in budgeting outcomes (Bozeman 1977). Incremental budgeting 
appears to be an accurate, but incomplete, theory of the appropriations process. In this study, 
I seek to improve and expand upon the incremental literature rather than refute it by 
incorporating the complex bargaining game predicated upon and driven by the partisanship 
of institutions in the separation of powers system.  
 Earlier national-level studies went so far as to characterize partisanship as not central 
to understanding budgeting (Lowery, Bookheimer, and Malachowski 1985; Wanat 1978; Fry 
and Winters 1970; Winters 1976; Jones 1974, 1997; Marquette and Hinckley 1981). Stability 
in the appropriations process is cited as evidence of the central role of structural norms and 
institutional roles (Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky 1966).  Fenno’s seminal work, Power of 
the Purse, also highlighted the centrality of the institutional roles in the budget process with 
partisan politics playing a more secondary role and several follow up studies continued this 
basic interpretation (Garand 1984; Pjerrou-Desrouches 1981).  
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More recent studies have shifted to more of a theoretical focus on the role of 
partisanship in the appropriations process (Lowery, Bookheimer, Malachowski 1985; 
McCubbins and Kiewiet 1985, 1988, 1990; Cox , Hager, and Lowery 1993).  While a 
significant advance in our understanding of partisanship in the budget process, the theoretical 
and empirical limitations of these studies continue to limit our understanding of the 
connection between partisanship and appropriations outcomes.  
More recent studies have also focused on the game theoretic nature of inter-
institutional bargaining in the appropriations process (Cameron 2000, Romer and Rosenthal 
1978, Kiewiet and McCubbins 1985, 1988, 1991, Krehbiel 1991, 1999).  These studies 
findings indicate that Congress possesses asymmetric power in bargaining with the president 
due to the constitutional limitations of veto authority. Presidents can veto to reduce spending 
proposals, but do not have the power to induce Congress to increase spending proposals. The 
reversion point is the key assumption driving this conclusion. Since president’s who veto 
legislation risk a reversion point of no budgetary allocation, veto threats to increase spending 
are not legitimate because the president would be worse off if the veto was upheld. These 
national studies do support the concept that political parties bridge the gap between 
institutional actors and that said actors pursue a strategy of accommodation (Kiewiet and 
McCubbins 1988).  
Previous research at the national and state-levels focuses only on pieces of the 
policymaking process. Theoretically, studies tend to exclude the executive from the analysis 
(Erickson, Wright, and McIver 1993; Strom and Rundquist 1977; Gross 1980).  In studies 
that model both the executive and the legislature, the simple fact of bicameralism is 
neglected (Sharkansky 1968; Thompson 1987; Dye 1984; Barrilleaux and Berkman 2003; 
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Kiewiet and McCubbins 1985, 1988, 1990; Cox Hager, and Lowery 1993; Brown 1995; 
Clarke 1998).  This research design ignores the presence of a third veto player, with separate 
institutional characteristics, preferences, and incentives, in the bargaining process. Other 
studies focus on aggregate rather than disaggregated budget changes (Alt and Lowery 1994, 
2000; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1985, 1988, 1991; Poterba 1994; Krause 2000). These studies 
measure legislative preferences with final budget data (Alt and Lowery 1994, 2000; 
Sharkansky 1968; Thompson 1987).  Failure to examine disaggregated budget changes 
precludes examining the complex nature of the sequential budget cycle. The budget process 
in American government constitutes a complex, sequential and cyclical process. The research 
literature indicates a role for partisanship to bridge the gap between the separation of powers 
system. However, there are numerous limitation placed on the role of partisanship in inter-
institutional bargaining. I seek to develop a theory of the appropriations process that accounts 
for the complex nature of the budget process and tests that theory with sequential and 
cyclical budgetary data.  
 
THEORY OF PARTISANSHIP AND THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS 
My theory of the appropriations process posits that partisanship is central to 
understanding inter-institutional bargaining in the appropriations process. Partisanship serves 
as a proxy for actor’s budgetary preferences.   The incentives for compromise between 
disparate institutional actors in a bargaining game are based on both electoral goals and 
bargaining constraints.  
Policymaking actors, namely the Executive Branch, House, and Senate seek to 
maximize their reelection chances and influence over public policy (Kiewiet and McCubbins 
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1985; Fenno 1966).  In order to achieve these goals, policymakers must deliver goods to their 
constituents and receive recognition for those efforts through credit claiming.  Credit 
claiming is not possible unless a budget is passed. Failure to compromise may result in the 
actors worst case scenario, budget impasse. The actors also fear public retribution for 
legislative gridlock beyond the failure to credit claim. During the 1995-1996 budget 
showdown between President Clinton and the Republican Congress, several Congressional 
members cited that gridlock has negative electoral consequences for all institutional actors. 
Louisiana Senator John B. Breaux eloquently stated this simple concept during a November 
7, 1995 interview. “At some point there’s no more winners, there’s only losers, and I think 
we’re pretty close to that point.” The senator was referring to the negative political 
consequences that are related to gridlock in budget negotiations.  
The appropriations process is different from the legislative process. Most importantly, 
the reversion points are different. In the legislative process, the Congress proposes a law and 
the reversion point for negotiations is either the status quo policy or no policy enactment. 
This provides significant influence to the proposer who can provide other institutional actors 
with a take it or leave it offer.  Conversely, in the appropriations process, a reversion point of 
no appropriations is not a credible threat. When the president and Congress fail to reach 
agreement on an appropriations bill by the end of the fiscal year, they generally pass a 
continuing resolution that continues agency funding at either the previous year’s funding 
levels or the lower of the House and Senate appropriations bills. This reduces the power of 
the proposer significantly since they are unable to credibly threaten other veto actors. The 
budget process is therefore constrained not so much by the proposer, but rather by the time 
constraints placed on appropriations negotiations. The need to pass annual appropriations 
42 
 
places a significant constraint on inter-institutional bargaining. If institutional actors fail to 
achieve compromise within the annual time constraints there are negative electoral 
consequences.  
While continuing resolutions, temporary measures that general fund government 
agencies at their previous funding level, are routinely passed, this does not decrease the 
pressure on institutional actors to compromise to pass appropriations bills. Continuing 
resolutions are generally a one to three month extension on appropriations negotiations. 
However, unlike legislative enactments, federal law requires that a budget is passed each 
fiscal year. Despite the ability of actors to extent the time frame for negotiations, this does 
not change the fundamental time constraint placed on appropriations negotiations. The time 
constraints placed on budget negotiations combined with the political costs of not 
compromising dramatically increase the need for institutional actors to accommodate in the 
appropriations process.  
The time constraints placed on appropriations negotiations provides institutional 
actors with electoral incentives to compromise.  Given legislator’s incentive structure, we 
would expect cross chamber bargaining and compromise in an effort to work with potential 
veto players necessary to deliver appropriations outputs (Heller 2007). The existence of a 
third player in the bargaining process also induces stability in appropriations negotiations and 
increases the need for institutional accommodation. In a unicameral legislature, the 
legislature possesses asymmetric power to the executive based on proposal power. However, 
in a bicameral legislature, assuming the two chambers possess different appropriations levels, 
the playing field is leveled. The executive can exploit the fact that the House and Senate 
prefer different levels of spending to achieve an outcome closer to his ideal point. For 
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instance, assume that the House prefers spending $10 billion, the Senate $13 billion and the 
president $15 billion for a particular spending bill. The president can choose an 
appropriations level at $13 billion because both the president and Senate possess veto 
authority over appropriations bills.  
I suggest that the constraints placed on appropriations negotiations due to time 
limitations, three institutional actors, electoral incentives, and a reversion point of the 
previous year’s appropriations level rather than no appropriations provides significant 
incentives for all institutional actors to choose a strategy of accommodation.  In order to 
consider the potential strategies of institutional actors I examine each of the potential 
strategies and provide specific examples of bargaining games in the appropriations process.  
There are three possible strategies institutional actors can employ in a bargaining 
situation. First, institutional actors can propose a sincere appropriations bill. By sincere, I 
mean appropriations requests are based solely on that institution’s preferences without 
concern for external preferences. For example, the Reagan 1982 Defense Budget is 
commonly cited as an example of a sincere budgetary strategy.  In this budget, President 
Regan proposed dramatic increases in defense spending including a laundry list of new 
defense projects.  The defense bill was so out of line with the preferences of the 
Democratically controlled House that the budget was rejected out of hand and the House of 
Representative constructed a bill that emphasized their policy preferences. In other words, 
failure to account for the preferences of other veto-wielding actors resulted in negative 
budgetary consequences for President Regan.  He would have maximized his budgetary goals 
by initially presenting a budget that accommodated for the preferences of the Democratic 
House.  
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Second, institutional actors can choose a reactive strategy (Wildavsky 1992). By 
reactive, I mean that an institutional actor requests a higher appropriation than they actually 
prefer with the understanding that other veto-wielding actors prefer an appropriations lower 
than their ideal point. By choosing a reactive strategy, the institutional actor intends to 
bargain with veto-wielding actors to achieve an outcome that balances the other institutional 
preferences and their exaggerated appropriations request in hopes of achieving an outcome 
near their actual ideal point. In other words, the institutional actor provides an insincere 
request with the hope of tricking other actors to adopt the proposer’s ideal point. For 
example, the 1996 showdown between President Clinton and the Republican House of 
Representatives was the result of the House of Representatives proposing dramatic cuts for 
Medicare and Medicaid that many experts viewed as the first step in the dismantling of those 
programs. Republican leaders assumed that President Clinton would compromise between 
these positions and make deep cuts to the Medicare program and other programs. However, 
the Congressional proposals’ were so out of line with President Clinton’s ideal point that the 
two sides could not reach compromise (Drew 1996). The ensuing government shutdown 
resulted in both negative electoral and budgetary consequences for the Republican House. 
First, electorally the Republicans were blamed for the government shutdown, which lowered 
their approval ratings while raising those of President Clinton and eventually led to his 
reelection in November 1996. The House Republicans also eventually had to give in to 
President Clinton’s healthcare spending requests to minimize the electoral damage of the 
episode.  
Third, an institutional actor can choose an accommodating strategy. An 
accommodating strategy implies that actors make an initial move towards the preferences of 
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other veto-wielding actors. In other words, they provide concessions initially to maximize 
chances of achieving compromise. This strategy provides budgetary concessions to other 
actors; however, the simple fact that all three actors possess veto authority requires 
concessions by each actor.  More importantly, the accommodating strategy maximizes 
electoral incentives by improving the ability to credit claim.  
This study assumes an accommodating strategy in the appropriations process 
(Kiewiet and McCubbins 1985).  There are several reasons for this basic assumption. First, 
failure to compromise has political costs for all sides.  A reactive strategy increases the 
distance between institutional requests, which in turn increases the likelihood of legislative 
gridlock.  The consequences necessitate reducing one of representatives most valuable 
resources – time – that could be devoted to other critical matters. Failure to compromise also 
results in delay in passing appropriations bills, which can have negative electoral impacts due 
to the inability to deliver constituent goods. Failure to compromise has negative electoral 
outcomes for the institutional actors. Fourth, institutions that request appropriations far out of 
line with other institutional actors risk having their policy preferences ignored. Institutional 
actors that fail to account for the preferences of other actors risk a backlash that run 
completely counter to their policy preferences (Davis et al. 1974; Ferejohn 1974).  Again, the 
1982 Reagan defense budget is a primary illustration of this potential outcome.  
Finally, the image of the policymaking branches of government unable to 
compromise on something seemingly as basic as annual government appropriations has the 
potential to have negative electoral ramifications for all parties. The image of government as 
ineffective and uncompromising can have negative repercussions in the next election cycle.  
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I theorize that the most successful strategy for institutional actors is to move in the 
direction of other veto-wielding actors.  This accommodative strategy minimizes the actor’s 
worst-case scenario, failure to compromise, that results in negative electoral and budgetary 
consequences. By proposing appropriations bills that compromise initially, even with 
institutions controlled by differing political parties, institutional actors maximize their 
opportunities to avoid political stalemate and the electoral consequences.  
This study argues that partisanship is the cue that institutional actors use to determine 
their bargaining strategy. Combining theories of the appropriations process together with 
partisan institutional theories leads to the study’s central expectation. If policymakers have 
incentives to choose an accommodating bargaining strategy and partisanship structures the 
relationship between actors both within and across institutions, then appropriations requests 
should witness both a direct and indirect impact of partisanship at each stage in the budget 
process.  In other words, partisanship should structure the interactions between strategic 
actors at each step in the appropriations process.  
Several specific model hypotheses are generated from this theoretical framework. The 
first hypothesis is the direct hypothesis, meaning that there is a direct effect of partisan 
control that leads to differences in appropriations requests. Specifically, the hypothesis posits 
that Democratic institutions request higher levels of spending than Republican institutions, 
all other things being equal. The second hypothesis is the indirect hypothesis, meaning there 
is an indirect impact of partisan control that leads to strategic appropriations requests based 
on the partisan control of other veto wielding institutions. Specifically, the hypothesis posits 
that institutions adjust their appropriations requests towards the preferences of other 
institutional actors in the bargaining process.  This second hypothesis is the central argument 
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of this study that in an effort to maximize budgetary and electoral gains, institutional actors 
will take into account the preferences of other veto wielding institutions in determining their 
level of budget requests.  This also represents the partisan effect that most previous studies 
have failed to examine.  
Analyzing patterns of appropriations requests at each stage in the budget process and 
across various configurations of government will provide an empirical test of this theory. To 
the extent that institutional actors pursue a strategy of accommodation in the bargaining 
process, their appropriations requests should adjust as the partisan configuration of 
government changes.  For example, Democratic governors, seeking to accommodate the 
preferences of House leaders, are expected to propose lower appropriations requests under 
Republican control of the House than under Democratic control.  
 
A SPATIAL MODEL OF THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS 
 This study employs the spatial framework to consider bargaining situations between 
various institutional actors. The spatial framework places the president, House, and Senate on 
a uni-dimensional line of higher to lower appropriations preferences. The literature is already 
clear that presidents can improve their position through use of the veto if they prefer lower 
levels of spending than the Congressional chambers. The logic stipulates that the president 
can veto appropriations bills until the House and Senate reduce spending to the point where 
the president prefers the spending bill to the reversion point, the previous year’s spending 
total. Therefore, the two scenarios I discuss deal with situations where the president prefers a 
higher level of spending than the House and Senate.  
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The first scenario assumes that the president prefers higher levels of spending than 
the Senate and the House. The president prefers $20 billion in spending, the Senate $ 18 
Billion, the House $12 billion. The status quo is point is $15 billion. In this scenario, the 
House faces both the need to reconcile appropriations with the Senate and a potential 
presidential veto. What incentive does the president have to veto appropriations? The 
president is made better off by the status quo than the House position because the reversion 
point is the previous year’s budget. The presidential veto is a credible threat because the 
president prefers the reversion point to the House appropriations level. Therefore, the House 
and Senate must account for the president’s spending preferences in this scenario.  
 In the second scenario, the president still prefers $20 billion, the Senate prefers $18 
billion, the House $16 billion and the status quo is still $15 billion. In this scenario, I expect 
the House and Senate to compromise on a bill that is $17 billion. At first glance, it appears 
that the House and Senate have little incentive to account for presidential preferences. 
However, I suggest that the time constraints and electoral incentives placed on the legislative 
actors provide some reason to believe that a veto threat may be credible. First, the fact that 
two veto players prefer a position of $18 billion or higher provides increased pressure on the 
House to compromise. Second, the president can still gain possible concessions through a 
veto if the House and Senate face budget deadlines. If the president threatens or issues a veto, 
then a continuing resolution is passed based on the previous year’s budget or on the $16 
billion preferred by the House. Notwithstanding, the president has placed significant pressure 
on the House and Senate to account for the president’s preferences given that they must pass 
appropriations before they can move onto other critical agenda items. In this scenario, a 
presidential veto could impose a credible threat if the House and Senate value moving on to 
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other agenda items and minimizing the electoral risks imposed by appropriations gridlock 
more than they value the difference between the chamber and presidential veto. The second 
scenario therefore is conditional based on the particular circumstances.  
 The larger point of these scenarios is that in an appropriations negotiation with three 
veto players, time and electoral constraints, a reversion point of the previous year’s budget, 
there are significant incentives to account for all three actor’s preferences. In other words, 
there are significant incentives to accommodate. If the president prefers lower spending then 
the House and Senate or the House and Senate prefer lower spending than the previous year’s 
appropriations, the president clearly has the incentive to threaten a veto. The second scenario 
is conditional on the particular circumstances and the strength of the institutional preferences 
versus the opportunity cost to each actor. In the vast majority of circumstances, I expect all 
three actors to choose an accommodative strategy through the agency of the political party.  
INSTITUTIONAL AND ECONOMIC MODEL CONTROLS  
Scholars have long considered structural roles and economic factors critical to 
understanding the appropriations process in American government. In order to isolate the 
impact of partisanship, it is necessary to control for these various institutional and economic 
factors.  
The executive branch possesses a number of structural characteristics and formal and 
informal institutional powers that must be controlled for in the model (MoreHouse 1993). All 
the governments included in this analysis utilize the classic executive budgeting model which 
provides the executive branch the authority to propose initial appropriations measures. States 
that utilize the executive budgeting model provide the chief executive with significant 
influence in the budget process, a strategic first mover advantage, to which other institutional 
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actors must react (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1997; Mueller 1985; Beyle 1995; Schlesinger 
1971). The chief executive, as the head of the executive branch, also has resource and 
information advantages over other political actors including state budget officers, economic 
forecasters, and tax revenue departments. Veto authority allows the executive to disapprove 
of a budget they deem unacceptable or outside their range of preferred budget outcomes. 
Executive veto authority varies significantly across states.  Chief executives with unrestricted 
line-item veto authority wield a strong bargaining stick in negotiations with the legislature 
(Cameron 2000; Mueller 1985; Beyle 1995; Schlesinger 1971).  Chief executives control a 
number of resources critical to legislators including the ability to call special sessions, 
withhold or redirect federal funding, and provide electoral support and favors for individual 
legislators providing the governor with tremendous leverage (Thompson 1987; Hedge 1983; 
Hedge and Sayre 1983). While formal powers including budget and veto authority clearly 
provide the most direct gubernatorial influence in the legislative process, other less formal 
methods often determine the chief executives relative legislative success including the ability 
to pander for public support, popularity, and agenda setting powers (Canes-Wrone 2001; 
Sigelman and Dometrius 1988; Barrilleaux and Berkman 2003).   
While the executive branch is led by a single actor, the legislature is a complex 
institution encompassing two chambers, two parties, numerous committees, and endless 
competing coalitions and interests (Squire and Hamm 2005). Budget authority, however, 
ultimately rests with the legislative branch. While all 50 state legislatures are constitutionally 
responsible for approving state budgets, the formal budget powers vary from state-to-state 
(Jewell 1982, 1997). Legislatures have unlimited power to change the budget proposed by 
the executive in all states except Maryland, Nebraska, and West Virginia. From the 1960’s to 
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1980’s, state legislatures made significant movements from part-time to professional 
institutions providing legislators with additional resources to formulate policy positions and 
improve incumbency rates (Mooney 1995, 1998; Thompson 1987; King 2000; and Squire 
and Hamm 2005). Legislative term limits represent a process of deinstitutionalization that is 
expected to result in power shifts from the legislature to the governor and other institutional 
actors due to higher rates of legislative turnover and reductions in institutional memory and 
commitment (Meinke and Hasecke 2003; Rosenthal 1996).  Policymakers also face electoral 
constraints in terms of periodic elections. Scholars have suggested that fiscal policy adjusts 
primarily in response to electoral factors, specifically towards the party that has gained seats 
in the last election (Barrilleaux and Berkman 2003; Smith 2007).  
Economic conditions, tax revenues and ultimately government appropriations are 
inextricably connected, to this point there is little disagreement. Scholars are less certain 
about what direction changes in economic indicators should have on appropriations requests. 
Previous studies indicate that recessions and unemployment rate increases lead to higher 
appropriations levels (Fischer and Kamlet 1984; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1985, 1988). 
Evidence suggests, on the other hand, that inflation leads to decreases in appropriations as 
governments combat rising prices with lower public spending levels. I expect increases in the 
unemployment rate to increase presidential appropriations requests and decrease 
gubernatorial requests. The reason for the discrepancy at the various levels of government is 
based on the budget restrictions at the state-level. Balanced budget amendments exist in 49 of 
the 50 states.1 State balanced budget requirements restrict public sector spending during 
economic downturns as state revenues decrease.  Therefore, unlike the federal government 
                                                 
1 Vermont, the lone state that does not have either a constitutional or statutory balanced budget, acts as if it 
does have a balanced budget requirement. In other words, Vermont does not run budget deficits.  
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which increases spending to fill the gap made by lower levels of private investments, the 
state governments need to either reduce public spending, raise taxes, or both. Since tax 
increases are not particularly popular in the current political environment, state revenue 
decreases generally result in budget reductions. Inflation is expected to have similar impacts 
at both the state and national level. Increases in inflation should result in decreased 
appropriations requests.   
 
SUMMARY 
 The theoretical frame for this study can be stated simply. In the separation of powers 
system, policy-making institutions are required to compromise in order to pass annual 
appropriations bills. Inter-institutional bargaining is the mechanism used by the three 
institutional actors, namely the executive, House, and Senate, in the complex game of 
budgetary politics. In the sequential, cyclical, and structural budgetary process, the executive 
proposes changes to the previous year’s budget framed by the partisan configuration of 
government.  Political parties represent the mechanism by which institutional actors coalesce 
around shared policy and electoral goals both within and across institutions. Therefore, 
partisanship structures executive actions in the appropriations process. Executive 
appropriations requests are influenced directly through partisan control of the Executive 
Branch, and indirectly through partisan control of the other veto-wielding institutions. 
Executive budget proposals, therefore, represent strategic documents based on an 
accommodative strategy that offers up front concessions to veto-wielding actors in order to 
maximize the probability of a successful budget compromise.  
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The role of partisanship in the appropriations process is critical because political 
parties represent the mechanism by which voters hold policymakers collectively accountable 
for their budgetary decisions.  If political parties do not help structure the appropriations 
process, then a fundamental tenet of democratic government, policymaker accountability to 
citizens, fails to exist in public budgeting.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND APPROPRIATIONS DECISIONS 
 
In this chapter, I examine the first step in the appropriations process, the Executive 
Branch changes to the previous year’s final budget allocations. While the Executive Branch 
in American government generally represents the first-mover in the appropriations process, 
they operate within a system of multiple veto players. In other words, all three policymaking 
branches possess some veto authority over appropriations legislation.  Inter-institutional 
bargaining represents the mechanism utilized by the multiple veto players to negotiate fiscal 
appropriations.  I argue that political parties are the institutional structure that allows these 
disparate actors to bridge the structural, ideological, and institutional gaps produced by the 
separation of powers system. The Congressional and state politics literatures have identified 
political parties as the institutional structure that binds actors across policymaking 
institutions. The appropriations literature does not view political parties as central to 
understanding the appropriations process.  
  In this study, I seek to identify whether partisanship is central to understanding the 
appropriations requests of executive officers in American government. I theorize that 
presidents and governors are strategic actors meaning they construct appropriations requests 
based both on their own policy preferences, but also on the preferences of other veto-
wielding actors. I further theorize that partisanship structures executive requests both 
directly, through executive partisanship, and indirectly, through the partisanship of the House 
and Senate. The indirect effect of partisanship suggests that executive actors anticipate the 
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preferences of the House and Senate partisan majorities and adjust their requests in order to 
maximize their electoral and policy goals. The analysis is predicated on the assumption that 
executives use a strategy of accommodation meaning they move their requests in the 
direction of veto-wielding actor preferences. I begin the study with an examination of the 
extent to which presidents accommodate the preferences of Congressional partisan majorities 
in the development of their budget proposals. Then I turn my attention to the strategies 
governors employ when proposing their budgets in response to the partisan control of their 
legislatures. 
The study results indicate strong evidence supporting the notion that executives at the 
national and state-level are strategic actors in the development of their appropriations 
requests. Both presidents and governors adjust their appropriations requests based both on 
their partisan affiliation and based on the partisan configuration of the legislature. The 
partisan effect is stronger at the national level with presidents playing a strategic game more 
so than governors. There are several factors that may contribute to this discrepancy. First, 
economic factors drive state budgeting decisions more so than national budgeting because 
states are restricted by balance budget amendments that force them to adjust appropriations 
based on economic conditions (Thompson 1987). The federal government faces no such 
restrictions. Second, party polarization and party unity vary significantly more at the state-
level (Aldrich and Battistia 2002). The variation in party polarization is expected to impact 
and perhaps decrease the role of partisanship in budget negotiations at the state-level. Despite 
the differences in the partisan effect at the national and state-levels, the results provide clear 
evidence that executives are strategic actors and that partisanship both directly and indirectly 
structure their appropriations requests.  
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EXECUTIVE’S ROLE IN THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS 
The Executive Branch represents the book-ends of the appropriations process. The 
executive both set the terms for the appropriations bargaining game through submission of an 
annual budget proposal and concludes the process by signing or vetoing appropriations bills 
(Wildavsky 1964)2. These formal budgeting powers, along with informal powers of the bully 
pulpit and the ability to influence public opinion, provide the Executive Branch with 
considerable influence in the appropriations process in American government. However, 
appropriations authority, at both the national and state-level, ultimately rests with the 
Legislative Branch. The U.S. Constitution and all 50 state constitutions provide authority to 
tax and spend solely to the Legislative Branch. The American separation of powers systems 
necessitate that the Executive and Legislative Branches compromise in determining budget 
outcomes; no branch can pass appropriations unilaterally.  
Most governments in the U.S. follow the executive budgeting model where the 
Executive Branch drafts a proposed budget to submit to the legislature. The U.S. Constitution 
empowers Congress to collect taxes, borrow money, and authorize expenditures while the 
Executive Branch can spend money only for the purposes and the amount specified by 
Congress.  The Constitution, however, does not describe a government appropriations 
system. Rather a system has evolved over time to reflect the growth and complexity of 
government funding (Oleszek 2004). Under the current U.S. appropriations system, the 
Executive Branch maintains significant budgetary authority through agenda setting and veto 
powers.  
                                                 
2 While legislatures generally possess veto override authority, it requires a supermajority in both legislative 
chambers, and therefore is exceedingly difficult to achieve.  
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American state constitutions vary both in the level of budgetary prescriptions and 
formal executive authority provided governors (Brace and Jewett 1995). The basic 
framework of the federal executive budgeting model applies to all states in the data sample; 
however, the formal gubernatorial veto authority varies significantly from line-item veto 
power in Wisconsin to no gubernatorial veto authority for a portion of the North Carolina 
state years (Beyle 1995). This variability provides an opportunity to study the influence of 
institutional authority on appropriations outcomes. Despite this variability, all governors in 
the sample possess significant budget authority. 
There exists a consistent pattern to the appropriations process. Federal agencies 
provide annual appropriations requests to the president; the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) combines these requests with presidential priorities to determine the 
composition of federal budget request. The recommended budget is then delivered to the 
House of Representatives for consideration.  The House Budget and Appropriations 
Committees are under no legal or statutory obligations to consider the president’s 
recommendations. While this concludes the president’s official role until the signing or 
vetoing of the Congressional bill, the informal executive-legislative negotiations continue 
throughout the appropriations process.  State executives play a similar role in constructing 
proposed budgets and delivering it to the State House Committee on Appropriations. The 
lone exception in the data sample is North Carolina, which switches the legislative chamber 
that receives appropriations bills each year. Otherwise, federal and state executives in the 
data sample are nearly identical in the structural appropriations process.   
The president’s next official role comes when he chooses to sign or veto the final 
Congressional appropriations bills. A budget veto results in one of two outcomes.  First, the 
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House and Senate could garner the two-thirds majorities necessary to override a presidential 
veto.  Second, if they lack the votes for an override, they can go back and alter the 
appropriations bill to the point necessary to accumulate the necessary two-thirds vote or until 
the president finds the bill acceptable. While state executives vary widely in their level of 
veto authority, the veto process is similar to the federal process. Both federal and state 
executives posses significant formal and informal authority in the appropriations process, 
however, they do not directly construct appropriations legislation.  Therefore, American 
executives have significant incentives to take into account the preferences of legislative 
majorities who control the outcome of their appropriations requests.  
 
THEORY OF EXECUTIVE PARTISANSHIP AND THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS   
Federal and state executives are not elected kings.  They exist within a system of shared 
powers and as such are required to bargain with House and Senate members in the context of 
the inter-institutional bargaining structure of the appropriations process. Given that the House 
and Senate construct the final versions of the appropriations bills, the chief executive has 
significant incentive to account for their preferences in their appropriations requests.  If the 
executive constructs a budget out of line with legislative preferences, they risk incurring 
negative electoral and policy consequences. First, failure to compromise can result in failure 
to achieve their desired budgetary allocations. While the executive can veto appropriations 
requests, the legislature can override the veto.  Even if the legislature lacks the votes 
necessary to override the veto, the executive risks negative electoral and budgetary 
consequences if they are viewed as obstructing the appropriations process. During his first 
year in office, President Reagan requested a federal defense appropriation so out of line with 
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the preferences of the Democratically controlled Congress that the request was rejected out 
of hand.  The Democratic Congress constructed a budget based on its own policy preferences 
and it is largely held that President Reagan achieved far fewer defense policy goals than he 
would have had he taken the Congress’s preferences into account. This example illustrates 
the danger of executives who fail to account for the preferences of legislative actors.  
Second, the executive has electoral incentives to account for the preferences of legislative 
actors. If the executive proposes a budget that fails to garner any support in the legislature, 
they can appear weak and inconsequential in the legislative process.  Appearing 
inconsequential clearly has negative electoral consequences. National and state executives 
are still fundamentally driven by the electoral connection and the desire for higher public 
approval ratings (Mayhew 1975). As such, executives possess significant incentives to 
propose appropriations that are not substantially different than legislative preferences in 
order to avoid their worst outcomes, legislative gridlock. When the executive and legislature 
fail to pass appropriations, both risk negative electoral ramifications because they appear 
ineffective and they cannot deliver promised public resources to constituents and interest 
groups.  
Given executives incentives to compromise, I expect to see evidence of this strategic 
behavior in executive appropriations requests. I argue that executive strategic behavior is 
critical to understanding the influence of partisanship in this stage of the appropriations 
process.  I submit that the failure of most studies to account for the strategic nature of inter-
institutional bargaining explains mixed evidence supporting the role of partisanship in the 
appropriations process.  
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Political parties represent the mechanism by which institutional actors coalesce 
around shared policy and electoral goals both within and across institutions (Aldrich 1995; 
Aldrich and Rhode 1998; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Cox and McCubbins 2001, Wright and 
Schaffner 2002).3  Parties represent the central mechanism holding politicians accountable to 
their constituents and also serve both an electoral and an organizational function, namely 
coordinating internal government systems and promoting broad public policy goals (Cox and 
McCubbins 1993). If political parties play the dominant organizational role in American 
democratic institutions, as claimed, then we should see evidence in government outputs, 
namely appropriations requests.  
Despite the centrality of political parties in American government, the appropriations 
literature has produced little evidence establishing a partisan influence on executive 
appropriations outcomes. I argue that the deficiency of empirical evidence linking 
partisanship and appropriations outcomes is due to a lack of appropriate budget data to 
examine the sequential appropriations process and a failure to model the inter-institutional 
bargaining process that results in both a direct and indirect effect of partisanship on 
appropriations requests. I solve both of these problems by collecting two original data sets 
and by measuring partisanship across various partisan configurations of government to 
isolate the impact of partisanship.  
This theoretical frame posits that there exists a direct correlation between partisan control 
and appropriations preferences. Democratic executives request higher levels of spending than 
Republican executives.  Traditionally, scholars have measured solely the direct effect of 
partisanship in the appropriations process (Sharkansky 1968; Thompson 1987; Alt and 
                                                 
3 Krehbiel’s (1998) pivotal politics model is an exception to the party centered literature.   
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Lowry 1993). I argue that the inter-institutional bargaining process elicits advantages to 
strategic actors. In other words, executives have incentives to take into account the 
preferences of other veto-wielding actors to improve their electoral and policy goals.  
I argue that executives have three potential bargaining strategies. First, they can construct 
appropriations requests based on their sincere preferences. If the monetary distance between 
the executive’s preferences and those of other institutional actors is substantial, then this is 
not an optimal strategy.  Proposing appropriations that differ significantly from those of other 
veto-wielding actors increases the likelihood of legislative gridlock. Second, executives can 
choose a reactive strategy meaning they exaggerate their policy preferences thereby 
increasing the distance between their request and those of other actors with the strategic goal 
of negotiating an outcome that is closer to their preferred position. This strategy has the 
potential advantage of rewarding executives a budget outcome closer to their ideal point; 
however, this reactive strategy also increases the likelihood of the executive’s worst 
outcome, legislative gridlock, resulting in negative electoral and budget outcomes. Third, 
executives can choose an accommodative strategy that seeks a compromise between the 
executive’s budget preferences and those of other veto-wielding actors. I argue that 
institutional strategic behavior is guided by an accommodative strategy. This strategy 
minimizes the risk of actors’ worst outcomes, namely budget gridlock and legislative 
backlash that can harm their electoral and budgetary goals.  
 This theoretical frame argues that executives are strategic actors within the American 
separation of powers system.  In order to maximize their policy and electoral goals, 
executives choose an accommodative strategy that combines their policy preferences with the 
preferences of other veto-wielding actors in the appropriations process. I further argue that 
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executive partisanship has a direct effect on the extent to which executives play their role of 
requesting an increase in the previous year’s budget. Most importantly, I theorize that 
majority party control of the House and Senate has an indirect effect on executive strategic 
behavior with executives moving appropriations requests in the direction of veto-wielding 
actors. I collected two unique data sets at the national and state-level to test this partisan 
theory and construct a test using change in the partisan configuration of government.  
 
DATA AND METHODS – THE PRESIDENT 
The national data set is composed of presidential appropriations requests for 15 
Congressional budget bills from fiscal year 1948-2006.4  Table 3.1 lists the domestic 
appropriations bills included in the study. Since the analysis is measuring changes from one 
budget cycle to the next, the first year analyzed is fiscal year 1949.  To make appropriations 
comparable over time, budget requests were converted to constant dollars (2004). While 
using the percentage change in budget requests is necessary for statistical accuracy, what I 
am actually interested in measuring is changes in dollars, since that is what policymakers are 
actually considering in their deliberations.   
In order to construct a budget measure that approximates dollars, but also utilizes a 
percentage change to minimize potential statistical problems, I normalize the percent change 
in agency budgets. Specifically, I take the percent change from the previous year’s final 
agency appropriations and multiple the percentage by the percentage of the total budget. For 
instance, if the president requests a 10 percent increase for the Agriculture Appropriations 
Bill and the department represents 10 percent of the total domestic non-defense discretionary 
                                                 
4 The fiscal years 1948 through 1985 come from the data set collected by McCubbins and Kiewiet (1990).  I 
expanded this original data set by coding fiscal years 1986 through 2004.  
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budget, then the total requested increase would be equal to 1 percent. Normalizing, or 
weighting the data, allows the analysis to approximate dollar values. A five percent increase 
in a in the District of Columbia Appropriations Bill, representing a small annual 
appropriations, should not carry the same weight as a five percent increase in the Health and 
Human Services Appropriations Bill, representing a large annual appropriations. By 
constructing a dependent variable in percentage terms that also approximates dollars, I 
achieve two important outcomes. First, the dependent variable is consistent with my 
theoretical framework that suggests policymakers consider appropriations in terms of dollar 
amounts and the tradeoffs those dollar amounts represent within total federal spending. 
Second, the dependent variable reduces the probability of statistical inaccuracies such as 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. 
The research strategy employed looks at the average percent changes in presidential 
agency-level appropriations requests for different partisan government configurations 
(Lowery 1985; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1990). This strategy provides an empirical test of 
both the direct – through the partisanship of the president – and indirect – through the change 
in presidential appropriations across the various partisan configurations of government. If 
presidential requests change significantly across various partisan configurations of the 
presidency or Congress, this would provide clear evidence that executives strategically 
account for the partisan makeup of other institutional actors in constructing their requests. 
There are distinct empirical expectations for a bargaining game where actors act sincerely 
versus strategically.  I define sincere behavior as appropriations requests where institutional 
actors determine the composition and size of the request solely on their personal budgetary 
64 
 
preferences. I define strategic behavior as appropriations requests that simultaneously factor 
in their personal budgetary preferences and those of other veto wielding institutions. 
The data structure and model hypotheses call for three analysis strategies. First, a 
simple t-test for measuring the impact of partisanship on presidential requests is utilized; this 
analysis tests the simple expectation that Democratic presidents request higher levels of 
spending than Republican presidents.  Then a two-way analysis of variance is used to 
measure the expectation that both presidential and Congressional partisan control influences 
presidential appropriations requests. Finally, a pooled time series analysis is utilized to 
isolate the impact of partisanship and test alternative institutional and economic theories.  
 
MODEL HYPOTHESES  
The dependent variable is the average percent change in presidential budget requests 
compared to the previous year’s final disaggregated budget totals (Senate Budget Estimates). 
The rationale for focusing on changes between stages in the budget cycle is threefold. First, 
measuring percent changes in each stage of the budget cycle simulates the game theoretic 
situation presented to policymakers as they determine their bargaining positions.  Second, in 
the short-term, this strategy holds time-invariant factors such as public opinion and 
representative ideology nearly constant. Public opinion and representative ideology change 
little in the course of a single fiscal year budget cycle, therefore, changes in the stages of the 
appropriations process can be attributed to partisan, institutional, and economic factors 
(Erickson et al. 1993). Finally, this strategy controls for both the impact of the partisan 
characteristics of the institution making the appropriations request, but also the impact of the 
partisan composition of other institutional actors in the process.  
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Partisan, structural, and economic variables constitute the three categories of 
independent variables. Presidential partisanship, House of Representatives majority control, 
and Senate majority control, are each coded as dummy variables with 1 signifying 
Democratic control and 0 otherwise. Two additional variables measure the impact of 
Democratic strength, the percentage of House seats controlled by Democrats and the 
percentage of Senate seats controlled by Democrats. These variables are operationalized by 
dividing the total number of Democrats in each chamber by the total number of seats in each 
chamber.  
Partisan expectations include both direct and indirect hypotheses. Given that political 
parties represent a bundle of policy preferences and that Democrats generally prefer 
expanded government programs, and therefore higher levels of domestic spending, 
Democratic control of the presidency should result in higher levels of domestic spending. 
The direct hypothesis posits that Democratic presidents request higher levels of spending 
than Republican presidents.  The limited studies that include partisanship in the analysis of 
the appropriations process generally measure this direct effect. The indirect effect represents 
the study’s central argument. Institutional actors incorporate the preferences of other veto 
wielding institutions in determining appropriations requests.  Given that Democratic 
institutions seek higher levels of domestic spending, the hypothesis posits that Democratic 
control of the Congressional chambers should increase presidential appropriations requests. 
Additionally, this study tests whether executives respond to legislative control or the next 
institutional actor in the appropriations process, namely the House of Representatives. Since 
the national data set lacks a sufficient number of cases of divided control of Congress, this 
question is tested in the state analysis.   
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The two measures of Democratic coalition size in the House and Senate allow me to 
test whether majority status or the size of legislative coalitions have greater influence in the 
legislative process. Specifically, I expect majority status rather than coalition size to 
determine presidential strategic behavior. First, majority status provides legislative majorities 
with procedural advantages that allow them to dominate committee actions (Cox and 
McCubbins 1993). Second, appropriations bills require only legislative majorities, not 
supermajorities, to pass through the chambers (Oleszek 2004).  Therefore, I expect majority 
status to provide the cue for the president in the bargaining process, not majority coalition 
size.  
Structural variables constitute the second set of control variables including 
presidential approval ratings and election years. Presidential approval ratings represent a 
significant informal power.  Presidential approval is measured as the percent of respondents 
indicating they approve of the president’s job performance. The literature suggests that 
higher levels of executive approval ratings should increase their standing and influence with 
Congress (Canes-Wrone 2001). The hypothesis posits that higher presidential approval 
ratings should result in higher appropriations requests. Regardless of partisan affiliation, 
presidents pursue a wide array of policy objectives and therefore, generally request increases 
in appropriations. Higher approval ratings should allow presidents to request higher levels of 
spending. Policymakers also face electoral constraints in terms of periodic elections. Scholars 
have suggested that fiscal policy adjusts primarily in response to electoral factors, 
specifically towards the party that has gained seats in the last election (Barrilleaux and 
Berkman 2003).  Election years are also associated with a rise in total appropriations 
(Kiewiet and McCubbins 1990). During election years, policymakers seek additional 
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resources for constituents to improve their electoral fortunes (Fisher 1975).  The electoral 
incentive should increase the desire for spending in election years.  Election year is measured 
using a dummy variable equaling 1 for election years and 0 otherwise. The resulting 
hypothesis posits that election years are associated with higher levels of spending.  
Economic factors constitute the third set of control variables including inflation, 
unemployment, total federal spending, and deficit size. Unemployment is measured as the 
average percent unemployment rate for the 6 months prior to the budget passing. This 
variable represents one of the central economic indicators driving policymaker decision-
making because unemployment rates have direct impact on constituents’ quality of life. 
Increasing unemployment results require increased government resources both in terms of a 
social safety net and an economic stimulus. Higher levels of unemployment, therefore, are 
hypothesized to result in increased presidential appropriations requests. Inflation represents 
the other main economic indicator identified in the literature (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991). 
I measure inflation using the 6 month average of changes in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
prior to passage of the national budget. Higher rates of inflation are hypothesized to result in 
lower presidential appropriations requests. The other economic indicators constitute 
measures of government spending. Total federal spending measures the total dollar amount 
of federal spending in a given fiscal year. I expect higher levels of federal spending to result 
in lower levels of presidential requests. While the national government can run budget 
deficits, as federal spending and deficit levels rise, policymakers have additional pressure 
from constituents, budget hawks, and the media to reduce government spending.  Therefore, I 
also expect increases in federal budget deficits to decrease presidential appropriations 
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requests. The deficit level is operationalized as the total federal debt as a percentage of 
national GDP.  
 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
Table 3.2 provides the results of the t-test measuring the difference between 
Democratic and Republican presidential average request levels.  The findings support the 
theoretical expectations.  Democratic presidents request an average 8.31 percentage point 
increase from the previous year’s final appropriation, while Republican presidents request 
only a 4.47 percentage point increase, a difference of nearly 4 percentage points per year.  
According to the t-test, the difference between the two averages is statistically significant 
with a t value of 2.0. The results provide the first empirical evidence that partisanship 
directly influences presidential appropriations requests.  
To gain insight into the influence of Congressional partisan control on presidential 
requests, I run a two-way analysis of variance test. Table 3.3 indicates that the first main 
effect, executive partisan control, does not appear to influence presidential appropriation 
requests.  The F value is only 3.25 and is not significant at a p-value of 0.07. At the less strict 
threshold of 0.1, the direct effect is significant. The second main effect, Congressional 
majority party control, does have a significant influence on presidential appropriations with 
an F value of 8.65 and a p-value of .00.  The results suggest that the partisan makeup of 
Congress, rather than presidential partisan control, is driving presidential appropriations 
levels. While this evidence sheds light on the direct and indirect influence of partisanship, it 
does not speak to the issue of cumulative impact of two institutions sharing partisan 
affiliation.  I expect that if two institutions share partisan affiliation, there should be an 
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impact above and beyond the combined impact of the individual partisan effects. The results 
of the interaction effect of presidential partisan control and Congressional majority party 
control is not statistically significant at the .05 level, but it is close. With an F-value of 2.89 
and a p-value of .08 the interaction effect is slightly above the statistical barrier of .05, but 
below the more relaxed standard of .10.  This interaction effect provides some evidence that 
there exists a cumulative effect of partisanship across policymaking institutions.  
The next empirical test utilizes t-tests to denote whether percent total differences 
across subgroups are statistically significant.  As a reminder, I expect presidential 
appropriations request levels to vary across various partisan configurations of government 
signifying an indirect impact of partisanship. This is precisely what I find. Table 3.4 presents 
the results. Under Republican control of Congress, Republican presidents request an 11 
percent average increase in spending, while Democratic presidents request only a 1.2 percent 
average increase. The statistical results are in the predicted direction and statistically 
significant with a t-test measure of 2.33 and a p-value of .02. Under Democratic 
Congressional control, Republican presidents requested 5.6 percent average increase in 
spending, while Democratic presidents requested an 8.3 percent average increase.  This 
difference is also in the expected direction and statistically significant with a t-test value of -2 
and a p-value of .01.  Both Republican and Democratic presidents base their appropriations 
requests on the partisan configuration of Congress. Unfortunately, the sample lacks cases of 
divided Congressional control and Democratic control of the presidency and, therefore, the 
ability to test theories of divided Congressional control. Theories of divided partisan 
Congressional control are examined using the state data set. Despite this shortcoming, the 
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results provide clear evidence of both a direct and indirect effect of partisanship on 
presidential appropriations request levels.  
While the summary statistics provides strong evidence that partisan control of 
Congress influence presidential appropriations requests, the findings could be skewed by 
economic and institutional historical circumstance. To test these possibilities, I pooled the 
data to control for alternative explanations and a series of independent variables.  
The time series is only fifty-eight years long, therefore, the observations available for 
any particular bill are relatively small.  As a result, pooling the data is an appropriate research 
strategy to gain statistical leverage and simplify the analysis by estimating a single 
coefficient (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991). Pooling the data, however, also produces several 
potential statistical problems.  First, there is the potential for correlated errors across 
appropriations bills. The appropriations of any one bill may affect the appropriations 
available for another bill. Heteroscedasticity is another potential problem.  Expressing the 
dependent variable as a percentage significantly reduces the risk of heteroscedasticity and 
correlated errors (Gujarati 2003). Therefore, as previously stated, I use average percent 
increases in presidential appropriations normalized to simulate dollar values while reducing 
statistical errors.  
In panel data, there may be unobserved bill-specific effects that are relatively constant 
over time. It is necessary to control for this time-series dependence in order to obtain 
unbiased standard errors. Panel data provides the advantage of using a larger sample size 
than if I use only one observation per bill; this technique allows greater estimation power so 
that coefficients can be estimated more precisely. Panel data also allows estimation of 
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dynamic models and control for unobservable bill-specific effects that are correlated with the 
observed explanatory variables.  
I run a random effects model which is also known as a generalized least squares 
model. This model controls for unobserved bill effects. The Wald statistic, which tests the 
significance of the independent variables in the model, is 34.95 with a p-value of 0.0001.  
This indicates that I can reject the null hypothesis that the independent variables do not have 
a significant effect on presidential change in the previous year’s appropriations. The random 
effects model assumes that the independent variables for a particular bill (Xit) in a particular 
time period and the individual specific bill effects (ui) are uncorrelated. If they are correlated, 
then a fixed effects model would constitute the more appropriate model to produced unbiased 
coefficients. The fixed effects model uses bill dummy variables to explain all the cross-
sectional variation across the appropriations bills and therefore tests the variation within each 
individual bill over time. If Xit and ui are correlated, then the fixed effects model is more 
appropriate and, if not, then the random effects model is the more appropriate model. To test 
whether Xit and ui are correlated, I use the Hausman test which indicates whether the random 
and fixed effects coefficients are significantly different. The null hypothesis is that Xit and ui 
are uncorrelated. The chi-square statistic is positive and not significant, p-value 0.21; 
therefore, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that Xit and ui are uncorrelated.  The Hausman 
test indicates that the random effects model is the more efficient model for the presidential 
appropriations data.  
Panel data techniques also possess a number of potential statistical problems that are 
necessary to test for. First, the standard error could be biased if the time-series dependence is 
not controlled for. In order to test whether the standard errors are biased, I run robust 
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standard errors. Second, it is necessary to test for serial correlation because it can bias the 
standard errors and cause the results to be less efficient (Drukker 2003). A test for serial 
correlation developed by Wooldridge (2002) can be applied to random effects models. The F-
test .34 does not reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. Third, it is necessary to 
test for heteroscedasticity in the pooled time series model since the random variables could 
have different variances.  To test for heteroscedasticity, I use a Breusch-Pagan test.  The null 
hypothesis is that there is no heteroscedasticity.  The p-value is not significant indicating that 
the null hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity cannot be rejected. The test statistics suggest that 
the random effects model is an efficient estimator of the panel data.   
The regression equation is as follows: 
∆ Average Presidential Appropriations Requests = β0 + β1Previous Year Appropriations 
Request + β2 Democratic Presidential Control + β3 Democratic House Control + β4 
Democratic Senate Control + β5 National Deficit + β6 Total Federal Spending + β7 
Unemployment + β8 Inflation + β9 Conflict + β10 Election Year + εi  
 
The dependent variable is again the average percent change in disaggregated presidential 
budget appropriations requests from the previous year’s budget. The independent variables 
include the same partisan, economic, and electoral controls operationalized in the previous 
section. As stated earlier, Democratic presidential partisanship is expected to increase 
appropriations requests and Democratic House and Senate majority control are expected to 
increase appropriations requests. Given these theoretical expectations, all three partisan 
variables should be positive and significant.   
The findings in Table 3.5 largely match the theoretical expectations and summary 
results.  The Democratic presidential partisanship coefficient is 2.9289 with a highly 
significant p-value, .00. The result indicates that Democratic presidents’ requests are nearly 3 
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percentage points higher on average than are Republican presidents’ requests.  Partisanship 
does appear to have a direct effect, through the agency of the president’s partisanship, on the 
size of appropriations requests.  
The Congressional partisan variables are also positive and significant indicating that 
the Congress’s partisan affiliation also has a considerable impact on presidential 
appropriations requests.  The Democratic House majority party coefficient is 9.5535 with a 
highly significant p-value, .00. This result indicates that presidents increase their 
appropriations requests by 9.5 percentage points under Democratic control of the House of 
Representatives compared to Republican control. The Democratic Senate majority party 
coefficient is 7.063 and is also highly significant with a p-value of 0.00. The result is also 
consistent with the theoretical expectation and summary findings that suggest an indirect 
effect of Congressional partisanship on the strategic actions of presidents. In other words, 
this evidence provides empirical support for the notion that presidents are strategic actors 
who base their appropriations requests on the partisan composition of the Congressional 
chambers.  
There remains one unanswered question in relation to the effect of partisanship on 
presidential requests, whether partisan control or the number of seats controlled by each of 
the Congressional chambers is the deterministic factor influencing presidential strategic 
actions.  As previously mentioned, the theoretical expectation is that majority status provides 
procedural advantages that allow members to dominate the legislative agenda (Cox and 
McCubbins 1993).  I expect the coefficients for the Democratic coalition size variables to be 
positive, but insignificant. This is precisely what I find.  Table 3.6 substitutes House of 
Representatives and Senate coalition size for majority status change. While both the House 
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and Senate variables are in the expected direction, neither is statistically significant. The 
partisan majority variables in the previous analysis were positive and significant, but the 
coalition size variables are not. These findings confirm my initial expectations, that the 
procedural advantages afforded the majority party, and not simply the size of legislative 
majorities, structures inter-institutional bargaining.  
While the results provide strong evidence for the role that partisanship plays in the 
appropriations process, the relationship could be the result of historical circumstance rather 
than the strategic interaction of institutional actors. Therefore, a series of controls are 
included to ensure that economic and structural factors are not driving the results.  
 The economic results do not match my theoretical expectations. Table 3.5 includes 
economic, electoral, and budgetary controls. The unemployment rate coefficient is positive as 
predicted, given that higher rates of unemployment are expected to result in increases in 
appropriations levels, however, the variable is not statistically significant. Similarly, the 
inflation rate is negative, given that higher inflation rates are expected to lower 
appropriations levels, as predicted and statistically significant. Federal deficit size is in the 
predicted direction, positive, but also does not statistically significant. Finally, total federal 
spending is statistically significant, but the coefficient is approximately zero. Failure to find 
statistically significant results from the economic variables would, at first glance, appear to 
be contradictory to the scholarly literature; however, the majority of previous studies 
measure the impact of economics on total budget size, not budget composition. The federal 
government also has the authority, which it has exercised liberally in recent years, to run 
budget deficits.  The federal government’s ability to run budget deficits during economic 
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downturns may obfuscate the relationship between economic conditions and appropriations 
requests at the agency level.  
 
NATIONAL BUDGET REFORMS 
 During the course of the time series analyzed in this study (1948-2006), the national 
government’s appropriation process has undergone numerous changes. The 1974 
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act (CBICA) represents the most 
significant change. The law was designed to provide both increased oversight of the 
appropriations process through the creation of House and Senate Budget Committees, but 
also shift appropriations authority from the Executive to the Legislative Branch (Oleszek 
2004). The CBICA was also intended to constrain federal spending through the creation of a 
concurrent budget resolution that placed a fiscal cap on Congressional appropriations. I split 
the time series into two data sets to examine the impact of the CBICA examining the 
influence of partisan, electoral, and economic factors before and after the acts 
implementation. The first data set includes data from 1948-1974 and the second data set 
includes data from 1975-2006. I expect the law to change the influence the partisan and 
economic factors in the budget process. Politically, the law should shift appropriations power 
towards the Congress resulting in an increase in the influence of Congressional partisan 
control and a decrease in the influence of presidential partisan control on appropriations 
requests. Economically, I expect deficit size to play a more prominently role in influencing 
presidential appropriations decisions following the acts passage.   
 Table 3.7 reports the analysis results. The direct and indirect partisan effects hold 
before and after the passage of the CBICA. Both presidential partisan control and House 
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majority status control are positive and statistically significant before and after passage of the 
CBICA; however, the coefficient size for both the president and the House of 
Representatives are significantly lower. Prior to 1974, the coefficient size of a Democratic 
president and Democratic House are 10.2924 and 10.8704 respectively. After 1974, the 
coefficient sizes are 4.8299 and 4.9433 respectively. This reduction in coefficient size 
indicates that the law was effective in reducing, but not eliminating, the influence of partisan 
changes on budget shifts. The mechanism for this change most likely was the fiscal cap 
placed on the budgetary process constrained the ability of both the Executive and Legislative 
Branches to drastically alter budget size. Since perfect information is assumed in the 
analysis, the president is affected by the fiscal constraints placed on Congress. In other 
words, the president anticipates the fiscal constraints placed on Congress and adjusts his 
budget priorities accordingly.  
The other noteworthy finding of the comparison analysis is the influence of economic 
factors. Prior to 1974, unemployment rate has a negative influence on presidential 
appropriations requests. Post 1974, deficit size is the central economic factor influencing 
presidential appropriations. This finding is consistent with the theoretical and practical 
expectations of the CBICA. The law was intended to curb growing deficit spending and the 
analysis indicates that it was successful. 
 
SUMMARY 
The analysis of national data indicates that presidential appropriations requests are 
based on strategic considerations, namely presidential partisan control and partisan control of 
the House and Senate. Just as important, the evidence suggests strategic considerations are 
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critical to understanding inter-institutional bargaining in the appropriations process. While 
the national data provides convincing empirical support for the theoretical claims, there exist 
two significant limitations of the national data. First, the limited number of shifts in majority 
control of the Congressional chambers, particularly the House of Representatives, makes it 
difficult to generalize the findings. Second, the federal government represents a sample size 
of one. In other words, the national data lacks the institutional and economic variation 
necessary to generalize the impact of partisanship on the appropriations process. To 
overcome these shortcomings, I turn to the state legislatures.  
 
THE AMERICAN STATE GOVERNORS 
 The American states provide the ideal setting to empirically test theoretical models of 
the appropriations process. The strength of the state politics subfield is the opportunity to 
explore the effects of various institutional rules and partisan structures on political outcomes 
(Brace and Jewett 1995).  The Congressional literature has significantly increased our 
theoretical understanding of legislative bodies by considering the incentives induced by 
institutional rules and structures.  The state politics literature has and can continue to expand 
our theoretical and empirical understanding of institutional rules and structures through the 
variance inherent in a 50 state system.  The partisan, institutional, and electoral variance 
within and across states provides the ideal empirical data to test theories of inter-institutional 
bargaining in the appropriations process.  
 
DATA AND METHODS - GOVERNORS 
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To test the impact of partisanship on institutional behavior, I collected state agency-
level appropriations data.  The data collection required that states provide agency-level 
Executive Branch, State House, and Senate appropriations requests as well as final 
appropriations figures.  Ideally, the study would include all 50 states, but most states lacked 
adequate data.  Table 3.8 identifies the ten states included in the analysis. Each state 
represents at least ten years of agency-level data of institutional requests of all three 
policymaking actors. Most of the states provided data for the most recent ten year period 
(1998-2008).  North Carolina and South Carolina possessed archived budget data that 
allowed for the collection of two decades of state budget years. The final sample included ten 
states covering a total of 160 separate state fiscal years, accounting for 1,280 total state 
agency requests.   
A number of methodological issues in the state data required adjustments prior to 
running the analysis. First, not all states use identical budget categories; however, accurate 
cross-state comparisons require identical data structures. I generated a set of eight budget 
categories utilizing the most common elements of state agency appropriations categories. All 
state budget categories were merged into these eight categories.5 Second, to make estimates 
comparable over time, appropriations were converted to constant dollars (2004).  Next, I 
again use percentage changes for the dependent variable to deal with potential problems of 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. Finally, since policymakers bargain in terms of dollars 
it was necessary to construct a measure that would approximate dollars. Therefore, I 
normalize the state data.  In other words, I adjust the agency’s percentage change by its share 
                                                 
5 The budget categories include agriculture, economic development, education, environmental protection, 
health and human services, public safety, transportation, and other. 
79 
 
of the total annual budget.  These statistical adjustments allow for a reasonable comparison 
of the state data and between the state and national data sets.  
The research strategy employed looks at the average percent changes in gubernatorial 
agency-level appropriations requests for different partisan government configurations. The 
analysis strategies mimic that of the national study. First, a simple t-test for measuring the 
impact of partisanship on gubernatorial requests is utilized; this analysis tests the simple 
expectation that Democratic governors request higher levels of spending than Republican 
governors.  Then a two-way analysis of variance is used to measure the expectation that both 
gubernatorial and state legislative partisan control influences gubernatorial appropriations 
requests. Finally, a pooled time series analysis is utilized to isolate the impact of partisanship 
and test alternative institutional and economic theories.  
 
MODEL HYPOTHESES 
The analysis utilizes the same categories of independent variables utilized in the 
national study including partisan, structural, and economic factors. The direct hypothesis 
posits that Democratic governors are expected to request higher levels of spending than 
Republican governors.  The indirect hypothesis predicts that institutional actors adjust their 
appropriations requests toward the preferences of other veto wielding institutions. Given that 
Democratic institutions seek higher levels of domestic spending, the hypotheses posit that 
Democratic control of either branch of the state legislature should result in an increase in 
gubernatorial appropriations requests.  
State-level institutional variability provides the statistical leverage necessary to test 
the impact of structural characteristics on the appropriations process. While structural rules 
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and procedures remain relatively constant over time within states, they vary significantly 
between states (Squire and Hamm 2005).  The formal and informal institutional controls fall 
into two general categories, executive and legislative characteristics. Executive 
characteristics include budget authority, veto authority, vote margin, and approval ratings, 
while legislative characteristics include budget powers, professionalization, and term limits.  
There exists considerable variation in formal gubernatorial budget powers (Mueller 
1985; Beyle 1995). Executive budget authority measures the comparative level of budget 
authority between the executive and legislative branches. Following Schlesinger (1960) and 
Beyle (1968), I operationalize executive budget authority by the level of constitutional 
authority provided to the governor on a 1 to 5 scale with 5 representing the highest level of 
budget authority and 1 the lowest. I expect that an increase in gubernatorial budget powers 
results in an increase in the Democratic gubernatorial appropriations requests.  
The second formal gubernatorial role in the appropriations is veto authority.  Studies 
examining legislative-executive relationships have focused on veto power as the central 
instrument of executive power in the legislative arena (Cameron 2000; Krehbiel 1993).  Veto 
authority allows the executive to disapprove of budgets they deem outside their preference 
range. Executive veto authority varies significantly across states.  Chief executives with 
unrestricted line-item veto authority wield a strong bargaining stick in negotiations with the 
legislature (Mueller 1985; Beyle 1995).  This ordinal variable measures the constitutional 
veto authority provided the governor on a 0 to 5 scale with 5 representing the maximum veto 
authority and 0 representing no veto authority. As veto authority increases, governors are 
expected to increase executive appropriations requests.  
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While formal powers including budget and veto authority clearly provide the most 
direct gubernatorial influence in the legislative process, other less formal methods often 
determine the chief executives relative legislative success (Canes-Wrone 2001). These 
informal powers can influence gubernatorial legislative success as significantly as formal 
budget powers (Sigelman and Dometrius 1988; Barrilleaux and Berkman 2003).  As the most 
visible political figure in the state, chief executives have the ability to pander for public 
support providing them with the significant political leverage (Canes-Wrone 2001).  
Executive public approval measures the percentage of respondents who answer positively to 
a question about the governor’s job performance. Since higher approval ratings increase 
executive influence, I expect higher approval ratings to result in higher appropriations 
requests.  
The enactment of legislative term limits in nearly half of the American states during 
the later part of the 20th century represents one of the most significant institutional changes in 
state legislatures (Meinke and Hasecke 2003). Term limits represent a process of 
deinstitutionalization that is expected to result in power shifts from the legislature to the 
governor (Rosenthal 1996; Gerber 1996).  This shift is due to higher rates of legislative 
turnover and a resulting reduction in institutional memory and commitment reducing 
legislative stability and coherent and consistent policy agendas. The result is a shift in 
appropriations clout from the legislature to the governor.  The concept is operationalized 
using a dummy variable equal to 1 in state years where term limits exist and 0 otherwise. The 
existence of legislative term limits is expected to increase gubernatorial appropriations 
requests as power shifts from the legislature to the governor.  
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From the 1960’s to 1980’s, state legislatures made significant movements from part-
time to professional institutions (Mooney 1998). While not all state legislatures became fully 
professionalized, nearly all became more professionalized over this 20 year time span 
(Mooney 1998; Thompson 1987). Professionalization provides legislators both with 
additional resources to formulate distinct policy positions and seek reelection.  The additional 
resources should shift political influence from the chief executive to the legislative chambers. 
Legislative professionalism is operationalized using the average real legislative salary per 
state per year (Chubb 1988; Maestas 2000).  The expected impact of higher levels of 
professionalization is lower gubernatorial appropriations requests.  
 The relationship between economic factors and partisanship requests are expected to 
be different at the state-level than they were at the national-level. At the national level, based 
on the ability of the federal government to run budget deficits, increases in the 
unemployment rate were expected to increase government spending. At the state-level, 
governments are restricted by balanced budget requirements.  Therefore, as increases in 
unemployment lead to decreases in government revenue, I expect a decrease in gubernatorial 
appropriations requests. Inflation is again expected to result in a decrease in gubernatorial 
appropriations requests.  
 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
I first complete some exploratory data analysis with two-way cross tabulations to 
determine the change in gubernatorial appropriations requests across various partisan 
configurations of the state legislature.  I expect appropriations requests to adjust to changes 
both in gubernatorial partisan control and legislative majority status changes.  During 
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Democratic control of these institutions, I expect a higher gubernatorial appropriations 
request than under Republican control. Table 3.9 exhibits the two-way cross tabulation 
results. The findings indicate that Democratic governors request nearly double the spending 
increase of Republican governors, 4.1 percentage points to 2.7 percent percentage points, a 
finding consistent with the expectation that Democrats request higher spending levels than 
Republicans.   
To gain insight into the influence of state legislative partisan control on gubernatorial 
requests, I run a two-way analysis of variance test. Table 3.10 reports the results. The direct 
effect of gubernatorial partisan control does not appear to influence presidential 
appropriation requests.  The F value is only 0.89 and is not significant at a p-value of 0.35. 
The indirect effect of State House partisan majority control is statistically significant with an 
F value of 3.31 and a p-value of 0.05. The second indirect effect, State Senate partisan 
majority control, does not appear to influence gubernatorial appropriations. The F-value of 
2.4 is not significant with a p-value of 0.12. The results suggest that the partisan control of 
the State House is driving gubernatorial appropriations decisions.  
Table 3.11 During Republican control of the state legislature, gubernatorial requests 
average less than 1 percentage points, but average more than a 7 percentage point increase 
during Democratic control of the legislature. Just as important, consider the affect of 
gubernatorial partisan affiliation. During Republican control of the state legislature, 
Republican governors request a 2 percentage point increase in spending, while Democratic 
governors request a nearly 2 percentage point decrease. Conversely, during Democratic 
control of the state legislature, Republican governors request a 2.5 percentage point increase 
in spending, while Democratic governors request nearly an 8 percentage point increase.  
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These findings support both the direct and indirect hypotheses. Democratic governors request 
more than Republican governors.  Governors also request higher appropriations from 
Democrat state legislatures than Republican ones.  The evidence indicates that governors are 
strategic actors in the appropriations process. Faced with a Republican legislature, 
Republican governors request higher appropriations levels as do Democratic governors 
facing Democratically controlled state legislatures. These findings are consistent with the 
expectation that institutional actors behave strategically based on the partisan affiliation of 
other veto-wielding institutions.  
While the initial summary statistics support the partisan hypotheses, further evidence 
is necessary to rule out alternative theories. Table 3.11 includes the t-test output comparing 
measures of mean percentage change in gubernatorial request from the previous year across 
various government configurations. The t-test measuring the overall difference between 
Republican and Democratic gubernatorial budget requests does not quite reach significance 
level with a t-score of 1.32 and a p-value of .18. The percent difference are substantial, 
however, the variation in the level of gubernatorial requests results in a lack of significance. 
Therefore, the direct hypotheses, that Democratic governors request higher levels than 
Republicans is not supported by the evidence.  
The t-test comparing gubernatorial requests under Republican control of the state 
legislature is significant at the 0.1 level with a t-score of -1.73 and a p-value of .08.  Under 
Democratic control of the legislature, the t-test indicates that the difference between 
Republican and Democratic governors is highly significant with a t-score of 2.62 and a p-
value of .00. Divided control of the state legislature provides a more muddled picture of the 
role of partisanship in the appropriations process. The t-test for Democratic control of the 
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House and Republican control of the Senate was not significant with a t-score of 0.14 and a 
p-value of 0.56.  Likewise, the t-test for Republican control of the House and Democratic 
control of the Senate was not significant with a t-score of 0.59 and a p-value of 0.64.  The 
results clearly indicate that unified control of the state legislature drives gubernatorial 
strategic actions.  
To statistically control for a myriad of political and economic factors that influence 
the appropriations process, I pooled the data and ran a time series regression. The dependent 
variable is the percent change in gubernatorial appropriations requests from the previous 
year.  The main independent variables of interest are the partisan control of the three 
policymaking institutions and whether those institutions share partisan affiliation.  The 
independent variables fall into three categories including partisan, institutional, and economic 
factors. Partisan factors include gubernatorial, House, and Senate Democratic control. 
Institutional factors include gubernatorial veto authority, budget powers, and approval 
ratings, as well as legislative budget powers, professionalization, and term limits. Finally, the 
economic factors include unemployment rate, inflation, and deficit size.  
I run a series of diagnostic checks to determine if the pooled time series random 
effects model is the most efficient estimator of the panel data. The Wald statistic, which tests 
the significance of the independent variables in the model, is 29.05 with a p-value of 0.006.  
This indicates that I can reject the null hypothesis that the independent variables do not have 
a significant effect on gubernatorial change in the previous year’s appropriations. The 
random effects model assumes that the independent variables for a particular bill (Xit) in a 
particular time period and the individual specific bill effects (ui) are uncorrelated. If Xit and ui 
are correlated, then the fixed effects model is more appropriate and, if not, then the random 
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effects model is the more appropriate model. To test whether Xit and ui are correlated, I use 
the Hausman test which indicates whether the random and fixed effects coefficients are 
significantly different. The null hypothesis is that Xit and ui are uncorrelated. The chi2 
statistic is positive and not significant, p-value 0.18; therefore, I cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that Xit and ui are uncorrelated.  The Hausman test indicates that the random 
effects model is the more efficient model for the gubernatorial appropriations data.  
Panel data techniques also possess a number of potential statistical problems that are 
necessary to test for. First, I test for biased standard errors using robust standard errors. 
Second, I test for serial correlation. The Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in the panel data 
reported an F-test value of 3.68 and a p-value of 0.55. This finding does not reject the null 
hypothesis of no serial correlation. Third, I test for heteroscedasticity using the Breusch-
Pagan test.  The null hypothesis is that there is no heteroscedasticity.  The p-value of .95 is 
not significant indicating that the null hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity cannot be rejected. 
The test statistics suggest that the random effects model is an efficient estimator of the panel 
data.   
The regression equation is as follows: 
∆ Average Gubernatorial Appropriations Requests = β0 + β1Previous Year Gubernatorial 
Appropriations Request + β2 Democratic Gubernatorial Control + β3 Democratic House 
Majority Control + β4 Democratic Senate Majority Control + β5 Gubernatorial Budget 
Powers + β6  Gubernatorial Veto Authority + β7 Legislative Term Limits + β8 Legislative 
Professionalism + β9 Legislative Budget Powers + β10 Unemployment + β11 Inflation + β12 
Election Year + εi  
 
Table 3.12 displays the statistical results. There exist empirical differences between the 
national and state results. First, the Democratic gubernatorial control coefficient is -1.2348.  
This variable is both not significant and not in the expected direction.  I expected Democratic 
gubernatorial partisan control to result in increases in state spending. This finding suggests 
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that the direct effect of gubernatorial partisanship is muted by other factors. This also 
suggests that partisanship does not have a direct effect, through the agency of the governor’s 
partisanship, on the size of appropriations requests. Second, the State House Democratic 
partisanship variable is positive and significant. The coefficient of 4.1721 is in the expected 
direction and highly significant with a p-value of .00. Alternatively, Senate Democratic 
partisanship variable has a coefficient of -1.2351 and is not significant. These combined 
results suggest that State House majority party control is driving the strategic decision-
making of governors. This result differs from the national results that indicated the president 
strategically reacts to the partisan control of the Congress, not just the House of 
Representatives.  
The next vector of control variables included institutional and structural 
characteristics. The pooled time series results indicate that institutional variables do not have 
a significant impact on gubernatorial requests, save two, gubernatorial veto authority and 
House term limits. The House term limit coefficient of -4.6971 is neither in the predicted 
direction or statistically significant. Legislative professionalism is expected to decrease 
gubernatorial requests as legislative authority shifts from the governor to the legislature. The 
legislative professionalism coefficient equals 0.0002.  The coefficient is both not in the 
expected direction or statistically significant. Gubernatorial approval ratings coefficient, -
0.0147, is not in the expected direction or statistically significant. Gubernatorial budget 
powers coefficient, -0.6611, is both not in the expected direction and not statistically 
significant. Finally, the gubernatorial veto authority coefficient is statistically significant; 
however, it is not in the expected direction. Increases in veto authority were expected to 
increase gubernatorial appropriations requests. The results suggest just the opposite. As 
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gubernatorial veto authority increases, gubernatorial appropriations request decrease. An 
alternative explanation for this relationship could be that governors in states that have strong 
veto powers, namely line-item veto authority, perceive their role more as the guardian of the 
public purse. Therefore, governors’ that possess line-item veto authority propose lower 
appropriations as stewards of the public purse.  
The economic control variables meet the theoretical expectations. I predicted that as 
unemployment increased there would be a decrease in gubernatorial requests based in the 
reduction in government revenue combined with state balanced budget requirements. This is 
exactly what I find. The coefficient for unemployment is -0.7225 meaning that a one percent 
increase in unemployment results in a 0.7225 percentage point decrease in gubernatorial 
request. The other economic variable included in the model is inflation.  Higher rates of 
inflation are hypothesized to reduce appropriations levels in real terms. I measure inflation 
using the 6 month average of changes in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) prior to passing of 
the state budget. The inflation coefficient equals 0.3309 and is highly significant. This result 
confirms the theoretical expectation that increases in inflation result in a decrease in 
gubernatorial requests.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter examined the first step in the appropriations process, namely the 
executive’s change to the previous year’s appropriations requests. The partisan variables in 
both the national and state models represented the key independent variables. This chapter 
reports strong evidence that partisanship frames executive requests at both the national and 
state-level.  At the national level, Democratic presidents consistently request higher levels of 
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spending than Republicans.  This finding supports the direct partisan hypothesis that 
Democratic presidents request higher levels of spending than their Republican counterparts. 
More importantly, both the summary and pooled time series regression results provide strong 
evidence that presidents are strategic actors that account for partisan control of the Congress 
by accommodating their budgetary preferences. These results indicate that chief executives 
utilize an accommodative strategy in the bargaining process to maximize their policy and 
electoral goals. Democratic Congressional control was positive and highly significant. 
Partisanship clearly plays a central role in determining president’s budget composition 
requests.  
The state results largely support the national results. The summary statistics suggest 
that Democratic governors request significantly higher appropriations requests than their 
Republican counterparts. However, the pooled time series results did not support this finding.  
The state model does provide strong evidence for the indirect hypothesis. Gubernatorial 
requests shifted in the direction of the majority party of the State House. Democratic control 
of the State House was positive and highly significant. Alternatively, Senate partisan control 
did not appear to influence gubernatorial appropriations requests. Governors appear to base 
their appropriations decisions on the next actor in the budgetary process, namely the State 
House majority party, and not on control of the entire state legislature.  
The national and state models provide strong support for the notion that partisanship 
influences the strategic behavior of executives in the appropriations process in American 
government. While the results were largely complementary, there were several differences at 
the two government levels.  The direct partisan hypothesis engendered strong evidence at the 
national-level, but only mixed support at the state-level. I suggest that the difference is 
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partially explained by the influence of economic factors and the influence of the president in 
Congress. First, governors are restricted by economic conditions and state balanced budget 
requirements. Therefore, they are less able to base their budget requests strictly on their 
ideological preferences. In other words, governors are required to fulfill a management role 
in state government rather than simply push for their preferred policy goals. This 
management role mutes the direct effect of gubernatorial partisanship on their appropriations 
requests. Presidents, on the other hand, are able and expected to pursue aggressive policy 
agendas that are based primarily on their ideological leanings. Therefore, the president’s 
partisanship has a strong and direct influence on their appropriations requests.  Both the 
national and state data also provide strong support for the indirect partisan hypothesis.  The 
only variation between the government levels is that the president bases his appropriations 
requests on control of the entire Congress, while governors based their appropriations 
requests solely on majority party control in the State House.  
Based on these results, I suggest that scholars revise their understanding of the direct 
and indirect role of partisanship on executive behavior in the appropriations process. 
Executives are strategic actors that take into account the preferences of other executive actors 
in the appropriations process. While the results indicate differences between presidential and 
gubernatorial behavior, what is consistent across the levels of government is the indirect 
influence of the majority status of House and Senate members on executive appropriations 
requests.  
These finding have larger implications for democratic representation and governance. 
Partisanship provides a mechanism for holding policymakers collectively responsible for 
their actions.  If partisanship fails to play a central role in the appropriations process, then 
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citizens lose a vital mechanism for holding policymakers accountability over one of 
government’s most critical functions. The purpose of this analysis was to identify a link 
between partisanship and the appropriations process, as it relates to the executive branch. The 
evidence indicates a link between partisanship and appropriations is based on the strategic 
interactions of veto wielding institutions.   The vital chain between citizens and their 
government appears to still be intact, at least at the executive-level of government. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
THE HOUSE AND THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS 
 
In this chapter, I examine the role of the House of Representatives and State House in 
the appropriations process in American government. The national analysis includes both the 
House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations recommendations and the House of 
Representatives floor recommendations. The state-level analysis comprises only State House 
floor appropriations requests since committee-level data was not available. My central 
purpose is to identify the influence of partisanship in committee-level, floor-level, and in the 
inter-institutional bargaining structure of the appropriations process. The previous chapter 
identified the prominent role that partisanship plays in shaping executive strategic behavior 
and appropriations request levels. The Executive Branch represents massive bureaucracies, 
but ultimately decision-making rests in the hands of one person, the president or governor. 
The House of Representatives and State Houses, on the other hand, are composed of 
numerous members with differing incentive structures, policy goals, and institutional status. 
It is plausible to expect, therefore, that alternative mechanisms structure the House 
appropriations processes. Despite the complexity of House structures, scholars have 
identified the central role that political parties play in determining committee member 
selections, rules of order, policy positions, and legislative outcomes. This analysis seeks to 
provide further clarity to the role of political parties also play in the appropriations process.  
At the national-level, the study also examines the relationship between the Committee 
on Appropriations and the parent chamber. If committees are led by partisan majorities that 
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reflect the preferences of the larger House, then partisanship should structure the preferences 
of the Committee on Appropriations and the relationship between the two institutions. 
Committee-level appropriations requests that reflect majority party preferences would lend 
credence to the notion that political parties structure the internal appropriations process. This 
analysis also examines bargaining between House of Representatives and the other 
policymaking institutions. As the middle actor in the appropriations process, House leaders 
must be cognizant of both the executive’s budget preferences and account for the preferences 
of the next actor in the appropriations process, the Senate.   
In this study, I seek to identify whether partisanship is central to understanding the 
appropriations requests of House members in American government. I theorize that U.S. 
House of Representatives and State House members are strategic actors meaning they 
construct appropriations requests based both on their own policy preferences, but also on the 
preferences of other veto-wielding actors. I further theorize that partisanship structures House 
member requests both directly, through House majority party control, and indirectly, through 
the partisanship of the executive and Senate. The indirect effect of partisanship suggests that 
House members incorporate preferences of the executive and Senate partisan majorities and 
adjust their requests in order to maximize their electoral and policy goals. The analysis is 
predicated on the assumption that House members use an accommodative strategy in the 
sequential appropriations process.  
The study results provide strong evidence that House members at the national and 
state-level are strategic actors. Both U.S. House of Representatives and State House members 
adjust appropriations requests based on the partisan control of the Senate. National-level 
results also indicate that the president retains significant influence over House appropriations 
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requests, while the state-level results suggest governors have less influence over House 
decisions. Structural and economic differences between the national and state governments 
may explain these discrepancies. First, as previously mentioned, economic factors play a 
more direct role in state budgeting decisions. At the state-level, the governor makes 
appropriations requests in January typically, however, the State House may not decide on 
appropriations bills until summer. Economic conditions can change drastically in a six month 
time span, overriding the influence of executive requests. Second, party polarization and 
party unity vary significantly more at the state-level (Aldrich and Battistia 2002). The 
variation in party polarization is expected to impact and perhaps decrease the role of 
partisanship in budget negotiations at the state-level. Despite the differences in the partisan 
effect at the national and state-levels, the results provide clear evidence that partisanship 
plays a central role in determining House appropriations requests.  
 
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ROLE IN THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS 
Scholars identify the House of Representatives and State House as the principal actors 
in the appropriations processes in American government (Fenno 1966; Wildavsky 1964 
Sharkansky 1968; Thompson 1987). As previously stated, the federal budget process, after 
1974, has been composed of two major components, the House and Senate Budget 
Committees passage of a concurrent budget resolution and the Committees on 
Appropriations passage of the 13 appropriations bills.  The state budget process includes only 
the second component in the legislative budget process. This analysis focuses on the 
construction of appropriations bills. Both national and state governments utilize a similar 
appropriations process at this stage in the budget cycle.  
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The House of Representatives produces the first binding appropriations bill, and as a 
result, wields considerable influence over the budget process.6 This step in the budget cycle 
is composed of two stages. First, the House Committee on Appropriations proposes a set of 
appropriations recommendations and sends them to the parent chamber. Second, the full 
House of Representatives passes a revised budget. This two-stage process increases the 
complexity of appropriations negotiations both internally and externally. The diffuse 
committee structure necessitates that House leadership maintain structures that incentivize 
committee members to consider the policy preferences of the larger House. Simultaneously, 
both committee members and House leadership must consider the preferences of the other 
actors in the bargaining process. Appropriations bills originate in the House Committee on 
Appropriations7 (Fenno 1966). The Committee on Appropriations sends its completed 
appropriations recommendations to the full parent chamber for revision and approval. 
As previously mentioned, the 1974 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control 
Act (CBICA) established the Congressional Budget Committees to oversee the entire 
process. Prior to these stages in the budget process, the House and Senate Budget 
Committees must come to agreement on a budget resolution that defines the overall size of 
federal spending and the amount allocated to each specific policy area. While this analysis 
does not specifically measure the Budget Committee targets, they are established by the same 
inter-institutional bargaining method that determines appropriations spending. Therefore, it is 
assumed that the partisan effects are a result of both the Budget Committee and 
Appropriations Committee negotiations.   
                                                 
6 For ease of use, House refers to both the U.S. House of Representatives and State Houses. When I refer to 
either institution individually, I use the actual titles.  
7 Various states call the appropriations committee by different names; however, the basic role of these 
committees is structurally similar to the U.S. Congress.  
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The relationship between House committees and the parent chamber is critical to 
understanding the appropriations process in American government. The level of influence 
that House leadership holds over the Committee on Appropriations has been the subject of 
long standing scholarly debate (Fenno 1966; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Aldrich and Rhode 
1998).  On the one hand, the House assigns members, distributes resources of time and 
money, and structures the legislative calendar that guides the committees’ actions.  On the 
other hand, the Committee on Appropriations remains an autonomous legislative unit that has 
decision-making power over committee bills (Fenno 1966).  The theoretical frame and the 
empirical analysis examine partisanship’s role in structuring this relationship.   
The House represents the middle actor in a three institution bargaining game. Once 
the full House has approved their appropriations recommendations, they are sent to the 
Senate for consideration. As a result, the House anticipates the preferences of Senate 
members and responds to the executive’s request based both on their proposal power and 
veto authority. First, the Senate, as the next actor in the process has considerable influence 
over appropriations outcomes. After the Senate passes their appropriations recommendations, 
the House and Senate can either enter into a conference committee to reconcile any 
differences between the two appropriations bills or one or both can reconsider their 
appropriations bill. In either situation, it is necessary for both the House and Senate bills to 
be identical.  While most scholars suggest that the House, mainly through its prominence as 
the first mover, maintains a more central role in the appropriations process, the House and 
Senate must agree on any and all changes before an appropriations bill is passed. Second, the 
executive maintains both formal, through the appropriations proposal and veto authority, and 
informal, through direct lobbying efforts, power over the House appropriations proceedings. 
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As a result, it is necessary for House members to account for executive preferences. The 
sequential nature of the appropriations process places a number of competing interests on the 
House. The theoretical frame outlines the central role of partisanship in structuring the 
internal and external appropriations process of the House in American government.   
 
A THEORY OF HOUSE PARTISANSHIP AND THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS   
The House has long been considered the budget gatekeeper. In other words, national and 
state-level appropriations committee members see it as their responsibility to maintain fiscal 
responsibility and pare executive budget requests (Fenno 1966).  The appropriations 
committee is motivated by two sets of competing expectations.  Committee members view 
their role as maintaining fiscal parsimony, while external actors including the larger House 
membership and the executive bureaucracy expect the appropriations committee to fully fund 
programs authorized by the legislature (Fenno 1966).  These two goals are often in conflict. 
The appropriations committee often attempts to adhere to both sets of expectations by 
compromising between the executive’s budget requests, the larger House membership 
expectations, and the more conservative preferences of committee members. In this way, the 
appropriations committee simultaneously takes into account the preferences of the executive 
and the larger House membership as it negotiates appropriations requests.  
I argue that partisanship structures the magnitude that committee members adhere to 
the guardian role. Regardless of partisan control, appropriations committee members are 
generally expected to reduce executive budget requests. Within this structural relationship, 
partisanship is expected to directly influence the magnitude of the decrease in committee 
appropriations request. Partisanship, as the previous chapter’s results indicated, represents a 
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proxy for particular ideological dispositions and resulting spending preferences. I expect at 
the national and state-level for Democrats to prefer higher levels of domestic spending than 
their Republican counterparts. This direct relationship between partisanship and spending 
preferences is expected to structure appropriation committee behavior. In other words, 
Republican majority control of the appropriations committee is expected to result in a great 
level of fiscal parsimony and push for lower levels of spending compared with their 
Democratic counterparts. Alternatively, Democratically controlled appropriations committees 
are expected to approve higher levels of executive domestic funding requests.  
Appropriations committees also have an incentive to account for the preferences of 
other veto-wielding actors, namely the full House membership, the Senate and the executive. 
I test the extent to which appropriations committees take into account the preferences of the 
full House membership by analyzing the change in the full House appropriations requests 
from the committee requests. The appropriations committee is charged with funding 
programs requested by the executive and passed by the legislature. As previously mentioned, 
this responsibility is often in conflict with their predilection for being fiscally responsible; 
however, the House committee does not make appropriations unilaterally. The Executive 
Branch possesses enormous resources to provide justification for program funding and to 
lobby the legislature for its budget requests.  The executive also enjoys formal powers in the 
appropriations process including veto authority that makes them a pivotal player in budget 
negotiations.  As discussed in the previous chapter, executives also strategically adjust their 
appropriations proposals to accommodate the appropriations preferences of majority control 
of the legislative chambers.  I expect a similar, though perhaps less strict, adherence to this 
strategy of accommodation from the House Committee on Appropriations.  The second 
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partisan hypothesis posits that appropriations committee budget requests incorporate the 
preferences of the executive.  
The House Committee on Appropriations is also constrained by the decisions of the 
House and Senate Budget Committees. The Budget Committees through budget resolutions 
set spending targets for the Appropriations Committees. This constrains the overall level of 
spending, but does not specifically determine the composition of appropriations spending or 
the size of individual spending bills. The Committee on Appropriations is also controlled by 
the same partisan majorities as the Budget Committees and therefore, the same partisan 
factors influencing appropriations decisions at the appropriations bill stage should also 
influence the establishment of the budget resolution.  
Appropriations committees also face numerous incentives to take into account the 
preferences of the full House membership. First, party leaders possess a battery of sanctions, 
both formal and informal, to align Committee decision-making with House expectations. 
Second, Committee members’ electoral success is intrinsically tied to the party label and the 
ideological positions of the larger party platform.  Therefore, they have personal electoral 
incentives to account for the preferences of House members to ensure their future electoral 
success and majority party status. These internal and external incentives are expected to 
result in appropriations committees developing requests that represent the preferences of the 
full House. Thus, the third partisan hypothesis posits that full House appropriations proposals 
possess minimal differences from House appropriations committee proposals.  
House appropriations committees send requests to the full House.  Since appropriations 
committees are expected to account for the preferences of the parent chamber, full 
appropriations requests are not expected to vary considerably from committee 
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recommendations. House appropriations committees have less incentive to account for the 
preferences of the third actor in the process, the Senate. While appropriations committees 
lack the incentives to account for the preferences of the Senate chamber, the full House 
membership does possess such incentives.  The Senate must agree to House appropriations 
recommendations either in conference committee or the House or Senate must reconsider 
appropriations requests before they can become law. As such, the partisan control of the 
Senate is expected to influence House appropriations requests. The fourth partisan hypothesis 
holds that partisan control of the Senate influences full House appropriations proposals.  
Since the state data set includes only one measure of House member preferences, I expect 
both gubernatorial and Senate partisan control to influence State House strategic 
appropriations recommendations.  
 
DATA AND METHODS – U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
The data set is composed of both House of Representative Committee on 
Appropriations agency-level appropriations requests and House of Representatives floor 
agency-level appropriations requests for 15 Congressional budget bills from fiscal year 1948-
2006.8  Similar to the executive budget data, this data set was converted to constant dollars 
(2004) and normalized. These data transformations not only decrease the likelihood of 
statistical error, but also create budget statistics that are approximations of dollars.  
The research strategy employed looks at the average percent changes in House 
Committee on Appropriations and House Floor agency-level appropriations requests for 
different partisan government configurations (Lowery, Bookheimer, and Malachowski 1985; 
                                                 
8 The fiscal years 1948 through 1985 come from the data set collected by McCubbins and Kiewiet (1990).  I 
expanded this original data set by coding fiscal years 1986 through 2004.  
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Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991). This strategy provides an empirical test of both the direct, 
through House majority control, and indirect, through the change in House appropriations 
across the various configurations of government. If House appropriations requests change 
significantly across various partisan configurations of the presidency or Congress, this would 
provide clear evidence that executives strategically account for the partisan makeup of other 
institutional actors in constructing their requests. There are distinct empirical expectations for 
a bargaining game where actors act sincerely versus strategically.  I define sincere behavior 
as appropriations requests where institutional actors determine the composition and size of 
the request solely on their personal budgetary preferences. I define strategic behavior as 
appropriations requests that simultaneously factor in their personal budgetary preferences and 
those of other veto wielding institutions. 
The data structure and model hypotheses call for three analysis strategies. First, a 
simple t-test for measuring the impact of partisanship on presidential requests is utilized; this 
analysis tests the simple expectation that Democratic presidents request higher levels of 
spending than Republican presidents.  Then a two-way analysis of variance is used to 
measure the expectation that both presidential and Congressional partisan control influences 
presidential appropriations requests. Finally, a pooled time series analysis is utilized to 
isolate the impact of partisanship and test alternative institutional and economic theories.  
 
MODEL HYPOTHESES 
The first dependent variable is the average percent change in House of 
Representatives Committee on Appropriations budget requests compared to the president’s 
agency-level appropriations requests (Senate Budget Estimates). The second dependent 
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variable is the average percent change in the House of Representative floor appropriations 
compared to the House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations budget requests.  
Partisan, structural, and economic variables constitute the three categories of 
independent variables. Presidential partisanship, House of Representatives majority control, 
and Senate majority control are each coded as dummy variables with 1 signifying 
Democratic control and 0 otherwise. In this analysis, Democratic presidential partisan control 
is expected to increase House Committee on Appropriations budget requests. Similarly, 
Democratic control of either of the two legislative chambers is expected to result in an 
increase in the appropriations request. Two additional variables measure the impact of 
Democratic strength, the percentage of House seats controlled by Democrats and the 
percentage of Senate seats controlled by Democrats. Therefore, I have the ability to test a 
central question in the party literature, whether majority status or the size of legislative 
coalitions have greater influence in the legislative process. Specifically, I expect majority 
status rather than coalition size to influence House Committee strategic behavior. First, 
majority status provides legislative majorities with procedural advantages that allow them to 
dominate committee actions. Second, appropriations bills require only legislative majorities, 
not supermajorities, to pass through the chambers.  Finally, I expect majority status to 
represent the president’s cue in the bargaining process, not majority coalition size.  
Structural variables constitute the second set of control variables including 
presidential approval ratings and election year. Presidential approval ratings represent a 
significant informal power.  Presidential approval is measured as the percent of respondents 
indicating that they approve of the president’s job performance. The literature suggests that 
higher levels of executive approval ratings should increase their standing and influence with 
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Congress (Canes-Wrone 2002). The hypothesis posits that higher presidential approval 
ratings should increase their influence on the House Committee and therefore increase the 
appropriations requests. Policymakers also face electoral constraints in terms of periodic 
elections. Scholars have suggested that fiscal policy adjusts primarily in response to electoral 
factors, specifically towards the party that has gained seats in the last election (Barrilleaux 
and Berkman 2003).  Election years are also associated with a rise in total appropriations 
(Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991). During election years, policymakers seek additional 
resources for constituents to improve their electoral fortunes.  The electoral incentive should 
increase the desire for spending in election years.  The resulting hypothesis posits that 
election years are associated with higher levels of spending.  
Economic factors constitute the third set of control variables including inflation, 
unemployment, total federal spending, and deficit size. Unemployment is measured as the 
average percent unemployment rate for the 6 months prior to the budget passing. Based on 
the notion that policymakers are concerned with the most up-to-date measures of economic 
well-being, this variable represents one of the central economic indicators driving 
policymaker decision-making. Increasing unemployment results require increased 
government resources both in terms of a social safety net and an economic stimulus. Higher 
levels of unemployment are, therefore, hypothesized to result in higher appropriations 
requests. Inflation represents the other main economic indicator identified in the literature 
(Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991). I measure inflation using the 6 month average of changes in 
the Consumer Price Index (CPI) prior to passage of the national budget. Higher rates of 
inflation are hypothesized to result in higher reduction in House appropriations requests. 
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The House Committee on Appropriations budget proposals, as previously stated, are 
expected to account for the preferences of the larger House membership. Since the full House 
considers the electoral and economic factors into its preference set, I do not expect these 
factors to substantially influence the House of Representatives appropriations 
recommendations.  
 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS – HOUSE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS  
Table 4.1 reports the summary statistics for the House Appropriations Committee 
change to presidential appropriations requests. The results provide mixed evidence for a 
direct partisan effect. The House Appropriations Committees is expected to reduce 
presidential appropriations requests regardless of partisan affiliation, however, Republicans 
are expected to request larger spending reductions than Democrats. The results indicate that 
House majorities reduce presidential requests by an average of 6.8 percentage points, 
supporting the notion that House Appropriations view their role as guardian of the public 
purse. To illustrate this point, the sample lacks an example of a fiscal year where the House 
Appropriations Committee increased the total presidential domestic appropriations request.  
The results also provide mixed results for the second direct hypothesis that 
Republicans request higher levels of reductions than Democrats. Republican majorities 
reduce presidential appropriations requests by an average of 7.4 percentage points compared 
to 6.5 percentage points for Democratic majorities. The t-test score for this difference is -0.49 
with a p-value of .35. This initial summary statistics run counter to the theoretical 
expectations. A possible explanation is that historical circumstance has resulted in 
Democratic control of the House of Representatives during periods of downward pressure on 
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total federal domestic spending. For instance, during international conflicts resources are 
historically shifted from domestic to defense programs. Tests of these alternative theories are 
examined in the following pooled time series analysis.  
To gain insight into the influence of partisan control on House of Representative 
Committee on Appropriations requests, I run a two-way analysis of variance test. Table 4.2 
illustrates the results. The results provide strong evidence for the direct effect of House 
majority party control on House appropriations requests. The F-value of 1.76 is highly 
significant with a p-value of 0.02. The results also provide evidence in support of the indirect 
effect. Partisan control of the presidency has an F-value of 10.07 with a p-value of 0.00. The 
second indirect effect, Senate partisan control, has an F-value of 1.87 and a p-value of 0.09. 
While the measure is not statistically significant at the 0.05 level, it is close to achieving 
statistical significance.  
The summary statistics reported in Table 4.3 also provide insights into the indirect 
effect of partisanship on House Appropriations Committee budget requests. I hypothesize 
that Democratic presidential appropriations requests fare better with Democratically 
controlled Congresses than Republican Congresses. The results suggest that Republican 
House Committees reduce Republican presidential requests by an average of 1.1 percentage 
point, while Democratic House Committees reduce Republican presidential requests by an 
average of 3.2 percentage points. Republican House Committees reduce Democratic 
presidential requests by 10.3 percentage points, while Democratic House Committees reduce 
Democratic presidential requests by 11.2 percentage points. At first blush, this result appears 
to contradict the indirect hypothesis.  However, Democratic presidents requested 
significantly less (1.2 percent) from Republican Congresses compared to Democratic 
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Congresses (8.1 percent). Therefore, I calculate the actual difference from the previous year 
by multiplying both the presidential and the House Committee changes. Overall Republican 
Houses reduce Democrat Presidential requests by nearly 8 percentage points whereas 
Democratic Houses actually increase Democratic Presidential budget requests only slightly 
(by .1 percent). This evidence suggests that House Appropriations Committees take into 
account the partisanship of the Executive Branch when constructing appropriations requests 
and comports with the theoretical expectation that House Committees account for 
presidential partisan control.  
 The summary statistics still do not account for a number of alternative theories that 
could explain the identified relationship between partisanship and appropriations outcomes. 
To test these alternative theories, I pooled the data and ran a time series regression to isolate 
the partisan effects. The House Appropriations Committee change in the president’s budget 
request remains the dependent variable in the analysis. The independent variables fall into 
three general categories including partisanship, the primary independent variables of interest, 
structural, and economic factors. The three partisanship variables include presidential 
partisanship, House partisan majority control, and Senate partisan majority control. An 
additional model includes two variables measuring impact of Democratic strength on the 
appropriations process, the percentage of House seats controlled by Democrats and the 
percentage of Senate seats controlled by Democrats. Similar to the Executive Branch 
analysis, the percentage of Congressional seats is used to determine whether the strength of 
Congressional majorities or the simple fact of majority control has the greater influence on 
House appropriations requests.   
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Panel data is data that is pooled for the same bills across time. In panel data, there 
may be unobserved bill-specific effects that are relatively constant over time. It is necessary 
to control for this time-series dependence in order to obtain unbiased standard errors. Panel 
data provides the advantage of using a larger sample size than if I use only one observation 
per bill; this technique allows greater estimation power so that coefficients can be estimated 
more precisely. Panel data also allows estimation of dynamic models and control for 
unobservable bill-specific effects that are correlated with the observed explanatory variables.  
I run a random effects model that controls for unobserved bill effects. The Wald 
statistic, which tests the significance of the independent variables in the model, is 136.28 
with a p-value of 0.000.  Based on this result, I reject the null hypothesis that the independent 
variables do not have a significant effect on House of Representative changes in presidential 
appropriations. The random effects model assumes that the independent variables for a 
particular bill (Xit) in a particular time period and the individual specific bill effects (ui) are 
uncorrelated. If they are correlated, then a fixed effects model would constitute the more 
appropriate model to produced unbiased coefficients. The fixed effects model uses bill 
dummy variables to explain all the cross-sectional variation across the appropriations bills 
and therefore tests the variation within each individual bill over time. If Xit and ui are 
correlated, then the fixed effects model is more appropriate. To test whether Xit and ui are 
correlated, I use the Hausman test which indicates whether the random and fixed effects 
coefficients are significantly different. The null hypothesis assumes that Xit and ui are 
uncorrelated. The chi-square statistic is positive and not significant, p-value 0.79; therefore, I 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that Xit and ui are uncorrelated.  The Hausman test indicates 
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that the random effects model is the more efficient model for the House of Representatives 
appropriations data.  
Panel data techniques also possess a number of potential statistical problems that are 
necessary to test for. First, the standard errors could be biased if the time-series dependence 
is not controlled for. In order to test whether the standard errors are biased, I run robust 
standard errors. Second, it is necessary to test for serial correlation because it can bias the 
standard errors and cause the results to be less efficient (Drukker 2003). A test for serial 
correlation developed by Wooldridge (2002) can be applied to random and fixed effects 
models. The F-test .21 does not reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. Third, it is 
necessary to test for heteroscedasticity in the pooled time series model since the random 
variables could have different variances.  To test for heteroscedasticity, I use a Breusch-
Pagan test.  The null hypothesis is that there is no heteroscedasticity.  The p-value is not 
significant indicating that the null hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity cannot be rejected. The 
test statistics suggest that the random effects model is an efficient estimator of the panel data.   
The time series regression equation is as follows: 
∆ Average Appropriations Requests = β0 + β1∆ Presidential Appropriations Request + β2 
Democratic Presidential Control + β3 Democratic House Control + β4 Democratic Senate 
Control + β5 National Deficit + β6 Total Federal Spending + β7 Unemployment + β8 Inflation 
+ β9 Conflict + β10 Election Year + εi  
 
The pooled time series provides support for both the indirect and direct hypotheses.  
Table 4.4 illustrates that House majority status directly impacts House Appropriations 
Committee request levels. The Democratic House majority control coefficient is positive and 
highly significant, with a coefficient of 7.9787 with a p-value of 0.00; the results indicate that 
a change from Republican to Democratic control of the House results in a nearly 8 
percentage point increase in House appropriations requests. The results are consistent with 
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the expectation that House majority control influences appropriations committee request 
levels.  Both Democrats and Republicans reduce presidential appropriations requests, 
however, Democratically controlled Houses reduce appropriations 8 percentage points less 
than Republican controlled Houses.  Again, this is consistent with my baseline assumption 
that Republicans reduce spending more than Democrats.  
The Democratic presidential variable is also in the predicted direction, negative, and 
highly significant, -6.1683 with a p-value of 0.00. This result indicates that House 
Committees reduce Democratic presidential appropriations requests by an average of 6.1683 
percentage points more than Republican presidents. Presidential partisan control influences 
the magnitude of decreases in the House committees’ appropriations requests.  Interestingly, 
House appropriations committees appear to react to the previous actor in the appropriations 
process, the president, rather than the next actor in the process, the Senate.  The Senate 
coefficient is not significant in the model. Therefore, House appropriations committees in the 
inter-institutional bargaining context are reacting to presidential requests. In the next section, 
I will investigate whether the full House reacts to presidential requests, Senate partisanship, 
both, or neither.   
 Table 4.5 reruns the model with different House and Senate partisan control variables. 
The model substitutes chamber partisan control for chamber coalition size to test whether 
majority status or size is more of an influence on House appropriations requests. The two 
variables were operationalized by dividing the number of Democratic members by the total 
number of seats in each chamber. Based on the party literature, the expectation is that 
majority status and not coalition size structures partisan influence in the appropriations 
process. This is precisely what I find. The Senate Democratic coalition size was not 
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statistically significant. House Democratic coalition size was also not statistically significant 
with a coefficient of 6.2365. These findings support the expectations that majority status and 
not coalition size is driving the results. This finding is not surprising given that the House 
leadership provide a partisan majority to each committee, particularly critical committees 
such as appropriations. Even a one vote committee advantage provides the majority with the 
full set of procedural advantages to allow bills to be sent to the House floor.  
 The economic results largely fail to match the theoretical expectations. Table 4.4 
reports that the unemployment rate coefficient is positive, as predicted; however, the 
coefficient is not statistically significant. Similarly, the inflation rate is negative, as predicted, 
but the coefficient of -0.2482 percentage points is also not statistically significant with a p-
value of .51. The coefficient for total federal spending is 0.0122 and is also not statistically 
significant.  The only economic factor that appears to influence the second step in the 
appropriations process is federal deficit size. The deficit coefficient equals -0.0306 
percentage points and is statistically significant with a p-value of .02.  In other words, a one 
percent increase in deficit spending, results in a decrease of 0.03 percentage points in House 
Committee on Appropriations budget requests. The finding is consistent with the theoretical 
expectation that higher deficit spending is related to lower appropriations spending.  It is also 
consistent with the popular perception among scholars that the House Committee on 
Appropriations functions as a gatekeeper of the federal purse.  Deficit size represents a 
common statistic, with enormous symbolic weight, evoked by House members that seek to 
pursue a more conservative spending approach. While deficit spending is found to influence 
House appropriations committee behavior, economic factors largely do not.  
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NATIONAL BUDGET PROCESS REFORMS 
 Table 4.6 compares the influence of the models independent variables on House 
Committee on Appropriations Requests before and after the 1974 Congressional Budget and 
Impoundment Control Act (CBICA). I split the data into fiscal years 1948-1974 and 1975 to 
2006 to test the impact of the CBICA on Congressional appropriations. I run a pooled times 
series regression analysis for both data sets and compare the partisan, economic and 
institutional factors on coefficient size and statistical significance in the model.  
The results suggest that the law had little influence on the relationship between the 
Executive and Legislative Branches in terms of partisan influence, but does provide evidence 
of a shift in economic effects. The Democratic presidential and House partisan control 
variables demonstrate little change either in the coefficient size or in their statistical 
significance before and after 1974. These findings suggest that the act did not have the 
intended effect of shifting budgetary power from the Executive to the Legislative Branches, 
as intended.  It also suggests that direct and indirect partisan factors continued to play a 
central role in determining changes in House Committee appropriations requests.  
Conversely, the CBICA appears to have successfully achieving another goal, 
strengthening the relationship between deficit sizes and appropriations requests. Prior to 
1974, the analysis actually indicates a positive relationship between deficit size and 
appropriations increases. In other words, prior to 1974, as deficit size increased so did House 
Committee appropriations requests.  This pattern reversed following the passage of CBICA. 
After 1974, the relationship between deficit size and annual appropriations becomes 
consistently negative.  The findings suggest that the CBICA incentivized House Committee 
members to control spending increases or even decrease domestic spending as deficit sizes 
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increased. While the CBICA did not appear to achieve all of its original goals, it appears that 
it was effective at linking national deficits and domestic spending. 
In the previous chapter, the findings indicated that the effect of presidential and 
Congressional partisanship both significantly decreased following the passage of the CBICA. 
Conversely, the influence of presidential and Congressional partisanship did not alter the 
House of Representatives appropriations requests. I suggest that this discrepancy is due to the 
nature of the stages of the budget process. The CBICA fundamentally altered the budget 
process by placing a cap on total federal spending. The president consistently requests 
significant increases, partisanship is found to influence the size of these increased requests. 
On the other hand, the House of Representatives consistently decreases presidential 
appropriations.  While the CBICA reduced the partisan influence on presidential spending 
requests by capping total federal spending, it did not significantly alter the ability of the 
House to recommend budget cuts or for partisan effects to influence those reductions.   
 In 1985, the Congress passed the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control 
Act (BBEDCA), otherwise known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act after the three 
legislative sponsors of the bill. The purpose of the legislation was to reduce government 
deficits by setting annual reduction targets (Oleszek 2004). Under the rules of the legislation, 
if the Congress failed to reach the annual deficit reduction targets, the president was 
authorized to impose across the board spending cuts to federal agencies. Most analysts 
believe that the reform failed to achieve its intended goals because most annual 
appropriations were excluded from the legislation. The successor to the BBEDCA, the 1990 
Budget Enforcement Act (BEA), expired in 2002.  
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To test for the influence of these budget reforms, I included a dummy variable in the 
analysis coded 1 for years in which the BBEDCA and BEA were in effect and 0 otherwise. 
The expectation is that this legislation would curtail government spending and reduce annual 
appropriations bills. The empirical evidence supports the popular notion that these budget 
reforms failed to achieve their intended goals. Table 4.4 reports the results of the pooled time 
series analysis. The coefficient for the Balanced Budget Acts equals -2.5425.  The coefficient 
is in the expected direction since House appropriations bills that fall under the act were on 
average 2.5 percentage points below appropriations bills not covered by the legislation. 
However, the coefficient was not statistically significant. This empirical result lends credence 
to the notion that the Balanced Budget Acts were unsuccessful at reducing annual 
appropriations.   
 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS - THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
The House of Representatives consideration of the House Committee on 
Appropriations’ budget requests represents the third step in the appropriations process. Table 
4.7 reports the summary statistics for the House of Representative change to the House 
Committee on Appropriations budget requests. House Democrats reduce House 
Appropriations Committee spending by an average of 2.2 percentage points, while House 
Republicans request on average a 1.1 percentage point reduction in spending. According to 
the t-test results, these figures are not statistically different and therefore fail to provide 
evidence that there exists a direct impact of partisanship on House floor appropriations 
requests.  
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Table 4.9 reports the results of the summary statistics. Both Republican and 
Democratic Houses reduce Democratic presidential requests more than Republican 
presidents. This is not a surprising finding given that Democratic presidents request 
significantly higher levels of domestic spending than their Republican counterparts. 
Table 4.8 reports the two-way analysis of variance test of the direct and indirect 
influence of partisanship on House of Representative floor appropriations.  The ANOVA test 
provides evidence of both a direct and indirect partisan effect. The direct effect, House of 
Representatives majority status, has an F-value of 5.58 and a p-value of 0.02. This test shows 
clear evidence of a direct effect of House partisan control on House of Representative 
appropriations requests. The result of the indirect effects are mixed.  The presidential partisan 
control does appear to influence House floor decisions with an F-value of 0.2 and a p-value 
of 0.65.  Conversely, Senate partisan control does influence House floor appropriations 
requests with an F-value of 7.52 and a p-value of 0.01. This evidence suggests that the parent 
chamber is forward looking in its appropriations requests accounting for the next actor in the 
appropriations process. This is in contrast to the House Committee on Appropriations which 
accounted for partisan control of the presidency in determining appropriations requests.  
To test the effect of Senate majority party control and the alternative theories of 
institutional and economic factors, I again turn to the time series regression analysis. I run a 
series of diagnostic checks to determine if the pooled time series random effects model is the 
most efficient estimator of the panel data. The Wald statistic, which tests the significance of 
the independent variables in the model, is 11.24 with a p-value of 0.04.  This indicates that I 
can reject the null hypothesis that the independent variables do not have a significant effect 
on House floor appropriations request changes from the House Committee on Appropriations 
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proposed budget. I use the Hausman test to determine whether the random and fixed effects 
coefficients are significantly different. The null hypothesis is that Xit and ui are uncorrelated. 
The chi-square statistic is positive and not significant, p-value 0.93; therefore, I cannot reject 
the null hypothesis that Xit and ui are uncorrelated.  The Hausman test indicates that the 
random effects model is the more efficient model for the House data.  
Panel data techniques also possess a number of potential statistical problems that are 
necessary to test for. First, I test for biased standard errors using robust standard errors. 
Second, I test serial correlation. The Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in the panel data 
reported a p-value of 0.41. This finding does not reject the null hypothesis of no serial 
correlation. Third, I test for heteroscedasticity using the Breusch-Pagan test.  The null 
hypothesis is that there is no heteroscedasticity.  The p-value of .73 is not significant 
indicating that the null hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity cannot be rejected. The test 
statistics suggest that the random effects model is an efficient estimator of the panel data.   
The model is as follows:  
∆ Average Appropriations Requests = β0 + β1∆ House Appropriations Committee Request + 
β2 Democratic Presidential Control + β3 Democratic House Control + β4 Democratic Senate 
Control + β5 National Deficit + β6 Total Federal Spending + β7 Unemployment + β8 Inflation 
+ β9 Conflict + β10 Election Year + εi  
 
The dependent variable is again the average percent change in the House of Representatives 
from the House Committee on Appropriation’s budget recommendations. The independent 
variables include the identical partisan, economic, and electoral controls used in the House 
Committee on Appropriations analysis. The pooled time series results fails to provide support 
for the direct hypothesis, but they do support the indirect hypothesis.  Table 4.10 illustrates 
that Democratic House majority status fails to directly impact House floor appropriations 
request levels. The Democratic House majority control coefficient is negative, as expected, 
116 
 
but not statistically significant with a p-value of 0.13. Partisanship does not appear to 
influence appropriations change between the House Committee on Appropriations and the 
parent chamber.  However, when this fact is combined with the summary statistics, indicating 
that the House floor makes only minor adjustments to House Appropriations Committee 
requests, it seems reasonable to deduce that the House Appropriations Committee accurately 
represents the preferences of the full House.  In other words, regardless of partisan control, 
the House Committee on Appropriations accurately represents the preferences of the larger 
House membership.  This conclusion is based on the proximity of the committee and full 
House appropriations.  
The Senate represents the next actor in the appropriations process and, therefore, I 
expect Democratic Senate majority status, rather than presidential partisan control, to 
indirectly influence House appropriations requests. This is precisely what I find. The 
Democratic presidential coefficient is in the expected direction, but is not statistically 
significant with a p-value of 0.46. Conversely, Democratic Senate majority status coefficient 
is in the expected positive direction8.4795 and statistically significant with a p-value of 0.00. 
The findings indicate that a change from Republican to Democratic Senate control results in 
an 8.4795 percentage point increase in House of Representatives appropriations requests. 
These results confirm the theoretical expectation that the House floor’s strategic actions 
account for the next actor in the budget cycle.  Combining the results of the indirect effects of 
these two appropriations stages reveals that the strategic actions of the House Committee on 
Appropriations are backward looking, based on the partisan control of the executive, while 
the House floor is forward looking, based on Senate partisan control.  
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 I run a second pooled time series analysis substituting House and Senate majority 
status with chamber coalition size to determine if majority status or majority size is driving 
the findings. The expectation is that majority status and not coalition size structures partisan 
influence in the appropriations process. This is precisely what I find. Table 4.11 reports that 
Democratic House and Senate coalition sizes are not statistically significant. These findings 
support the expectations that majority status and not coalition size is driving the results. This 
finding is not surprising given that the majority party leadership assigns a large partisan 
majority to the appropriations committee. Even a one-vote committee advantage provides the 
majority with the full set of procedural advantages to allow bills to be sent to the House floor.  
 The economic results reported in Table 4.10 do not match the theoretical 
expectations. The unemployment rate coefficient is positive, however, it is not statistically 
significant. Similarly, the inflation rate is negative, as predicted, but the coefficient is also not 
statistically significant with a p-value of 0.51. The coefficient for total federal spending is 
also not statistically significant.  The only economic factor that appears to influence the third 
step in the appropriations process is federal deficit size. The deficit coefficient equals -0.004 
and is statistically significant with a p-value of 0.02.  The finding is consistent with the 
theoretical expectation that higher budget deficits are related to higher reduction in House 
appropriations cuts.   
 
NATIONAL BUDGET REFORMS 
 In the previous chapter, I tested the impact of numerous federal budget process 
changes on the relationship between partisan and economic variables and presidential 
appropriations request levels. This analysis indicated that the 1974 Congressional Budget 
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Impoundment Control Act (CBICA) altered the relationship between economic variables and 
presidential appropriations requests, but did not influence the impact of partisanship on 
presidential requests. Table 4.12 details the results of the tests of the CBICA on House floor 
appropriations.  The findings indicate that the partisan relationship is consistent over the 
entire time series. Democratic Senate majority status control has a significant influence on 
House floor appropriations both before and after the 1974 passage of the CBICA.  
 Another national budget reform that became a popular legislating method starting in 
the 1980’s was the use of omnibus legislation. During the past 30 years, the use of omnibus 
legislation in the appropriations process has varied dramatically. In some years, all 13 annual 
appropriations bills have been included in omnibus bills while other years have used no 
omnibus legislation. I coded a dummy variable for omnibus legislation with 1 identifying 
bills that were included in an omnibus package and 0 otherwise. Table 4.10 reports the 
empirical findings. My expectation is that omnibus legislation should produce higher 
spending bills. Omnibus legislation is a method of packaging appropriations bills in order to 
gather the necessary votes to pass legislation that otherwise would face legislative 
uncertainty. Therefore, I expect omnibus appropriations bills to produce increases in 
appropriations spending.  
The omnibus coefficient is -6.8721. This suggests that appropriations bills included in 
omnibus legislation were actually 6.8 percent smaller than bills not included in omnibus bills. 
While the coefficient is not statistically significant, the direction of the variable is the 
opposite of the theoretical expectations. One possible explanation is that the House of 
Representatives, which is often seen as the gatekeeper of the federal purse, uses omnibus 
119 
 
legislation as a means of reducing spending just as other proponents use it as a method to 
pass legislation that would otherwise prove difficult to pass.  
 
SUMMARY 
The analysis of national data indicates that the House Committee on Appropriations 
and the full House of Representatives membership are influenced by partisan strategic 
considerations. Partisanship has both a direct and indirect influence on both stages of the 
appropriations process; however, these two stages react to external actors in different 
manners. Partisan control of the Executive Branch and House of Representatives influences 
the House Appropriations Committee strategic behavior. Alternatively, the partisan control of 
the Senate influences the strategic considerations of the full House of Representatives. This 
evidence provides several new insights into the workings of the House of Representatives 
appropriations process. First, the House Committee on Appropriations accurately represents 
the preferences of the full House.  In other words, the House Committee considers not only 
the preferences of Committee members, but also the preferences of the larger House in 
determining their appropriations proposal.  
Second, while the House Committee on Appropriations strategically adjusts their 
appropriations requests based on the partisan composition of the House of Representatives 
and Executive Branch, the full House bases its strategic decisions on the partisan 
composition of the Senate.  In both cases, partisan control structures the accommodative 
strategy of House members to adjust appropriations towards the preferences of other veto-
wielding actors in the appropriations process. The following section explores whether the 
House’s role in the appropriations process is consistent across state governments.  
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THE AMERICAN STATE HOUSES  
The American states possess the institutional variation that the national government 
lacks. The states, therefore, represent the ideal environment to confirm or reject the findings 
that partisan factors influence the strategic interactions between the policymaking branches. 
If structural factors alone account for the incremental nature of budgeting, then the variation 
in institutional and structural characteristics across the state governments should provide the 
leverage necessary to refute the national-level findings. The analysis utilizes the same 
categories of dependent and independent variables utilized in the national study including 
partisan, structural, and economic factors. The state-level analysis includes only one 
dependent variable.  The states provide data only at the House floor level and not at the 
committee level.  
State Houses execute a nearly identical role in the state appropriations process as the 
House of Representatives does in the federal appropriations process. The governor forwards 
appropriations requests to the State House appropriations committee for consideration.  The 
appropriations committee membership has a large majority party advantage on most 
committees and constructs appropriations recommendations that are forwarded to the full 
State House. The full House considers the committee recommendations and constructs an 
appropriations bill. The House appropriations bill is then forwarded to the Senate 
appropriations committee. The House represents the middle actor in the three institution 
bargaining game and the pivotal actor in appropriations negotiations.  
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DATA AND METHODS – STATE HOUSES 
The data set is composed of State House agency-level appropriations requests for ten 
states for an average of twelve years each. Most of the states provided data for the most 
recent ten-year period (1998-2008).  North Carolina and South Carolina possessed archived 
budget data that allowed for the collection of several decades of state budget years. The final 
sample included ten states covering a total of 160 separate state fiscal years, accounting for 
1,280 total state agency requests.  The data is composed only of full House 
recommendations.  State budget offices did not have records of committee recommendations.  
The research methods employed largely mimic those of the U.S. House of 
Representatives analysis. Summary statistics are analyzed to provide an overview of State 
House changes to gubernatorial appropriations requests. A pooled time series analysis is 
conducted to control for the structural, economic and institutional characteristics that are 
expected to influence state-level appropriations. The following section outlines the model 
hypotheses to be tested in the analysis.  
 
MODEL HYPOTHESES 
The theoretical expectations largely match the national study for partisan variables. 
However, the theoretical expectations for institutional and economic factors differ 
significantly from the national expectations. The direct partisan hypothesis posits that 
Republican controlled State Houses are expected to request larger reductions in gubernatorial 
requests than Democratically controlled Houses.  State Houses, much like the U.S. House of 
Representatives, represent the gatekeepers of the state government purse. Therefore, State 
Houses are expected to reduce gubernatorial spending requests regardless of partisan 
122 
 
affiliation. Notwithstanding, partisanship is expected to determine the magnitude of the 
decrease in House appropriations proposals with Republicans requesting larger decreases 
than Democrats.   
The indirect hypothesis predicts that institutional actors adjust their appropriations 
requests toward the preferences of other veto wielding institutions. Again, this hypothesis is 
the central independent variable in the analysis.  The theoretical expectations again assume 
an accommodative strategy by House members, meaning members adjust appropriations 
requests towards the preferences of other veto-wielding actors. Given that Democratic 
institutions seek higher levels of domestic spending, the hypothesis posits that Democratic 
control of the Executive Branch or the Senate should reduce State House cuts in 
gubernatorial appropriations requests.  
The theoretical expectations for the institutional variables are as follows. 
Gubernatorial formal and informal powers increase the political power of the Executive 
Branch relative to State Houses.  Therefore, increases in gubernatorial powers are expected 
to increase gubernatorial influence on House appropriations proposals. I expect that an 
increase in gubernatorial budget powers, veto authority, and approval ratings results in a 
lower level of House appropriations reductions.   
Legislative formal institutional powers are also expected to influence House 
appropriations proposals. Increases in institutional powers are expected to increase the 
authority of State Houses relative to the Executive Branch. Therefore, the enactment of term 
limits should lower relative legislative influence, increase the influence of the Executive 
Branch, and reduce Democratic Houses reductions in gubernatorial requests. Alternatively, 
higher rates of legislative professionalism and budget powers should increase the influence of 
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the State House relative to the Executive Branch and result in State Houses requesting higher 
levels of appropriations reductions.  
 Balanced budget requirements at the state-level are expected to alter the relationship 
between economic indicators and appropriations requests from those expected at the 
national-level.  At the national level, the results indicated that economic factors have a 
minimal impact on the appropriations process.  The federal government’s capacity to run 
budget deficits during economic downturns represents the theoretical disconnect between 
national and state economic indicators. Balanced budget requirement constrain the ability of 
state government to alter aggregate budget totals in a given year. Three factors, state tax 
structures, economic conditions, and committed funds, primarily determine annual aggregate 
revenues and expenditures. Tax structures and committed funds are assumed to be constant in 
the short run.  State economic conditions, therefore, are largely responsible for aggregate 
budget totals. When the economy is strong, available revenues increase and state government 
spending is expected to increase accordingly.  This economic reality changes the dynamics 
between state governments and financial indicators.  
 State appropriations requests are expected to align closely with state economic 
conditions. Increases in state unemployment rate are expected to decrease state revenues and 
increase State House appropriations reductions. Increases in national inflation rates are 
expected to also decrease state purchasing power and result in an increase in State House 
appropriations reductions. 
 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS  
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Table 4.13 reports the t-test results comparing the direct effect of partisanship on 
State House appropriations. Republican controlled State Houses reduce gubernatorial 
requests by an average of 1.5 percentage points compared to 1.2 percentage points for 
Democratically controlled State Houses. While the directional influence and the fact that 
Republican state legislatures reduce spending more than Democratically controlled State 
Houses are consistent with the empirical expectations, the t-test value of 0.32 indicates that 
that the two parties are not statistically different.  
Next I utilize a two-way analysis of variance test to measure the impact of direct and 
indirect partisanship on State House appropriations request levels. Table 4.14 reports the 
analysis findings. The tests results provide evidence of a direct, but not an indirect influence.  
The F-value for the direct effect of State House majority status control is 1.38 with a p-value 
of 0.04. This result suggests that State House partisanship does directly influence 
appropriation request levels. However, the indirect influence of gubernatorial and Senate 
partisan control do not have an influence with F-values of 1.26 and 1.04 respectively.  
Table 4.15 includes the results of House changes to gubernatorial appropriations 
requests across various partisan configurations of the state legislature. The findings indicate 
that Houses cut Democratic gubernatorial requests (-1.8) significantly more than Republican 
gubernatorial requests (-1.5).  This result is not surprising given the fact that Democratic 
governors request higher appropriations increases than their Republican counterparts. The 
differences in Democratic and Republican House appropriations reductions are more difficult 
to isolate. The results do provide some evidence that Senate partisan control has a significant 
influence on House appropriations decisions.  
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To statistically control for a myriad of political and economic factors that influence 
the appropriations process, I pooled the data and ran a time series regression. The dependent 
variable again is the percent change in State House requests from the governor’s 
appropriations requests.  The independent variables include a vector of partisan, structural, 
and economic factors.  
I run a series of diagnostic checks to determine if the pooled time series random 
effects model is the most efficient estimator of the panel data. The Wald statistic, which tests 
the significance of the independent variables in the model, is 78.73 with a p-value of 0.000.  
This indicates that I can reject the null hypothesis that the independent variables do not have 
a significant effect on State House appropriations request changes from the governor’s 
proposed budget. I use the Hausman test to determine whether the random and fixed effects 
coefficients are significantly different. The null hypothesis is that Xit and ui are uncorrelated. 
The chi-square statistic is positive and not significant, p-value 0.84; therefore, I cannot reject 
the null hypothesis that Xit and ui are uncorrelated.  The Hausman test indicates that the 
random effects model is the more efficient model for the State House data.  
Panel data techniques also possess a number of potential statistical problems that are 
necessary to test for. First, I test for biased standard errors using robust standard errors. 
Second, I test serial correlation. The Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in the panel data 
reported a p-value of 0.49. This finding does not reject the null hypothesis of no serial 
correlation. Third, I test for heteroscedasticity using the Breusch-Pagan test.  The null 
hypothesis is that there is no heteroscedasticity.  The p-value of .99 is not significant 
indicating that the null hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity cannot be rejected. The test 
statistics suggest that the random effects model is an efficient estimator of the panel data.   
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The model is as follows: 
∆ Average Appropriations Requests = β0 + β1Previous Year Gubernatorial Appropriations 
Request + β2 Democratic Gubernatorial Control + β3 Democratic House Control + β4 
Democratic Senate Control + β5 Gubernatorial Budget Powers + β6  Gubernatorial Veto 
Authority + β7 Legislative Term Limits + β8 Legislative Professionalism + β9 Legislative 
Budget Powers  + β10 Unemployment + β11 Inflation + β12 Election Year + εi  
 
Table 4.16 displays the statistical results. First, the direct effect the Democratic House 
control coefficient is positive, as expected, however, the variable is not statistically 
significant with a p-value of 0.42. The state-level results do not support the direct hypothesis 
that partisan control directly influences State House appropriations requests. The Democratic 
gubernatorial coefficient is negative, as expected, but is also not significant with a p-value of 
0.23. The Democratic Senate coefficient (-0.9766) is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
The results indicate that State Houses facing Democratic Senates decrease appropriations by 
a smaller margin than those facing Republican Senates. The result is also consistent with the 
theoretical expectation and summary findings indicating that Houses strategically adjust their 
appropriations based on the partisan control of other veto wielding institutions.  Again, 
House members are forward looking in their strategic behavior making adjustments based on 
the next actor in the appropriations process.  
Surprisingly, the institutional variables do not have an impact on House 
appropriations requests. This result runs counter to the theoretical expectations. 
Gubernatorial approval ratings, expected to increase gubernatorial influence on House 
requests was not statistically significant. The gubernatorial veto authority coefficient, also 
expected to increase gubernatorial influence on House requests also lacked statistical 
significance. Finally, the gubernatorial budget powers coefficient is positive, as expected, but 
also failed to achieve statistical significance.  These results suggest that gubernatorial formal 
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and informal powers fail to have a significant impact on House appropriations decisions. 
Again, this is not a surprising result given that the partisan factors indicate that governors do 
not significantly alter the decision-making of House members.   
The economic variables provided mixed results. Unemployment is measured as the 
average percent unemployment rate for the 6 months prior to the budget passing. I expected 
unemployment coefficient to be negative and significant. This is exactly what I find. The 
other main economic indicator identified in the literature is inflation.  Higher rates of 
inflation are hypothesized to reduce appropriations levels in real terms. I measure inflation 
using the 6 month average of changes in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) prior to passing of 
the state budget. This coefficient was not significant. The results indicate that unemployment, 
a proxy for economic well-being, does have a significant effect on House appropriations 
requests. As expected, poor economic conditions result in decreases in House appropriations.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Scholars identify the House at the national and state-level as the most influential actor 
in the appropriations process.  As the middle actor in a three institution bargaining game, the 
House faces the complex task of ensuring government fiscal responsibility while 
incorporating the appropriations preferences of the executive and Senate. Political parties 
have long been considered a critical component of House organizational structures and 
connection between members and citizens. This study suggests that partisanship is critical to 
understanding the strategic behavior of House members at both the committee and floor-level 
and at both the national and state-levels. The findings indicate that partisanship does 
influence House strategic behavior both directly and indirectly.   
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House appropriations decisions were analyzed at three separate points, U.S. House of 
Representatives Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representative floor decisions, 
and State House floor decisions, and partisanship influenced appropriations decisions both 
directly and indirectly at all three points in the appropriations process in American 
government. The findings suggest that House members are strategic actors in the 
appropriations process in American government.  House partisanship reflects the differing 
ideological positions of the House coalitions in regards to domestic appropriations spending. 
Additionally, the findings support the notion that House member strategic actions represent 
an accommodative approach with the House basing appropriations decisions partially on the 
partisan makeup of other veto-wielding institutions. At both the national and state-level, 
partisanship drives House decision-making within the context of the structural appropriations 
process.  
Partisanship was also found to structure the relationship between the House of 
Representatives Committee on Appropriations and the parent chamber. The House 
Committee on Appropriations strategically responded to presidential partisan control, while 
the parent chamber responded to Senate partisan control. This dual relationship between the 
House and the other policymaking branches is further supported by antidotal evidence. The 
Executive Branch often focuses its lobbying efforts for sustaining presidential budget 
recommendations at the committee-level. The parent chamber, on the other hand, must 
account for the preferences of the next actor in the appropriations process, namely the Senate. 
In this way, the House accounts for the policy priorities of both veto-wielding institutions in 
order to maximize their electoral and budgetary goals.   
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The institutional variables were found to have little impact on House appropriations 
requests. Neither the executive nor the legislative institutional variables provided any 
statistically significant impact on House behavior.  This finding suggests that structural and 
partisan factors shape House behavior and not the relative powers of the executive and House 
institutions. This finding is consistent with the notion that actors utilize an accommodating 
partisan strategy. If House members were reactive or sincere, then I would expect state 
differences in relative institutional powers between the executive and legislature to influence 
appropriations requests. House members utilizing a reactive or sincere strategy are motivated 
to use negative powers to entice (or cajole) other institutional actors into accepting their 
preferences. In such a bargaining game, it would logically follow that institutional actors that 
possess stronger formal and informal powers would improve their appropriations positions. 
However, in a bargaining game where actors utilize an accommodating strategy, actors are 
seeking compromising positions that account for other veto-wielding actor’s preferences, 
thus reducing the need for coercive tactics based on differences in formal powers.    
The economic findings reveal the central difference between national and State House 
appropriations processes. Again, economic well-being factors such as unemployment and 
inflation demonstrated no effect on House appropriations requests. These economic factors 
did significantly impact State House requests. Again, the difference in the effect of economic 
effects illustrates the fiscal constraints placed on state legislators that simply don’t appear to 
exist at the federal level.  This does not mean that national actors lack any constraints. Deficit 
size does impact House of Representative appropriations decisions. Since the national 
government can run large budget deficits, it is deficit sizes and not economic factors that 
influence decision-making at the national-level.  
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The findings that partisanship drives budget negotiations both at the Committee and 
floor level and at the national and state-level has serious implications for Democratic 
governance. Unlike the Executive Branch, the House represents a complex and diverse 
institution composed of members with divergent policy goals. Without partisanship playing a 
role in the appropriations process, citizens have little chance to hold policymakers 
accountable for their policy decisions. This study provides strong evidence that partisanship 
both directly and indirectly influences House strategic bargaining decisions.   
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CHAPTER 5 
THE SENATE AND THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS 
 
In this chapter, I examine the Senate’s role in the appropriations process. At the 
national-level, I examine the Senate Committee on Appropriations budget recommendations 
and the full Senate appropriations recommendations. At the state-level, I examine the Senate 
floor-level appropriations recommendations. While the Senate represents the third actor in 
the appropriations process, it does not represent the last word in the appropriations process. 
Once the Senate has completed its appropriations legislation, Senate and House members 
must reconcile the two appropriations bills in conference committee. The executive has 
authority to sign or veto the final bill.  In these ways, both the House and the Executive 
Branch retain veto authority over Senate decision-making (Ferejohn 1975).  Despite 
representing the third actor in the appropriations process, I expect the Senate to maintain 
incentives to account for the preferences of the other veto-wielding actors in the 
appropriations process.  
The Senate generally increases House appropriations requests in the third stage of the 
budget process. This study investigates the influence of partisanship on the extent to which 
the Senate’s structural appropriations role is carried out. I argue that partisanship has a direct 
influence on the magnitude with which this structural role is followed. The analysis also 
examines the role of inter-institutional bargaining in determining Senate appropriations 
requests. While the Senate represents the third actor in the process, both the House, through 
the conference committee, and the Executive Branch, through veto authority, retain influence 
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over the appropriations process. By accounting for the preferences of these veto-wielding 
actors, I argue that partisanship has an indirect influence on Senate appropriations decisions. 
Examining changes in Senate appropriations across various configurations of government is 
the research design I employ to identify these patterns. The study also controls for a number 
of independent variables that influence the appropriations process including institutional and 
economic characteristics.  
This study also investigates the relationships between Senate Committee on 
Appropriations and the full Senate. This analysis was not completed at the state-level due to a 
lack of data availability. The Senate in American government performs similar decision-
making tasks in the appropriations process to the House, but the institutions are also 
exceedingly different driven by divergent motivations, structural characteristics, and 
representative structures (Fenno 1966). The Senate Committee on Appropriations 
relationship to the parent chamber is characterized by less conflict than the House Committee 
on Appropriations. There exists a more formal link between the Senate Committee members 
with other Committees and the party leadership of the Senate. The Senate Committee on 
Appropriations is more likely than the House Committee on Appropriations to act on behalf 
of the Senate. Senate members are driven by the desire for influence, rather than the desire 
for special access to information and group identity. These structural differences between the 
House and Senate are expected to produce differences in appropriations requests even when 
member policy preferences are similar.  The Senate Committee on Appropriations is 
expected to better represent the Senate than the House Committee on Appropriations 
represents the House based on institutional differences in representation and the incentive 
structures of individual members in each chamber.  
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The following section outline’s the specific role that the Senate performs in the 
appropriations process in American government. This analysis lays the groundwork for the 
model hypotheses and empirical analysis later in the chapter.  
 
THE SENATE’S ROLE IN THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS 
The Senate represents the third institutional actor in a three institution appropriations 
process. At the national-level, the Senate is involved in two components of the budget 
process, namely the passage of a Budget Committee reconciliation bill and passage of 13 
appropriations bills. This analysis focuses on the second stage of this process. At the state-
level, the process is isolated to construction of appropriations bills. The Senate produces the 
second binding appropriations bill and encompasses two stages in the appropriations 
process9. First, the Senate Committee on Appropriations proposes a set of appropriations 
recommendations and sends them to the parent chamber. Second, the full Senate passes a 
revised appropriations bill. The diffuse committee structure necessitates that Senate 
leadership maintain structures that incentivize committee members to consider the policy 
preferences of the larger Senate. Simultaneously, both committee members and Senate 
leadership must consider the preferences of the other actors in the bargaining process.  
Once the House passes an appropriations bill, it moves to the Senate, where a second 
set of appropriations must be made and reconciled with the House requests. Similar to the 
House, most decisions in the Senate are made at the committee-level. The Senate, even more 
so than the House, generally follows the recommendations of the Senate appropriations 
committees. At the national level, the Senate has historically respected and valued the 
                                                 
9 For ease of use, Senate refers to both the U.S. Senate and State Senates. When I refer to either institution 
individually, I use the actual titles.  
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autonomy and decision-making authority of individual Senators. This autonomy results in the 
full U.S. Senate respecting the decision-making of the individual committees. Therefore, 
committee-level decision-making requires even more consideration than it did in the House 
analysis.  
Again, the Senate Committee on Appropriations actions are constrained by the budget 
resolution passed by the House and Senate Budget Committees. The budget resolution 
provides a blue print for federal spending, but does not bind the House or Senate to specific 
spending for appropriations bills. The budget resolution does impose limits on overall federal 
spending. While the budget limits and the overall appropriations spending should be highly 
correlated, the more interesting question is the impact of the establishment of the Budget 
Committees on appropriations spending patterns. Therefore, I test the effect of the 1974 
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act later in the analysis.   
At the national-level, the difference in representation between the House of 
Representatives and the U.S. Senate offers insight into the disparity in appropriations 
requests.  The committee-level analysis is isolated to the national-level because the state data 
lacks committee-level appropriations. House of Representative member constituencies tend 
to be homogenous geographic and demographic units with limited specific interests that need 
to be satisfied (Fenno 1966).  Alternatively, U.S. Senate member constituencies represent 
state-wide, geographically and demographically diverse units with numerous constituencies 
that require distribution of benefits and services.  This difference in representation partially 
explains the Senates penchant for increased spending relative to the House of 
Representatives.  The other difference extends to both the U.S. Senate and State Senates, 
namely the Senate’s position in the order of the appropriations process. As the first 
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legislative actor, the House faces significant pressures to reduce overall spending. The Senate 
thus faces the more advantageous position of receiving appropriations after they have been 
significantly reduced.  Senators, therefore, can judge appropriations requests without 
overriding fiscal constraints.   
The expectation between the Senate and the Senate Committee on Appropriations 
contrasts with that of the House of Representatives. Rather than working on behalf of the 
Senate, the Committee on Appropriations is expected to act as a direct surrogate of the 
Senate.  In other words, the Senate and the Committee on Appropriations should be almost 
indistinguishable.  The Senate Committee on appropriations also has approximately 27 
members, representing more than 25 percent of the membership, compared with 
approximately 60 members on the House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations, 
representing less than 14 percent of the total chamber.  The fact that the Committee on 
Appropriations is comprised of such a large portion of the Senate provides further evidence 
of that the committee should better represent the preferences of the parent chamber.   
Despite representing the third actor in the appropriations process, both the U.S. 
Senate and State Senates have formal and informal incentives to account for the preferences 
of other veto-wielding actors in constructing their appropriations requests. Both the executive 
and the House retain veto authority in the appropriations process even after they have 
completed their appropriations requests. First, the House represents the next actor in the 
process.  Once the Senate approves an appropriations bill it precedes to a conference 
committee or the House and Senate must alter their appropriations to construct identical bills. 
The conference committee is composed of representatives from the House and Senate who 
must reconcile the two versions of the bill. Drastic differences between the chamber 
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appropriations bills can result in gridlock and require both institutional actors to develop new 
appropriations bills. Both House and Senate members possess significant incentives to avoid 
this situation.  Second, the Senate must also consider the preferences of the executive due to 
veto authority. The executive possesses the authority to veto or sign appropriations bills after 
the House and Senate have reconciled their differences. This provides incentives for the 
Senate to account for the executive’s policy preferences. As a result, I expect the Senate to 
account for the preferences of other actors in the appropriations process.  
Conversely, the House of Representative and the Executive Branch have incentives to 
account for the preferences of the Senate based on two structural rules, the filibuster and the 
reconciliation process. As previously state, the filibuster provides the Senate with veto 
authority over appropriations legislation if 41 Senators agree to block the appropriations bill. 
The House of Representatives is also required to reconcile differences in appropriations bill 
with those of the upper chamber. Therefore, both the president and the House require 
significant Senate approval to pass appropriations bills.  
 
THEORY OF THE SENATE AND THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS   
The Senate appropriations process is fundamentally comparable to the House 
appropriations process at both the national and state-levels. Senate appropriations committees 
receive requests from the full House chamber, consider appeals from executive agencies, and 
make appropriations recommendations to the full Senate. The full Senate generally makes 
minimal changes to Senate appropriations committee recommendations and, if their exist 
differences between the two bills the Senate enters into a negotiation with the House in a 
conference committee.  The motivation of the members in each chamber, however, is quite 
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unique.  While the House constitutes the gatekeeper of the government purse, the Senate acts 
as the judicial appeals court (Fenno 1966). In other words, the Senate functions as a de facto 
arbitrator for executive agencies that face budget reductions from the House.  Based on this 
structural role, the Senate generally increases appropriations requests.  Within this structural 
role, there exists a complex system of bargaining between the Senate appropriations 
committees and the parent chambers as well as between the Senate, Executive Branch, and 
House.  
This study theorizes that partisanship influences the magnitude of the change in 
spending requests within the structural role of the Senate. In other words, the Senate is 
expected to increase spending requests, but the level of the increase should be influenced by 
the partisan composition of the Senate and other veto-wielding institutions. Since Democrats 
prefer higher levels of spending relative to Republicans, Democratically controlled Senates 
are expected to increase spending requests relative to their Republican counterparts. Senate 
members also have incentives to account for the policy preferences of the Executive Branch 
and House in determining appropriations outcomes.  
The motivation for Senators to consider these other veto-wielding actors is similar to 
those faced by executives and House members. First, failure to compromise can result in 
failure to achieve their desired budgetary allocations. While the Senate can dramatically 
increase spending, the House can alter changes in conference committee and the executive 
can institute a veto of the bill. Failing to account for the preferences of these other actors can 
result in failure to achieve one’s policy preferences.  Second, failing to achieve concessions 
towards their proposed budget can make the Senate appear inconsequential in appropriations 
decisions. If the Senate refuses to compromise and, as a result, fails to achieve any of their 
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appropriations priorities, then they face being labeled as obstructionists and ineffective. This 
strategy can produce negative electoral consequences. Senate members also seek to credit 
claim for appropriations procured for their constituents.  Taking an adversarial approach on 
appropriations requests, runs counter to this electoral goal.  Therefore, Senate members are 
expected to compromise between achieving their appropriations goals and accounting for the 
preferences of other veto-wielding actors.  
Senators can choose one of three bargaining strategies.  First, they can choose budgeting 
positions that exaggerate their position.  This strategy could allow Senators to provide 
concessions and still achieve their true budgetary decisions. The potential negative 
consequences of such as strategy are considerable. By exaggerating their policy position they 
risk alienating the minority party membership within the Senate and the majorities of the 
other policymaking institutions.  This increases the risk of gridlock and negative electoral 
consequences. Second, Senators can choose a sincere strategy that produces appropriations 
bills that accurately represent the preferences of Senate members. In other words, their 
appropriations request could be based solely on member preferences.  Once again, such a 
strategy risks alienating House and Executive Branch members who support they must win to 
successfully pass appropriations legislation.  They also risk negative electoral consequences 
when those sincere positions differ significantly from their House and Executive Branch 
counterparts.  Third, Senate members can choose an accommodating strategy.  This strategy 
translates into members constructing appropriations requests that represent a compromise 
between their policy positions and the preferences of veto-wielding institutions. The strategy 
minimizes the risks and maximizes the benefits for electoral and budgetary goals. This 
strategy allows Senate members to minimize the risk of legislative gridlock and maximizes 
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their ability to credit claim while achieving a portion of their budgetary goals. I theorize that 
Senators employ this third strategy to maximize their electoral and budgetary benefits.    
I expect to see evidence of this strategic behavior in Senate appropriations requests. 
Political parties represent the mechanism by which institutional actors coalesce around 
shared policy and electoral goals both within and across institutions. Therefore, partisan 
control of the Senate should dictate the Senates strategic position in appropriations 
negotiations.  By examining the change in Senate appropriations requests across various 
configurations of government, it is possible to measure the level of accommodation in budget 
negotiations. The analysis also controls for vectors of institutional and economic variables 
that are expected to influence the relationship between partisanship and appropriations 
requests.  
The Executive Branch and the House both have incentives to take into account the 
preferences of the Senate in determining appropriations requests. First, unless appropriations 
are included in the reconciliation package, the Senate has the ability to filibuster 
appropriations. That is, appropriations bills must appeal to the 60th Senator opposite the 
ideological spectrum of the president. Filibuster authority provides the Senate with 
significant influence in the appropriations process because a minority of 41 Senators can hold 
up appropriations bills. Given that 60 Senators must agree to appropriations bill levels to 
achieve appropriations outcomes, generally members of the minority party in the Senate must 
agree to the appropriations levels in order to avoid filibuster (Krehbiel 1998). In other words, 
the Senate filibuster provides the minority party in the Senate the ability to influence 
appropriations levels. If appropriations are included in the reconciliation package the Senate 
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still needs to approve of the measure. In either circumstance, the president and the House 
require Senate approval to pass appropriations legislation.  
The political implications of the Senate filibuster are threefold. First, the Senate filibuster 
provides pressure to increase spending. The president requests increases in appropriations 
spending approximately 80 percent of the time. The Senate has traditional served as an 
arbitrator of agency cuts by the House of Representatives to presidential requests.  In other 
words, the Senate generally requests increases in appropriations spending. Therefore, two of 
the three actors in the appropriations process have incentives to increase appropriations 
spending, the president and the Senate. Second, the filibuster provides the central 
institutional mechanism for the minority party to have its budget preferences considered in 
the appropriations process. Unlike the Executive Branch and the House of Representatives 
which can technically make appropriations decisions with little input from the minority party. 
The Senate must account for the preferences of majority and minority Senators (Lee and 
Oppenhiemer 2006). Finally, the filibuster requires that the president and House of 
Representatives account for Senate member preferences in the appropriations process.  
 
DATA AND METHODS – U.S. SENATE 
The data set is composed of both Senate Committee on Appropriations agency-level 
appropriations requests and Senate floor agency-level appropriations requests for 15 
Congressional budget bills from fiscal year 1948-2006.10  Similar to the presidential and 
House of Representatives budget data, this data set was converted to constant dollars (2004) 
                                                 
10 The fiscal years 1948 through 1985 come from the data set collected by McCubbins and Kiewiet (1990).  I 
expanded this original data set by coding fiscal years 1986 through 2004.  
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and normalized. These data transformations not only decrease the likelihood of statistical 
error, but also create budget statistics that are approximations of dollars.  
The research strategy employed looks at the average percent changes in Senate 
Committee on Appropriations and Senate floor agency-level appropriations requests for 
different partisan government configurations (Lowery, Bookheimer, and Malachowski 1985; 
Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991). This strategy provides an empirical test of both the direct, 
through Senate majority control, and indirect, through the change in partisan control of the 
Executive Branch and House of Representatives, influence of partisanship in the 
appropriations process. If Senate appropriation requests change significantly across various 
partisan configurations of the president or Congress, this would provide clear evidence that 
Senate members strategically account for the partisan makeup of other institutional actors in 
constructing their appropriations requests.  
The data structure and model hypotheses call for several analysis strategies. First, a 
simple t-test for measuring the impact of partisanship on Senate requests is utilized; this 
analysis tests the simple expectation that Democratic Senates request higher levels of 
spending than Republican Senates.  A pooled time series analysis is also utilized to isolate 
the direct and indirect influence of partisanship and test alternative institutional and 
economic theories.  
 
MODEL HYPOTHESES – U.S. SENATE 
The first dependent variable is the average percent change in Senate Committee on 
Appropriations budget requests compared to the House of Representative’s agency-level 
appropriations requests (Senate Budget Estimates). The second dependent variable is the 
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average percent change in Senate floor appropriations requests compared to the Senate 
Committee on Appropriations budget requests. These dependent variables allow the 
particular stage in the budget process to be isolated. This strategy provides a means for 
comparing the impact of partisan configuration of the Senate as well as the House and 
Executive Branch on appropriations requests.  
Partisan, structural, and economic variables constitute the three categories of 
independent variables. Presidential partisanship, House of Representatives majority control, 
and Senate majority control, are each coded as dummy variables with 1 signifying 
Democratic control and 0 otherwise. In this analysis, Senate Democratic control is expected 
to directly increase Senate appropriations requests. This direct hypothesis holds for both the 
Senate committee and the Senate floor appropriations requests. Democratic control of the 
Executive Branch and House of Representatives is also expected to indirectly increase Senate 
Committee on Appropriations requests. Partisan control of the presidency and the House of 
Representatives are expected to influence the strategic decision-making of Senators in 
constructing appropriations bills. Two additional variables measure the impact of Democratic 
strength, the percentage of House seats controlled by Democrats and the percentage of Senate 
seats controlled by Democrats. As in the previous studies, I expect majority status rather than 
majority size to determine Senate strategic behavior.  
Structural variables constitute the second set of control variables including 
presidential approval ratings and election year. Since presidents structurally request increases 
in appropriations requests and Senate members are expected to implement a strategy of 
accommodation, the hypothesis posits that higher presidential approval ratings should result 
in higher appropriations requests. Policymakers also face electoral constraints in terms of 
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periodic elections which provide increased incentives to provide constituent benefits and 
higher appropriations requests. Election year is measured using a dummy variable equaling 1 
for election years and 0 otherwise. The resulting hypothesis posits that election years are 
associated with higher levels of spending.  
Economic factors constitute the third set of control variables including inflation, 
unemployment, total federal spending, and deficit size. Unemployment is measured as the 
average percent unemployment rate for the 6 months prior to the budget passing. Increasing 
unemployment results require increased government resources both in terms of a social 
safety net and an economic stimulus. Higher levels of unemployment are, therefore, 
hypothesized to result in increased Senate appropriations requests. The next economic 
indicator of note is the annual inflation rate. I measure inflation using the 6 month average of 
changes in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) prior to passage of the national budget. Higher 
rates of inflation are hypothesized to result in lower Senate appropriations requests. Higher 
rates of total federal spending create downward pressure on government appropriations.  
Therefore, I hypothesize that higher total federal spending is associated with lower Senate 
appropriations requests. Finally, the size of the deficit also places downward pressure on 
government spending.  Higher deficit spending is hypothesized to be associated with lower 
Senate appropriations.  
 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS – SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 
Table 5.1 reports the t-test for the average percent change in Senate Committee on 
Appropriations requests from the House of Representatives. As expected, Senate Committees 
increase House appropriations requests by an average of 4.62 percent. Republican controlled 
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Senate Committees increase House appropriations by 3.59 percentage points compared to 5.1 
percentage points for Democratically controlled Senates. While these findings are consistent 
with the empirical expectations, the t-test does not quite meet statistical significance at the 
0.05 level.  
Next I run a two-way analysis of variance test to measure the influence of direct and 
indirect partisan influence on Senate Committee Appropriations. Table 5.2 reports the 
findings. The results do not support the direct hypothesis that Democratic Senates request 
higher levels of funding than Republicans. The F-value equals 0.18 with a p-value of 0.67. 
The results of the indirect partisan effect are mixed. Presidential partisan control does not 
have a statistically significant impact on Senate Committee appropriations with an F-value of 
0.37 and a p-value of 0.54.  Conversely, House partisan control does have a statistically 
significant influence on Senate Committee appropriations requests with an F-value of 3.98 
and a p-value of 0.04. This finding is consistent with the theoretical expectations. Senate 
Committees are expected to account for House partisan control in order to reconcile the 
House and Senate appropriations bills.  
Table 5.3 provides the summary statistics for the average percentage Senate change to 
the House of Representatives appropriations request. The findings support the direct partisan 
hypothesis that Democratic Senates request higher levels of appropriations requests than 
Republicans. Democratically controlled Congresses request are 5.2 percentage point increase 
in appropriations, while Republican controlled Congresses request on average a 3.12 
percentage point increase.  The t-test comparing the 2.8 percentage point difference between 
partisan majorities in the Senate is statistically significant at the 0.05 level providing further 
credence that Democratically controlled Senate chambers seek higher appropriations requests 
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than their Republican counterparts. As previously stated, Senate Appropriations Committees, 
as the last actor in the appropriations process, are expected to increase House appropriations 
requests. The results are both in the expected direction.  Based on their position in the 
appropriations process and incentive structures, Senate Appropriations Committees generally 
increase appropriations requests. 
The findings also indicate strong support for the indirect effect of partisanship. Since 
Senate Appropriations Committees are expected to react to House of Representatives 
requests, I analyze the difference in Republican and Democratically controlled Senates under 
different partisan configurations of the House of Representatives. Republican controlled 
Senates increase appropriations requests approximately 2.8 percentage points following 
Republican control of the House of Representatives, conversely, following a Democratically 
controlled House of Representatives, Republican Senates request approximately no change in 
appropriations requests. Democratically controlled Senates increase spending 5.4 percentage 
points under Democratically controlled House of Representatives compared to approximately 
no change under Republican controlled Houses. These findings provide strong preliminary 
evidence that Senators are strategic actors utilizing an accommodative strategy. 
To verify that the summary statistics are not a product of an alternative predictor or 
an intervening variable, I run a pooled time series regression analysis. The purpose of this 
analysis is both to identify if partisan control influences Senate appropriations requests and to 
rule out any alternative explanations for the identified relationship between partisanship and 
Senate appropriations requests. The average change in Senate Appropriations Committee 
requests from the House of Representatives remains the dependent variable. The independent 
variables consist of a set of partisan, structural, and economic variables.  
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Panel data is data that is pooled for the same bills across time. In panel data, there 
may be unobserved bill-specific effects that are relatively constant over time. It is necessary 
to control for this time-series dependence in order to obtain unbiased standard errors. Panel 
data provides the advantage of using a larger sample size than if I use only one observation 
per bill; this technique allows greater estimation power so that coefficients can be estimated 
more precisely. Panel data also allows estimation of dynamic models and control for 
unobservable bill-specific effects that are correlated with the observed explanatory variables.  
I run a random effects model that controls for unobserved bill effects. The Wald 
statistic, which tests the significance of the independent variables in the model, is 88.09 with 
a p-value of 0.000.  Based on this result, I reject the null hypothesis that the independent 
variables do not have a significant effect on Senate Committee on Appropriations changes in 
House of Representative floor appropriations proposals. The random effects model assumes 
that the independent variables for a particular bill (Xit) in a particular time period and the 
individual specific bill effects (ui) are uncorrelated. If they are correlated, then a fixed effects 
model would constitute the more appropriate model to produced unbiased coefficients. The 
fixed effects model uses bill dummy variables to explain all the cross-sectional variation 
across the appropriations bills and therefore tests the variation within each individual bill 
over time. If Xit and ui are correlated, then the fixed effects model is more appropriate. To test 
whether Xit and ui are correlated, I use the Hausman test which indicates whether the random 
and fixed effects coefficients are significantly different. The null hypothesis assumes that Xit 
and ui are uncorrelated. The chi-square statistic is positive and not significant, p-value 0.25; 
therefore, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that Xit and ui are uncorrelated.  The Hausman 
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test indicates that the random effects model is the more efficient model for the Senate 
Committee on Appropriations data.  
Panel data techniques also possess a number of potential statistical problems that are 
necessary to test for. First, the standard error could be biased if the time-series dependence is 
not controlled for. In order to test whether the standard errors are biased, I run robust 
standard errors. Second, it is necessary to test for serial correlation (Drukker 2003). A test for 
serial correlation developed by Wooldridge (2002) can be applied to random and fixed 
effects models. The F-test .13 does not reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. 
Third, it is necessary to test for heteroscedasticity in the pooled time series model since the 
random variables could have different variances.  To test for heteroscedasticity, I use a 
Breusch-Pagan test.  The null hypothesis is that there is no heteroscedasticity.  The p-value is 
not significant indicating that the null hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity cannot be rejected. 
The test statistics suggest that the random effects model is an efficient estimator of the panel 
data.  
The statistical model is as follows: 
∆ Average Senate Committee on Appropriations Requests = β0 + β1∆ House of 
Representatives Appropriations Request + β2 Democratic Presidential Control + β3 
Democratic House Control + β4 Democratic Senate Control + β5 National Deficit + β6 Total 
Federal Spending + β7 Unemployment + β8 Inflation + β9 Conflict + β10 Election Year + εi  
 
The pooled time series results do not indicate support for the direct partisan hypothesis, but 
do support the indirect partisan hypotheses.  Table 5.4 illustrates that Senate majority control 
does not have a statistically significant influence on Senate appropriations request levels. The 
Democratic Senate majority control coefficient is 0.3733 and not statistically significant.  
The direct hypothesis does not hold up in the national-level analysis. The Democratic House 
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majority control coefficient equals 1.3392 and is statistically significant.  This finding 
supports the studies central premise that the Senate is a strategic actor incorporating the 
preferences of the House of Representatives when constructing their appropriations request. 
Surprisingly, the results suggest that the indirect partisan effect is stronger than the direct 
partisan effect. Clearly, Senate members are strategically basing their appropriations 
decisions on what House members will find acceptable in conference committee. These 
results also indicate why previous studies of the appropriations process that examine only the 
direct impact of partisanship find mixed results.  
The Democratic presidential variable was also not statistically significant.  This result 
suggests that, as expected, Senate chambers base their strategic decisions on House, not 
presidential partisan control. The House of Representatives represents the previous and the 
subsequent actor in the appropriations process.  The Senate both receives funding proposals 
from the House of Representatives and presents its appropriations requests to the House of 
Representatives in conference committee. A symbiotic relationship thus emerges between the 
House and Senate that requires a level of strategic accommodation.  The evidence bears out 
this accommodating relationship measured in terms of partisan institutional alignment.  
 I complete a second pooled time series model substituting the House and Senate 
partisan majority variables for chamber coalition size. The purpose of this second analysis is 
to determine whether majority status or coalition size has a greater influence on Senate 
appropriations requests. I expect majority status and not coalition size to influence Senate 
strategic decision-making. The results in Table 5.5 support this theory. Neither the House nor 
Senate Democratic coalition size was statistically significant in the model. Coalition size 
plays a critical role in legislative initiatives that are near the filibuster pivot in the Senate or 
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near the presidential veto override pivot for either chamber.  Appropriations bills rarely reach 
a level of disagreement where these legislative pivots come into play. Rather the 
appropriations process, driven by a strategy of inter-institutional cooperation, historically 
relies on majority control in the incremental process of agency adjustments. These findings 
support the expectations that majority status and not coalition size are critical to 
understanding the inter-institutional bargaining structure of the appropriations process.   
National economic indicators, such as unemployment and inflation, continue to 
contradict the theoretical expectations. Table 5.4 indicates that unemployment rate 
coefficient is -0.0169 and not statistically significant. The inflation rate is not in the expected 
negative direction or statistically significant. Similar to the House of Representative analysis, 
national economic factors do not appear to influence Senate member behavior. Unlike the 
House of Representative results, the Senate Committee the total federal spending and deficit 
size variables are not statistically significant. The results suggest that the Senate Committee 
on Appropriations does not account for economic factors in their strategic decision-making. I 
submit that since the House of Representatives already accounted for total federal spending 
and deficit size in their appropriations reductions, Senate members are free to consider other 
factors in their deliberations.  
 
NATIONAL BUDGET REFORMS 
 Table 5.6 reports the results of a comparison of the pooled time series before and after 
the 1974 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act (CBICA). Not surprisingly 
the economic indicators do not significantly alter Senate Committee appropriations requests 
before or after the CBICA.  This is consistent with the earlier findings that economic 
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indictors do not appear to influence Senate Committee appropriations decisions. The CBICA 
also does not appear to significantly influence inter-institutional bargaining. The House of 
Representatives partisan majority control variable, the indirect effect, is statistically 
significant before and after passage of the CBICA. Also, the size of the Democratic House 
majority control coefficient doe not change drastically decreasing from 10.8704 to 10.4682. 
According to these results, the impact of the CBICA on Senate appropriations is minimal. 
However, it is also important to remember that both the president and the House of 
Representatives already accounted for the preferences of the Senate majority party in their 
appropriations requests. Perhaps the economic and partisan factors have already been 
accounted for through these indirect effects.  
 These results are similar to those of the president, but decidedly different from the 
House of Representatives. The difference again can be explained by the nature of the 
appropriations process. Both the president and the Senate generally increase appropriations 
requests, while the House of Representatives decreases appropriations. The CBICA was 
intended to limit federal spending and therefore is designed to have a disproportionate effect 
on those institutions that prefer higher spending levels.  
The 1985 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act (BBEDCA) and the 
1990 Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) were both intended to reduce government deficits by 
setting annual deficit reduction targets for appropriators (Oleszek 2004). To test for the 
influence of these budget reforms, I included a dummy variable in the analysis coded 1 for 
years in which the BBEDCA and BEA were in effect and 0 otherwise. I expect the 
coefficient to be negative given that these legislative reforms were intended to reduce 
appropriations expenditures. Table 5.4 reports the results of the pooled time series analysis. 
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The Balanced Budget Acts coefficient is -1.0339.  The coefficient is in the expected 
direction; however, the coefficient was not statistically significant. The empirical evidence 
fails to support the theory that these reforms decreased federal spending.  
 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS - U.S. SENATE  
Table 5.7 reports the results of the t-test of the percent change in Senate 
appropriations requests from the Senate Committee on Appropriations. Both Republican and 
Democratic Senates increase Senate Committee spending as expected. Democratic Senates 
increase spending by an average 0.2752 percentage points compared to 0.3983.  However, 
these two numbers are not statistically different with a t-test score of 0.31.  
Next I examine the direct and indirect partisan hypotheses with an analysis of 
variance test.  Table 5.8 reports the test findings. The results suggest both a direct and 
indirect partisan effect on Senate appropriations requests. The direct effect of Senate majority 
status control has an F-value of 8.82 and a p-value of 0.00.  While presidential partisan 
control does not appear to influence Senate behavior with an F-value of 0.16 and a p-value of 
0.69, House majority status control does indirectly influence Senate appropriations requests 
with an F-value of 20.65 and a p-value of 0.00.  The results suggest that there is both a direct 
and indirect partisan influence on Senate appropriations requests.  
Table 5.9 reports the summary statistics for the Senate change to the Senate 
Committee on Appropriations requests. The results fail to produce statistical support for 
either the direct or indirect hypotheses. Democratically controlled Senates request a 0.51 
percentage point average increase in Senate Appropriations Committee requests compared to 
a 0.39 percentage point average increase for Republican controlled Senates.  The differences 
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are nearly identical and not statistically different. While the Senate results do not meet the 
partisan expectations, they do meet the structural expectations. The findings provide strong 
evidence that the Senate Committees on Appropriations accurately represent the preferences 
of the full Senate. The lack of change at the floor-level indicates that committee members 
have accurately represented the preferences of the full Senate.  Senate level changes in 
appropriations requests are made almost exclusively at the committee-level. The full Senate 
requests such minimal changes to committee requests that the influence of internal and 
external partisan factors is not discernable.  
 To test alternative theories that may explain the lack of variation between the Senate 
Appropriations Committee and the Senate, I turn to the pooled time series analysis. I run a 
series of diagnostic checks to determine if the pooled time series random effects model is the 
most efficient estimator of the panel data. The Wald statistic, which tests the significance of 
the independent variables in the model, is 51.1 with a p-value of 0.000.  This indicates that I 
can reject the null hypothesis that the independent variables do not have a significant effect 
on Senate floor appropriations request changes from the Senate Committee on 
Appropriations proposed budget. I use the Hausman test to determine whether the random 
and fixed effects coefficients are significantly different. The null hypothesis is that Xit and ui 
are uncorrelated. The chi-square statistic is positive and not significant, p-value 0.72; 
therefore, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that Xit and ui are uncorrelated.  The Hausman 
test indicates that the random effects model is the more efficient model for the Senate data.  
Panel data techniques also possess a number of potential statistical problems that are 
necessary to test for. First, I test for biased standard errors using robust standard errors. 
Second, I test serial correlation. The Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in the panel data 
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reported a p-value of 0.61. This finding does not reject the null hypothesis of no serial 
correlation. Third, I test for heteroscedasticity using the Breusch-Pagan test.  The null 
hypothesis is that there is no heteroscedasticity.  The p-value of .11 is not significant 
indicating that the null hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity cannot be rejected. The test 
statistics suggest that the random effects model is an efficient estimator of the panel data.   
The model is as follows:  
∆ Average Senate Appropriations Requests = β0 + β1∆ Senate Committee on Appropriations 
Request + β2 Democratic Presidential Control + β3 Democratic House Control + β4 
Democratic Senate Control + β5 National Deficit + β6 Total Federal Spending + β7 
Unemployment + β8 Inflation + β9 Conflict + β10 Election Year + εi  
Table 5.10 illustrates the results that largely support the summary statistics. The indirect 
partisan hypotheses are not supported by the results, however, the direct partisan hypothesis 
is supported. Both the presidential partisanship and House Democratic majority status control 
variables are in the expected directions, but neither is statistically significant. Senate 
Democratic majority status control is in the expected direction (0.2416) and is statistically 
significant. The consistent results indicate strong support for the notion that the Senate 
Committees on Appropriations accurately represent Senate member preferences.   
 The additional control variables in the model are consistent with the Senate 
Appropriations Committee findings, namely that structural and economic factors fail to 
influence the Senate in constructing appropriations requests.  The one exception includes the 
total federal spending coefficient (0.002). This finding suggests that a one percent increase in 
total federal spending results in a 0.002 percent decrease in Senate appropriations levels.  
 I run a second pooled time series model substituting House and Senate majority status 
control for coalition size.  This analysis allows me to measure whether majority status or 
coalition size is driving the partisan influence in the appropriations process. Table 5.11 
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reports the results. Both the House and Senate coalition size coefficients are in the expected 
direction, however, neither coefficient is statistically significant.  This finding suggests that 
majority status and not coalition size is central to understanding the role of partisanship in the 
appropriations process.  
 
NATIONAL BUDGET REFORMS 
 In order to test the influence of the myriad of national budget reforms that occur 
within my time series data, I run a number of additional models to test for process change 
effects.  First, I test the 1974 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act (CBICA). 
I split the time series to compare appropriations requests before and after the 1974 CBICA 
passage. Table 5.12 reports the results of the two pooled time series regression models. The 
results suggest significant differences in Senate behavior before and after passage of the act. 
The direct and indirect partisan factors fail to achieve statistical significance before or after 
establishment of the CBICA. The economic indicators tell a different story. Deficit size is in 
the expected direction, but is not statistically significant before 1974.  Conversely, after 1974 
the deficit size coefficient remains negative, but is highly significant. These results suggest 
that the CBICA did accomplish its goal of providing greater incentives for all institutional 
actors to account for deficit size in determining appropriations request levels.  
I also include a control in the pooled time series analysis to test the rise in omnibus 
legislation in the appropriations process. I coded a dummy variable for omnibus legislation 
with 1 identifying bills that were included in an omnibus package and 0 otherwise. Table 
5.10 reports the empirical findings. Omnibus bills are generally used to circumvent the 
regular legislative process to include multiple policy topics in a single bill to decrease 
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uncertainty and increase the likelihood of passage (Krutz 2000, 2001). Therefore, omnibus 
legislation is expected to increase the size of appropriations bills as Congressional leaders 
can add various pork barrel spending provisions to garner votes.  
The empirical results indicate that omnibus bills produce a 0.2046 percentage point 
increase in spending per appropriations bills when compared to non-omnibus appropriations 
bills. While this coefficient is in the expected direction, it is not statistically significant. 
Overall, the study results suggest that omnibus bills do not have a significant impact on the 
size of appropriations bills.  
SUMMARY 
The analysis of national data indicates that Senate Appropriations Committee 
decisions are influenced by indirect partisan strategic considerations. However, Senate floor 
appropriations decisions are not influenced by partisan factors. Partisan control of the House 
of Representatives influences Senate strategic behavior, while presidential partisan control 
does not. These findings indicate that the Senate is forward looking, reacting to the next actor 
in the appropriations process, namely the House of Representatives.  The Senate floor, on the 
other hand, appears to simply accept the recommendations of the Senate Committee on 
Appropriations. In more positive terms, the Senate Committee on Appropriations appears to 
accurately represent the preferences of the full Senate. The lack of variation in Senate floor 
appropriations requests comports with the expectation that Senators provide significant 
autonomy to Senate Committee members. This evidence provides two new insights into the 
workings of the Senate appropriations process. First, Senate Committees on Appropriations 
accurately represent the preferences of the full Senate.  Second, the Senate Appropriations 
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Committee strategically adjusts their appropriations requests based on the partisan 
composition of House of Representatives.  
 
THE AMERICAN STATE SENATES 
For the period 1948-2004, the U.S. Senate switched partisan control only 8 times. In 
order to test the national findings and increase their generalizability, I examine the State 
Senates. The state-level partisan and institutional variability make it the ideal setting to test 
theories of the appropriations process. The state-level analysis includes only one dependent 
variable, Senate floor appropriations requests.  The states provided data only at the Senate 
floor-level.   
State Senates execute a nearly identical role in the state appropriations process as the 
U.S. Senate does in the federal appropriations process. State Houses forward appropriations 
recommendations to the Senate appropriations committees for consideration. The full Senate 
bases the final appropriations bill largely on recommendations from the Senate committee. 
The Senate represents the final actor in the three institution bargaining game.  
 
DATA AND METHODS – STATE SENATES 
The data set is composed of State Senate agency-level appropriations requests for ten 
states for an average of 10 years each. The states in the data set include Alaska, Florida, 
Massachusetts, Missouri, North Carolina, South Carolina, Vermont, West Virginia, and 
Wisconsin. North Carolina and South Carolina possessed archived budget data that allowed 
for the collection of several decades of state budget years. The final sample included ten 
states covering a total of 160 separate state fiscal years, accounting for 1,280 total state 
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agency requests.  The data is composed only of Senate recommendations.  State budget 
records did not include committee-level recommendations.  
The research methods employed largely mimic those of the U.S. Senate analysis. 
Summary statistics are analyzed to provide an overview of Senate changes to House 
appropriations requests. A pooled time series analysis is conducted to control for structural, 
economic, and institutional characteristics. The following section outlines the model 
hypotheses to be tested in the analysis.  
 
MODEL HYPOTHESES 
The theoretical expectations largely match the national study for partisan variables, 
but the institutional and economic factors differ significantly from the national theoretical 
expectations. The Senate acts as a judicial appeals court in the appropriations process (Fenno 
1966). This structural role generally results in the Senate requesting increases in House 
appropriations recommendations. Within this structural role, the direct partisan hypothesis 
posits that Democratically controlled Senates are expected to request higher increases in 
House appropriations requests than their Republican counterparts.  Partisanship is expected 
to directly influence Senate preferences based on the procedural advantages awarded to the 
majority party and the differences in collective preferences between members of the two 
parties.  
The indirect hypothesis predicts that institutional actors adjust their appropriations 
requests toward the preferences of other veto-wielding actors. The theoretical expectations 
again assume that Senate members are strategic actors and that they choose an 
accommodative strategy, meaning members adjust appropriations requests towards the 
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preferences of other veto-wielding actors in order to minimize the risk of negative electoral 
and budgetary outcomes. Given that Democratic institutions seek higher levels of domestic 
spending, the hypothesis posits that Democratic control of the Executive Branch or the House 
should increase Senate appropriations totals as Senate members adjust appropriations in 
favor of the preferences of these veto-wielding actors.  
The theoretical expectations for the institutional variables largely mimic those of the 
State House expectations. Gubernatorial formal and informal powers increase the political 
power of the Executive Branch relative to the state legislative chambers.  Therefore, 
increases in gubernatorial powers are expected to increase gubernatorial influence on Senate 
appropriations proposals. I expect that an increase in gubernatorial budget powers, veto 
authority, and approval ratings results in an increase in Senate appropriations requests.   
Changes in legislative formal institutional powers are also expected to influence 
Senate appropriations decisions. Increases in legislative institutional powers are expected to 
increase the authority of state legislative chambers relative to the Executive Branch. 
Therefore, the enactment of term limits is expected to reduce legislative influence, increase 
the influence of the Executive Branch, and decrease Senate appropriations requests.  Higher 
rates of legislative professionalism and budget powers should increase the influence of the 
Senate relative to the Executive Branch and result in an increase in Senate appropriations 
requests.   
 State appropriations requests are expected to align closely with state economic 
conditions. Increases in state unemployment rate are expected to decrease state revenues and 
increase Senate appropriations recommendations. Increases in national inflation rates are 
expected to also decrease state purchasing power and reduce Senate appropriations requests.  
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EMPIRICAL FINDINGS – STATE SENATE 
I begin by examining the influence of Senate partisan control on the change in State 
Senate appropriations requests. Table 5.13 reports the analysis results. The analysis provides 
strong evidence of a direct effect of partisanship on State Senate appropriations requests. 
Democratic State Senates request an average 0.35 percentage point increase in State House 
appropriations, while Republican controlled State Houses request a 3.81 percent decrease. 
These t-test is significant with a value of -2.25. This result suggests that their exists a 
significant difference between Democratic and Republican State Senate appropriations 
decisions. This finding is inconsistent both with the theoretical expectations and the federal 
government results.  Republican Senates decrease appropriations requests rather than commit 
to the traditional structural role of increasing spending witnessed so consistently at the 
federal level.  Possible explanations for this behavior include a less structure in the 
appropriations process that lends greater weight to partisan ideological positions and less 
emphasis on traditional structural roles. These findings may also be the result of economic 
constraints. Since state budgets are subject to balanced budget rules, Senate members may be 
forced to make further cuts in spending based on changing economic conditions. 
Next I complete an analysis of variance test to measure the direct and indirect partisan 
effects on State Senate appropriations decisions. The results suggest a direct, but not an 
indirect partisan influence on State Senate decisions. The direct partisan effect of State 
Senate partisanship has an F-value of 6.46 and a p-value of 0.00.  The indirect partisan 
effects of gubernatorial and State House partisanship are both statistically insignificant with 
F-values of 0.03 and 0.53 respectively.  The evidence is clear cut. State Senates 
appropriations requests show evidence of a direct, but not an indirect effect of partisanship.  
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To further investigate partisan effects, I examine the average percent change in State 
Senate appropriations across various partisan configurations of state government. Table 5.15 
reports the results. The findings indicate that Republican controlled Senates do reduce 
appropriations more than their Democratic counterparts. Republican controlled Senates 
decrease House appropriations requests by an average 3.7 percentage points compared to .4 
percentage point increase for Democratically controlled Senates. While this finding 
challenges the structural expectation that the Senate role always increases House 
appropriations requests, it does support the direct hypothesis that Democratically controlled 
Senates request higher increases than Republican controlled Senates.   
The results also generally support the indirect hypothesis.  Under Republican control 
of the legislature, the Senate requests a 1.1 percentage point decrease in House 
appropriations. When Republicans control the Senate, but Democrats control the House, 
Senate members request a 17 percentage point decrease in spending. The results are 
consistent with the notion that Democrats request higher levels of increases, but contradicts 
the concept of accommodation in budget negotiations. The findings suggest that partisanship 
plays an even more pertinent role in budget negotiations as the state-level than the national 
level.  Under Republican control of the House, Democratically controlled Senates request 
nearly zero change in appropriations, but Republican Senates request a 1 percentage point 
decrease in appropriations. Again, the evidence suggests that partisan control alters the 
strategic behavior of the Senate. As partisan control of the House changes, so too does the 
behavior of the Senate. Once again, the state-level data does not show the level of strategic 
accommodation witnessed at the national level.  
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To statistically control for a myriad of political and economic factors that influence 
the appropriations process, I pooled the data and ran a time series regression. The dependent 
variable again is the percent change in Senate appropriations budget requests from the House.  
The main independent variables of interest are the partisan control of the three policymaking 
institutions and whether those institutions share partisan affiliation.   
I run a series of diagnostic checks to determine if the pooled time series random 
effects model is the most efficient estimator of the panel data. The Wald statistic, which tests 
the significance of the independent variables in the model, is 81.42 with a p-value of 0.000.  
This indicates that I can reject the null hypothesis that the independent variables do not have 
a significant effect on State Senate appropriations request changes from the State House 
appropriations requests. I use the Hausman test to determine whether the random and fixed 
effects coefficients are significantly different. The null hypothesis is that Xit and ui are 
uncorrelated. The chi-square statistic is positive and not significant, p-value 0.23; therefore, I 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that Xit and ui are uncorrelated.  The Hausman test indicates 
that the random effects model is the more efficient model for the Senate data.  
Panel data techniques also possess a number of potential statistical problems that are 
necessary to test for. First, I test for biased standard errors using robust standard errors. 
Second, I test serial correlation. The Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in the panel data 
reported a p-value of 0.16. This finding does not reject the null hypothesis of no serial 
correlation. Third, I test for heteroscedasticity using the Breusch-Pagan test.  The null 
hypothesis is that there is no heteroscedasticity.  The p-value of .84 is not significant 
indicating that the null hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity cannot be rejected. The test 
statistics suggest that the random effects model is an efficient estimator of the panel data.   
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The regression equation is as follows: 
∆ Average Senate Appropriations Requests = β0 + β1House of Representative Changes in 
Appropriations Request + β2 Democratic Gubernatorial Control + β3 Democratic House 
Control + β4 Democratic Senate Control + β5 Gubernatorial Budget Powers + β6  
Gubernatorial Veto Authority + β7 Legislative Term Limits + β8 Legislative Professionalism 
+ β9 Legislative Budget Powers  + β10 Unemployment + β11 Inflation + β12 + εi  
 
The main theoretical hypotheses tested include partisan control of the three policymaking 
institutions has both a direct and indirect impact on Senate appropriations requests. Given 
these model hypotheses, I expect all three partisan variables, Democratic gubernatorial 
control, Democratic House majority control, and Senate Democratic majority control to be 
positive and significant.  
Table 5.16 displays the statistical results.  The findings do not match the theoretical 
expectations. First, Democratic Senate majority status has a positive coefficient of 0.2634, as 
expected, but it does not reach statistical significance. This finding suggests that partisanship 
does not directly influence the appropriations process in state government. One possible 
explanation for the finding could be the lack of variation at the Senate appropriations level. 
The Senate chamber produces requests that are close to the appropriations requests of the 
House.  The indirect partisan effect is also not supported by the findings. Democratic control 
of both the House and the Executive Branch are both negative coefficients, which contradicts 
the theoretical expectations, but both coefficients lack statistical significance. The results 
indicate that partisanship does not structure Senate chambers appropriations decisions at the 
state-level.   
The institutional factors represent the second set of independent variables tested in the 
model. Senate term limits were expected to decrease the power of the Senate and therefore 
decrease Senate appropriations requests. The coefficient of -1.1677 is in the expected 
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direction, but the coefficient is not statistically significant. Legislative professionalism is 
expected to increase Senate appropriations requests.  This coefficient is neither in the 
expected direction or statistically significant. The myriad of gubernatorial independent 
factors, gubernatorial vote margin, budget powers, and veto power, all fail to reach a level of 
statistical significance. The results indicate that institutional factors do not play a critical role 
in determining the appropriations requests of State Senate chambers.  
Economic factors represent the third set of independent variables in the model. An 
increase in the unemployment rate is again expected to increase Senate appropriations 
requests. The Unemployment is measured as the average percent unemployment rate for the 
6 months prior to the budget passing. The coefficient is in the expected positive direction, 
1.2137 and is statistically significant.  Higher rates of inflation are hypothesized to reduce 
appropriations levels in real terms. I measure inflation using the 6 month average of changes 
in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) prior to passing of the national budget. The inflation rate 
coefficient is 4.0395 which is not in the hypothesized direction and fails to achieve statistical 
significance. The model is consistent with other state models that unemployment, a proxy for 
economic well-being drives state appropriations decisions.   
 
CONCLUSION 
The Upper House as the third player in the appropriations process plays a more 
reactionary role than the Executive Branch or the House in American government. The 
Senate is considered the arbitrator of agency appropriations requests, increasing funding 
where appropriate and when funding allows. I hypothesized that partisanship influences the 
extent to which this structural role is carried out. The U.S. Senate results support the concept 
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that partisanship influences the magnitude of the structural role. Partisanship has both a direct 
effect, through the agency of the Senate majority status, and an indirect effect, through the 
agency of the House of Representatives majority status. Democratic partisanship, as 
expected, has the effect of increasing Senate appropriations proposals.  
The state-level findings did not indicate a connection between partisanship and 
Senate appropriations requests levels. First, Senate members often decrease rather than 
increase House appropriations requests. Second, according to the pooled time series results, 
Senate appropriations are not influenced by direct or indirect partisan considerations. These 
findings contradict the national results that Senate members rarely divert from their structural 
role of increasing House appropriations requests. The most likely explanation for the 
difference between national and state findings are the financial constraints placed on Senators 
at the state-level by balanced budget requirements.  The fiscal constraints placed on State 
Senates, particularly acute given they represent the last proposer of appropriations, puts 
additional pressure on Senators to adjust appropriations based on economic rather than 
ideological or partisan factors.  
This economic theory is further supported by the national and state economic 
findings. Economic factors including unemployment rates and inflation had little influence 
on U.S. Senate appropriations requests; however, at the state-level unemployment rates did 
have a statistically significant influence of Senate requests. These results lend further 
credence to the notion that State Senates face economic constraints that force them to react to 
fiscal conditions that supplant ideological and partisan influences. U.S. Senate appropriations 
results were influenced only by federal deficit size. The impact of deficit size can also be 
seen through the lens of partisan politics as more conservative members, particularly 
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Republicans members, use increases in federal deficits as a tool in promoting fiscal 
parsimony.  Therefore, the economic findings at the federal-level support the notion that 
Senate members represent strategic actors in the appropriations process.  
The institutional variables appear to have little influence on Senate appropriations. 
Neither legislative nor executive institutional powers appear to influence Senate 
appropriations requests.  Again, it appears that economic factors supersede all institutional 
factors in Senate deliberations. This is not a particularly surprising result given the regularity 
with which state economic conditions can change even over the course of a single budget 
cycle. While the governor submits budget recommendations in January of a given fiscal year, 
the Senate may not take up deliberations until July or later based on the pace of House 
deliberations. Therefore, the Senate, as the last actor in the process, is often saddled with 
responding to rapidly changing economic conditions. Again, it appears that these economic 
conditions override partisan considerations at the state-level.  
At both the national and state-level, Senates adjust appropriations request far less than 
the other two actors in the appropriations process. The Senate represents the third actor in the 
appropriations process. As the previous chapters findings indicate, the Executive Branch and 
the House factor Senate member preferences into their appropriations proposals.  Since 
Senate member preferences are already factored into appropriations, there is less need for 
Senate members to make substantial adjustments to appropriations bills.  
At the federal level, the Senate Committee on Appropriations accurately represents 
the preferences of the full Senate in appropriations deliberations. The Senate represents a 
unique and independent policymaking institution.  Its place in the appropriations process 
results in a low level of variation in appropriations request, but does not mean that the 
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institution lacks influence on the appropriations process. The preferences of the Senate are 
included earlier in the process by both the executive and the House. The lack of variation at 
the Senate level provides strong evidence that the appropriations process is a strategic 
endeavor.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
Representative government’s foundation is rooted in the notion that citizens influence 
policymaker decisions. Scholars largely agree that political parties represent the mechanism 
by which constituents hold policymakers collectively accountable (Aldrich 1995; Aldrich and 
Rhode 1998; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Cox and McCubbins 2001; Wright and Schaffner 
2002). The Congressional and state politics literatures have identified political parties in 
structuring a host of government functions including the legislative process, legislative 
organization, and executive-legislative relations. Appropriations politics is the exception to 
this rule. Both Congressional and state studies have found mixed evidence concerning the 
influence of political parties in the appropriations process (Wildavsky 1964; Fenno 1966; 
Wanat 1978; Auten, Bozeman, and Cline 1984). Given the centrality of political parties in 
American government and the highly political nature of appropriations processes, these 
findings appear a contradiction worth further examination.  
The findings of this study overwhelmingly support the theoretical frame that 
partisanship is central to understanding the appropriations process within the context of 
budgetary structural roles and norms. In other words, institutions perform traditional, 
structural roles in the budgetary process - executives requesting increases in spending, 
Houses cutting executive requests, and the Senate acting as an arbitrator providing increases 
to requests – however, partisanship influences the magnitude with which these structural 
roles are performed. Previous studies often fail to isolate partisan effects because they 
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measure only direct effects. As the results confirm, a substantial portion of the partisan effect 
on appropriations requests is manifested through indirect partisan effects. By accounting for 
the preferences of other veto-wielding institutions in their appropriations requests, 
institutional actors structure appropriations politics through the lens of partisanship. 
 In this dissertation, I combine the theoretical richness of the national government 
literature and the institutional variation of state government to build a deeper understanding 
of the budget process in American government. This study represents the first analysis to 
examine both national and state-level appropriations.  The national analysis incorporates 
committee-level data that advances of understanding of the internal partisan mechanisms 
influencing appropriations deliberations. The state analysis utilizes multi-state analysis to 
study the impact of institutional, partisan, and economic variation that the national level data 
lacks.  
 
A STRATEGY OF ACCOMMODATION IN INTER-INSTITUTIONAL BARGAINING 
 The appropriations process in American government represents a complex bargaining 
game. The three policymaking institutions, namely the Executive Branch, House of 
Representatives, and Senate, negotiate to achieve their desired budgetary outcomes. This 
process is constrained by the electoral incentives of all three institutional actors. The 
reelection incentive creates significant motivation for policymakers to achieve a budget 
resolution.  Failure to achieve compromise increases public discontent with policymakers and 
decreases their odds of reelection. Therefore, policymakers must weigh their need for 
compromise and the desire to achieve their budgetary goals. The central question in terms of 
the bargaining strategy is whether institutional actors are sincere or strategic in terms of their 
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appropriations bargaining positions. In other words, do institutional actors choose a 
bargaining position that sincerely and exclusively represents their budgetary preferences or 
do they select a bargaining position that incorporates both their budgetary preferences and 
the preferences of other veto-wielding actors in the appropriations process. I argue that 
institutional actors choose a strategic position to maximize their electoral and policy goals.  
 Policymakers are faced with three separate potential bargaining choices – reactive, 
sincere, or accommodative.  I argue that the third strategy, accommodation, maximizes 
electoral and policy outcomes.  By choosing an accommodating strategy, policymakers 
minimize the likelihood of failure to compromise, which, as previously mentioned, can result 
in negative electoral consequences.  The accommodating strategy also maximizes the 
potential for achieving budgetary goals.  The appropriations process is analogous to log 
rolling in that institutional actors work to achieve their top priorities by allowing other actors 
to achieve their top priorities. The empirical evidence in all three phases of the appropriations 
process strongly support the notion that political actors choose an accommodating strategy. 
The following section lays out the evidence of this strategic interaction by examining the 
direct and indirect influence of partisanship in the appropriations process.  
 Kiewiet and McCubbins (1988) suggest that in bilateral bargaining games, 
presidential veto authority provides presidents greater ability to reduce than increase 
Congressional appropriations. I submit that this notion of inter-institutional bargaining is 
incomplete. Due to both the appropriations reversion point and the trilateral nature of inter-
institutional bargaining in the appropriations process, presidents do have the ability to 
influence both decreases and increases in Congressional appropriations. The reason is that 
the reversion point for appropriations politics is the previous year’s spending limits. 
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Presidents have incentives to veto Congressional spending bills that fall below the reversion 
point if they prefer higher spending because they will be better off by the status quo.  
Presidents also have incentives to veto Congressional spending bills that are above 
the reversion point, but below their preferred spending limit because of time constraints on 
budget negotiations and the low risk alternatives. Congressional threats to reduce 
appropriations bills to zero are not credible. Congressional members motivated by the 
electoral incentive will be made worse off by reducing spending to zero. The 1995-1996 
showdown between President Clinton and the Republican Congress is a prime example. 
President Clinton effectively used presidential veto authority to increase Congressional 
spending bills.  
The statistical evidence in the three empirical chapters supports this revised game 
theoretic model. Presidential partisan control had a significant influence on Congressional 
spending even though the president prefers higher spending levels than Congress 80 percent 
of the time. Despite the fact that the president consistently prefers higher spending than 
Congress, he is able to achieve spending requests higher than those preferred by Congress.  
 
THE INFLUENCE OF PARTISANSHIP IN THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS 
 Chapters 3 through 5 examined specific stages in the appropriations process, 
Executive Branch, House, and Senate, respectively. This section combines these findings to 
improve our understanding of the overarching influence of partisanship in the appropriations 
process. I argue that partisanship exerts both a direct and indirect influence on appropriations 
request. The partisanship of the actor making the appropriations request represents the direct 
effect. The evidence supports the direct hypothesis for each stage of the budget cycle, Senate 
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strategic decision-making representing the exception. That is, at each stage in the budget 
process, the partisan affiliation of the institution making the appropriations request had a 
direct influence on the size of the appropriations request. As expected, Democratic 
institutions typically requested higher levels of spending than their Republican counterparts. 
Partisan affiliation represented a different set of budget priorities that manifested in 
statistically significant differences in executive and House appropriations requests. The 
failure to identify a direct partisan influence in Senate appropriations requests explains why 
previous studies have found mixed partisan effects in the budgetary process. This finding 
does not suggest that partisanship is not central to explaining institutional behavior, even 
Senate behavior in the appropriations process.  The results suggest that all actors are 
influenced by the indirect partisan effect.  
  The indirect influence of partisanship implies that institutional actors account for the 
partisan preferences of other veto-wielding actors in the appropriations process. For instance, 
a Democratic governor facing a Republican state legislature would be expected to lower his 
appropriations request levels compared to one facing a Democratically controlled legislature.   
The indirect influence of partisanship was evident at each stage in the budget cycle. 
Not all actors influence all other actors in the appropriations process. Strategic considerations 
provide incentives to consider various institutional actors more than others. At the national-
level, both House and the Senate partisan control influence the president’s appropriations 
requests. Both the president and the parent chamber influence the House of Representatives 
Committee on Appropriations budget requests; however, Senate control does not influence 
the House Committee’s requests. This suggests that presidential efforts to lobby House 
committee members to secure a portion of their budget requests is an effective strategy. The 
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evidence also suggests that the sticks and carrots used by the House leadership are effective 
in ensuring that committee members take into account the budgetary preferences of the larger 
House. The House of Representative floor appropriations requests are influenced by Senate 
partisan control, but not presidential partisan control. I argue that the full House membership 
has little need to consider the preferences of the president since the appropriations requests 
received from the House Committee on Appropriations have taken into account the 
president’s budget priorities. Finally, U.S. Senate appropriations requests are influenced by 
House partisan control, but not presidential partisan control. This finding is somewhat 
surprising. I suggest that the explanation for this discrepancy is the asymmetry in the veto 
authority each institution possesses. While the president retains the ability to veto 
Congressional appropriations, the presidential veto is a blunt instrument. Presidents wield 
only the power to sign or veto an entire bill; therefore, if the president disapproves of only 
pieces of the bill, he must still veto the entire bill (Cameron 2000). On the other hand, Senate 
members must come to agreement on the specific components of an appropriations bill in 
conference committee with House members. Therefore, the veto authority enjoyed by the 
House and the president do not have equal influence on Senate decision-making.  I argue that 
it is this asymmetry influence that explains the indirect partisan effect on Senate 
appropriations requests.   
At the state-level, the evidence suggests a similar pattern of indirect partisan 
influence in the sequential appropriations process. The evidence indicates that the governor 
accounts for the partisan preferences of the House and Senate. Alternatively, House members 
account for the indirect partisan preferences of the Senate, but not the governor. The 
explanation for this discrepancy may simply be that House members are forward looking in 
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their strategic actions meaning that they weight the preferences of the next actor in the 
appropriations process, the Senate, disproportionately. Finally, the State Senate was the one 
institution that did not account for the indirect partisan preferences of another institution. I 
argue this discrepancy is due to economic constraints faced by state actors. Balanced budget 
amendments in the states fiscally constrain policymakers to largely match revenue and 
spending streams in a given fiscal year. As the third actor in the appropriations process, the 
Senate faces the unenviable task of ensuring that the state government does not run a budget 
deficit. The Senate also receives appropriations sometimes more than six months after the 
governor has proposed budget recommendations, during which time the budget situation can 
change drastically. Therefore, Senate members are constrained by fiscal factors more so than 
any other institutional actor at the national or state-level.   
  
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES AND THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS 
Surprisingly, institutional factors showed little impact on institutional appropriations 
decisions. This finding indicates that inter-institutional bargaining is characterized by 
structural and partisan factors and not by institutional formal and informal powers. The 
institutional variables were found to have little impact on Executive Branch, House, or 
Senate appropriations requests.  Only gubernatorial veto authority had any discernable 
influence on appropriations requests, and the coefficient was not in the expected direction. 
Higher levels of veto authority actually decrease gubernatorial requests. Neither executive 
nor legislative institutional variables provide any statistically significant impact on House 
member behavior.  Executive and legislative institutional power also failed to influence 
Senate appropriations requests. This finding is consistent with the notion that actors utilize an 
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accommodating partisan strategy. If institutional actors chose a strategically reactive or 
sincere bargaining strategy, I would expect differences in executive and legislative relative 
powers to influence appropriations requests. However, in a bargaining game where actors 
utilize an accommodating strategy, actors are seeking compromising positions that account 
for other veto-wielding actor’s preferences, thus reducing the need for coercive tactics based 
on differences in formal powers.   
The 1974 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act (CBICA) did 
influence inter-institutional bargaining, but failed to achieve all the goals of the legislation. 
The CBICA established House and Senate Budget Committees charged with overseeing the 
appropriations process by issuing budget resolutions that set overall federal spending limits. 
The CBICA was intended both to constrain federal spending and shift appropriations power 
from the Executive to the Legislative Branch. The evidence suggests that the act was 
successful in constraining federal spending, but not successful in shifting power between the 
branches. The findings indicate that both presidential and Senate efforts to raise annual 
appropriations spending were constrained following the passage of the act. Conversely, the 
act did not constrain the House propensity to reduce presidential requests. In regards to the 
shifting of budgetary power between the branches, the coefficients sizes for presidential, 
House, and Senate partisan control do not appear to be influenced by the CBICA passage. 
These findings suggest that the CBICA constrained federal spending by capping annual 
appropriations, but did not influence the effect of partisanship in the federal budget process.   
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ECONOMIC INDICATORS AND THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS 
Economic factors exhibit substantially different results at the state and national levels. 
At the national level, the size of the budget deficit and total federal spending influences 
appropriations requests.  Increases in these government spending indicators resulted in 
decreases in appropriations requests. Given that increases in budget deficits and total federal 
spending result in downward pressure from fiscally conservative interest groups and budget 
hawks, this result is not surprising. Conversely, increases in unemployment and inflation 
were found to have no significant impact on national-level appropriations.  While this result 
was not expected, it is easily explained by the budgetary constraints, or lack thereof, at the 
national-level. The federal government lacks balanced budget constraints faced by the state 
governments. During periods of economic downturn, the federal government often chooses 
to pump capital into the marketplace through deficit spending.  
At the state-level, the pattern was reversed. Increases in unemployment and inflation 
consistently influenced state expenditures. The fact that traditional measures of economic 
well-being influenced state and not federal government appropriations is also not surprising.  
State governments are constrained by balanced budget requirements.  These fiscal constraints 
tie state budgetary actions directly to the current state economic conditions. In other words, a 
decline in state revenues results in decreases in state spending. The evidence supports the 
traditional notion that economic well-being indicators have a greater influence on state than 
national budgetary processes.   
EMPIRICAL DIFFERENCES IN NATIONAL VERSUS STATE FINDINGS 
Given the diversity of American governments included in the analysis, the 
consistency of results identifying both a direct and indirect effect of partisanship is 
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remarkable. The results provide strong support that partisanship influences the appropriations 
process in American government within the confines of the structural roles and norms. Both 
national and state actors demonstrated an accommodative strategic approach to developing 
appropriations requests by taking into account the preferences of other veto-wielding actors. 
In fact, indirect partisan effects proved more consistent than direct partisan effects across 
national and state governments.  
There exist some differences between the influence of partisanship at the national and 
state-levels. First, presidents account for partisan control of Congress, while the partisan 
control of the House influenced gubernatorial appropriations requests. This finding may 
simply be the result of data limitations. The federal data lacks cases in which the presidency 
is controlled by a Democrat with split control of Congress. Nevertheless, the results suggest 
that presidents exhibit more of a propensity for strategic behavior than governors. Second, 
the House of Representatives accounts for the partisan control of the Executive Branch and 
the Senate. Alternatively, State House members account for only the partisan control of the 
Senate in constructing appropriations, not the governor. I suggest that this discrepancy is due 
in large part to the lobbying efforts of the Executive Branch at the national-level. I strongly 
suspect that presidents continue to wield considerable power with House appropriations 
committees when compared to governors.  The difference in resources, public appeals, and 
formal relationships between staff members are just a few factors that distinguish presidential 
and gubernatorial influence. Finally, State Senates did not demonstrate indirect partisan 
effects witnessed at the national-level. I suspect that the difference is due mainly to 
differences in economic constraints. State governments are restricted by balanced budget 
laws.  These constraints are particularly prudent for Senate members who represent the final 
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proposer in the appropriations process and therefore face considerable pressure to balanced 
state budgets regardless of partisan preferences.  
Both the national and state-level analysis provided substantial support for my partisan 
theory of the appropriations process. However, the evidence applied more favorably to the 
national than the state data.  The reason for this discrepancy is threefold. First, economic 
constraints at the state-level reduce the ability of institutional actors to base appropriations 
decisions on partisan factors. My personal experience in national and state-level politics 
support this theory. At the state-level, economic conditions often force all actors to abandon 
their policy priorities in order to institute significant budget cuts.  Alternatively, at the 
national-level, the relative absence of fiscal constraints results in a bargaining game that is 
driven by partisan institutional preferences. Second, while I was not able to measure 
differences in partisan polarization for purposes of this study, I strongly suspect that partisan 
polarization varies widely across states in the data set. This variation would certainly have 
the effect of reducing the influence of partisanship in the appropriations process. Changes in 
partisan control of policymaking institutions in non-polarized states are less likely to result in 
substantial differences in appropriations outcomes. The national government demonstrates 
partisan polarization that many states lack. Finally, majority party changes in national-level 
institutions often produce electoral mandates for the incoming party’s policy agenda that 
result in larger budgetary shifts. Switches in state-level majority party control do not carry 
the same electoral mandate and therefore result in less substantial ideologically driven policy 
changes.
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TABLE 3.1. SAMPLE OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS BILLS,  
FISCAL YEARS 1948-2006 
 
Bills Fiscal Years 
Agriculture 1948-2006 
District of Columbia 1948-2006 
Independent Offices 1948-1967 
Independent Offices, Veterans Affairs and Housing and   
Urban Development 1968-2006 
Interior  1948-2006 
Labor - Federal Security 1948-1954 
Labor, Health and Human Services, Education 1955-2006 
Legislature 1948-2006 
State, Commerce, Justice, Judiciary  1948-2006 
Treasury, Post Office, and General Government 1948-2006 
Public Works 1956-1967 
Energy  1968-2006 
Transportation 1968-2006 
Office of Education 1971-1972 
Homeland Security  2002-2006 
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TABLE 3.2 MEAN NORMALIZED PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN PRESIDENTIAL REQUEST FROM 
PREVIOUS YEAR’S FINAL APPROPRIATIONS BY PARTY CONTROL OF THE PRESIDENCY, 
FISCAL YEAR 1948-2006 
 Party Control of the Presidency 
 Total Republican Democrat 
Change in Presidential Request 6.1 % 4.47 % 8.31 % 
 (22) (23) (20) 
 N = 553 N = 319 N = 234 
t = 2.0** 
 
*= p < 0.05 
**= p < 0.01 
 
 
Note: The t-test is measuring whether the difference between Democrats and Republicans for the 
average percent change in presidential appropriations requests is statistically significant. The 
figures in parentheses represent standard errors.  
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TABLE 3.3 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE SUMMARY TABLE FOR CHANGES IN PRESIDENTIAL 
REQUEST FROM THE PREVIOUS YEAR’S FINAL APPROPRIATIONS, FISCAL YEAR 1948-2006 
Stage in Budget Cycle Direct Effect: 
Party Control of 
Presidency 
Indirect Effect: 
Party Control of 
Congress 
 
Presidential Change in Previous 
Year’s Final Appropriations  
 
F= 3.25 
p = 0.07 
df= 1 
 
 
F= 8.65 
p= 0.00 
df= 1 
N= 553 
df=  552
  
 
181 
 
 
 
 
Note: The table cell entries represent the percentage change in appropriations from the previous year budget to the president’s 
proposed budget for all eight partisan configurations of the federal government. Each cell entry includes first the percentage change, 
then the standard error in parentheses, and finally the number of observations.  The figures at the bottom of the table denote t-test 
scores of the relationship between the Republican and Democratic presidential control.
TABLE 3.4  PRESIDENTIAL CHANGE IN PREVIOUS YEAR’S FINAL APPROPRIATIONS REQUEST ACROSS DIFFERENT PARTISAN  
CONFIGURATIONS OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1948-2006  
  
Stage in Budget Cycle Party Control of Congressional Chambers 
  House Republican House Democrat House Republican House Democrat Total 
  Senate Republican Senate Republican Senate Democrat Senate Democrat  
       
 Republican 11 -1.4 -1.4 5.6 4.5 
  (22) (19) (10) (25) (23) 
Presidential Request   N= 35 N= 60 N= 19 N= 284 N= 
319 
Change in Previous       
Year’s Appropriations Democrat 1.2 N/A N/A 11.3 8.3 
Request  (20)   (20) (20) 
  N= 68   N= 166 N= 
234 
       
 Total 10 -1.4 -1.4 8.1  
  (21) (19) (10) (19)  
  N= 103 N= 60 N= 19 N= 371  
       
  t= 2.33 N/A N/A t= -2.34 t= -2.0 
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TABLE 3.5  MEAN NORMALIZED PERCENT CHANGE IN PRESIDENTIAL REQUEST FROM 
PREVIOUS YEAR’S FINAL APPROPRIATIONS, FISCAL YEAR 1948-2006 
  
Independent Variables  Presidential Appropriations Requests 
  
Presidential Change in Previous Year’s  12.0375 
Appropriations (7.3083) 
  
Democratic President 2.9289** 
 (1.9717) 
  
Democratic House  9.5535** 
 (3.2303) 
  
Democratic Senate 7.063** 
 (3.3132) 
  
Total Federal Spending 0.0122** 
 (0.0041) 
  
Election Year -0.0243 
 (1.8742) 
  
Deficit -0.0147 
 (0.0255) 
  
Unemployment Rate 1.0288 
 (1.0519) 
  
Inflation Rate -0.7809** 
 (0.2583) 
  
Omnibus Bills 1.1111 
 (3.5812) 
  
Constant 0.06** 
 (0.02) 
*= p < 0.05  
**= p < 0.01  
 
Note:  The following analysis represents the results of a random effects pooled time series 
regression model. The cell entry represents the effect of the independent variables on the percent 
change in the president’s budget request from the previous year’s final budget. The number in 
parentheses represents the standard error. The sample size is 553.  Robust standard errors were 
run in this model. The overall R-square of the model is 0.12.   
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TABLE 3.6  MEAN NORMALIZED PERCENT CHANGE IN PRESIDENTIAL REQUEST FROM 
PREVIOUS YEAR’S FINAL APPROPRIATIONS, FISCAL YEARS 1948-2006 
  
Independent Variables  Presidential Appropriations Requests 
  
Presidential Change in Previous Year’s  12.3481 
Appropriations (7.2378) 
  
Democratic President 2.7062 
 (1.9312) 
  
Democratic House Coalition Size 6.2365 
 (5.2303) 
  
Democratic Senate Coalition Size 4.3162 
 (4.9634) 
  
Total Federal Spending 0.09317** 
 (0.0217) 
  
Election Year 0.0127 
 (1.846) 
  
Deficit -0.01453 
 (0.0136) 
  
Conflict 5.7801** 
 (2.798) 
  
Unemployment Rate -0.0228 
 (1.0167) 
  
Inflation Rate -0.8958** 
 (0.2003) 
  
Constant 8.5656 
 (11.96) 
  
  
*= p < 0.05 
**= p < 0.01 
 
Note:  The following analysis represents the results of a random effects pooled time series 
regression model. The cell entry represents the effect of the independent variables on the percent 
change in the president’s budget request from the previous year’s final budget. The number in 
parentheses represents the standard error. The sample size is 553.  Robust standard errors were 
run in this model. The overall R-square of the model is 0.0784.   
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TABLE 3.7  MEAN NORMALIZED PERCENT CHANGE IN PRESIDENTIAL REQUEST FROM 
PREVIOUS YEAR’S FINAL APPROPRIATIONS, FISCAL YEARS 1948-1974 AND FISCAL YEARS 
1975-2006 
   
Independent Variables                   Pre 1974                Post 1974 
   
President’s Previous Year Appropriations  -3.6435 20.6198** 
 (13.1265) (8.3697) 
   
Democratic President 10.2924** 4.8299 
 (5.1722) (3.1464) 
   
Democratic House  10.8704** 4.9433 
 (4.0719) (5.6347) 
   
Democratic Senate  -0.1756 0.1006 
 (0.1232) (0.0147) 
   
Total Federal Spending -0.3086 0.1292** 
 (0.3067) (0.0307) 
   
Election Year -1.271 0.2996 
 (3.0671) (2.2917) 
   
Deficit 0.5465 -0.0267** 
 (0.3072) (0.0014) 
   
Conflict -11.0109** -6.6883 
 (5.2331) (4.685) 
   
Unemployment Rate -6.9424** 1.8155 
 (2.1932) (1.5476) 
   
Inflation Rate 3.8296 -1.2628** 
 (2.4081) (0.2967) 
   
Constant -106.8799** 5.4963 
 (42.3018) (25.2392) 
*= p < 0.05   
**= p < 0.01   
   
Note:  The following analysis represents the results of a random effects pooled time series 
regression model. The cell entry represents the effect of the independent variables on the percent 
change in the president’s budget request from the previous year’s final budget. The number in 
parentheses represents the standard error. The sample size is 234 observations pre-1974 and 319 
observations post-1974.  Robust standard errors were run in this model. The overall R-squares of 
the models are 8.22 and 11.85 respectively. 
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TABLE 3.8 SAMPLE OF STATE APPROPRIATIONS DATA, FISCAL 
YEARS 1975-2008 
 
States Fiscal Years 
Alaska 1997-2007 
Florida 1998-2008 
Michigan 1997-2008 
Missouri  2000-2007 
North Carolina 1989-2007 
South Carolina  1975-2007 
Vermont 2000-2009 
Washington 2001-2008 
West Virginia 1998-2008 
Wisconsin  1993-2008 
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TABLE 3.9 MEAN NORMALIZED PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN GUBERNATORIAL REQUEST 
FROM PREVIOUS YEAR’S FINAL APPROPRIATIONS BY PARTY CONTROL OF THE 
GOVERNORSHIP, FISCAL YEARS 1975-2008 
 Party Control of the Governor 
 Total Republican Democrat 
Change in Gubernatorial Request 3.4 % 2.7 % 4.1 % 
 (16) (16.2) (16) 
 N = 876 N = 455 N = 421 
t = 1.32 
 
*= p < 0.05 
**= p < 0.01 
 
Note: The t-test is measuring whether the difference between Democrats and Republicans for the 
average percent change in gubernatorial appropriations requests is statistically significant. The 
figures in parentheses represent standard errors.  
.  
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TABLE 3.10 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE SUMMARY TABLE FOR CHANGES IN GUBERNATORIAL 
APPROPRIATIONS REQUEST FROM PREVIOUS YEAR’S FINAL APPROPRIATION, FISCAL 
YEARS 1975-2008 
Stage in Budget Cycle Direct Effect: 
Party Control of the 
Governorship 
Indirect Effect: 
Party Control 
of House 
Indirect Effect: 
Party Control of 
the Senate 
 
Gubernatorial Change in 
Previous Year’s Final 
Appropriations  
 
 
F= 0.89 
p = 0.35 
df= 1 
 
 
F= 3.31 
p= 0.05 
df= 1   
 
F= 2.4 
p= 0.12 
df= 1 
N= 928  
 
df=  927 
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TABLE 3.11  GUBERNATORIAL CHANGE IN PREVIOUS YEAR’S FINAL APPROPRIATIONS REQUEST ACROSS DIFFERENT PARTISAN  
CONFIGURATIONS OF STATE GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEARS 1975-2008  
  
Stage in Budget Cycle Party Control of State Legislative Chambers 
  House Republican House Democrat House Republican House Democrat Total 
  Senate Republican Senate Republican Senate Democrat Senate Democrat  
       
 Republican 2.1 4.1 2.9 3.1 2.7 
  (1.1) (4.1) (1.6) (1.3) (16) 
Gubernatorial    N= 192 N= 8 N= 82 N= 173 N= 
455 
Change in Previous       
Year’s Appropriations Democrat -1.6 5.3 4..1 7.4 4.1 
Request  (2.0) (3.3) (1.3) (0.9) (16.2) 
  N= 106 N= 43 N= 102 N= 170 N= 
421 
       
 Total 1.1 5.1 3.6 5.2  
  (17.5) (2.9) (13.5) (15)  
  N= 298 N= 51 N= 184 N= 343  
       
  t= -1.73 t= 0.14 t= 0.59 t= 2.62  t= 1.32
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TABLE 3.12  MEAN NORMALIZED PERCENT CHANGE IN GUBERNATORIAL REQUEST FROM 
PREVIOUS YEAR’S FINAL APPROPRIATIONS, FISCAL YEARS 1975-2008 
  
Independent Variables  Gubernatorial Appropriations Requests 
  
Governor’s Change in Previous Year’s  19.9257 
Appropriations (13.9103) 
  
Democratic Governor -1.2348 
 (1.391) 
  
Democratic House 4.1721** 
 (1.6896) 
  
Democratic Senate -1.2351 
 (1.9216) 
  
House Term Limits -4.6971 
 (2.3859) 
  
Legislative Professionalism 0.0002 
 (0.0005) 
  
Gubernatorial Approval Rating -0.0147 
 (0.0255) 
  
Gubernatorial Budget Powers -0.6611 
 (0.8101) 
  
Gubernatorial Veto Powers -4.1292** 
 (1.6609) 
  
Inflation Rate 0.3309** 
 (0.0792) 
  
Unemployment Rate -0.7225** 
 (0.0693) 
  
Constant 11.2903 
 (7.8663) 
*= p < 0.05 
**= p < 0.01 
 
 
Note:  The following analysis represents the results of a random effects pooled time series 
regression model. The cell entry represents the effect of the independent variables on the 
percent change in the president’s budget request from the previous year’s final budget. The 
number in parentheses represents the standard error. The sample size is 553.  Robust standard 
errors were run in this model. The overall R-square of the model is 0.12.  
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TABLE 4.1 MEAN NORMALIZED PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS 
COMMITTEE REQUEST FROM PRESIDENTIAL REQUEST BY PARTY CONTROL OF THE HOUSE, 
FISCAL YEAR 1948-2006 
 Party Control of the House of Representatives 
 Total Republican Democrat 
Change in House Committee Request -6.8 % -7.4 % -6.5 % 
 (17.4) (16) (19) 
 N = 566 N = 129 N = 437 
t = -0.49 
 
*= p < 0.05 
**= p < 0.01 
 
Note: The t-test is measuring whether the difference between Democrats and Republicans for the 
average percent change in House Committee appropriations requests is statistically significant. 
The figures in parentheses represent standard errors.  
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TABLE 4.2 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE SUMMARY TABLE FOR CHANGES IN HOUSE COMMITTEE 
ON APPROPRIATIONS REQUEST FROM THE PRESIDENT’S APPROPRIATIONS REQUEST, FISCAL 
YEAR 1948-2006 
Stage in Budget Cycle Direct Effect: 
Party Control of the 
House 
Indirect Effect: 
Party Control 
of Presidency 
Indirect Effect: 
Party Control of 
the Senate 
 
House Committee Change 
in Presidential 
Appropriations Request 
 
 
F= 1.76 
p = 0.02 
 
 
F= 10.07 
p= 0.00   
 
F= 1.87 
p= 0.09 
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Note: The table cell entries represent the percentage change in House Committee appropriations from the president’s budget across all 
partisan configurations of the federal government. Each cell entry includes the percentage change in appropriations, then the standard 
error in parentheses, and finally the number of observations.  The figures at the bottom of the table denote t-test scores of the 
relationship between the Republican and Democratic House control.
TABLE 4.3  HOUSE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS CHANGE IN PRESIDENTIAL APPROPRIATIONS REQUEST ACROSS DIFFERENT 
PARTISAN CONFIGURATIONS OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1948-2006  
  
Stage in Budget Cycle Party Control of Congressional Chambers 
  House Republican House Democrat House Republican House Democrat Total 
  Senate Republican Senate Republican Senate Democrat Senate Democrat  
       
 Republican -1.1 1.5 3.5 -3.2 4.5 
  (13.7) (14.3) (6.6) (12.3) (17) 
House Committee   N= 113 N= 60 N= 18 N= 288 N= 486 
Change in Presidential       
Appropriations Request Democrat -10.3 N/A N/A -11.2 -10.9 
  (22.4)   (6.1) (20.5) 
  N= 76   N= 178 N= 243 
       
 Total -4.6 1.5 3.5 -6.2  
  (20.1) (11.4) (6.6) (15)  
  N= 189 N= 60 N= 18 N= 377  
       
  t= 3.66 N/A N/A t= 5.3 t= 5.24 
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TABLE 4.4  MEAN NORMALIZED PERCENT CHANGE IN HOUSE COMMITTEE REQUEST FROM 
PRESIDENTIAL APPROPRIATIONS  REQUEST,  FISCAL YEARS 1948-2006 
  
Independent Variables  House Committee 
Appropriations Requests 
  
Presidential Change in Previous Year’s  -20.2561** 
Appropriations (2.7604) 
  
Democratic President -6.1683** 
 (1.2454) 
  
Democratic House  7.9787** 
 (2.0106) 
  
Democratic Senate -2.8816 
 (3.691) 
  
Total Federal Spending 0.0122 
 (0.0307) 
  
Election Year 1.4627 
 (1.9775) 
  
Deficit -0.0306** 
 (0.0161) 
  
Unemployment Rate 1.007 
 (1.058) 
  
Inflation Rate -0.2482 
 (0.2552) 
  
1985 Balanced Budget Act -2.5425 
 (2.5321) 
  
Constant 15.1969** 
 (4.0859) 
*= p < 0.05  
**= p < 0.01  
 
Note:  The following analysis represents the results of a random effects pooled time series 
regression model. The cell entry represents the effect of the independent variables on the percent 
change in the House Committee’s budget recommendation from the president’s budget request. 
The number in parentheses represents the standard error. The sample size is 553.  Robust 
standard errors were run in this model. The overall R-square of the model is 0.2172.   
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TABLE 4.5  MEAN NORMALIZED PERCENT CHANGE IN COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 
REQUEST FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL APPROPRIATIONS, REQUEST,  FISCAL YEARS 1948-2006 
  
Independent Variables  Presidential Appropriations Requests 
  
Presidential Change in Previous Year’s  -26.02561** 
Appropriations (2.7604) 
  
Democratic President -5.4242** 
 (1.9312) 
  
Democratic House Coalition Size 6.2365 
 (5.6724) 
  
Democratic Senate Coalition Size -2.1291 
 (2.3763) 
  
Total Federal Spending 0.0073 
 (0.0142) 
  
Election Year 1.9956 
 (1.1853) 
  
Deficit -0.014* 
 (0.0086) 
  
Conflict 1.6871 
 (1.8019) 
  
Unemployment Rate -0.6103 
 (0.6536) 
  
Inflation Rate -0.0183 
 (0.1316) 
  
Constant -31.9157 
 (7.7991) 
*= p < 0.05  
**= p < 0.01  
 
Note:  The following analysis represents the results of a random effects pooled time series 
regression model. The cell entry represents the effect of the independent variables on the percent 
change in the House Committee’s appropriations recommendations from the president’s 
appropriations requests. The number in parentheses represents the standard error. The sample 
size is 552.  Robust standard errors were run in this model. The overall R-square of the model is 
0.1796.  
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TABLE 4.6  MEAN NORMALIZED PERCENT CHANGE IN HOUSE COMMITTEE REQUEST FROM 
PRESIDENTIAL APPROPRIATIONS REQUEST, FISCAL YEARS 1948-1975 AND FISCAL YEARS 1975-2006 
   
Independent Variables                   Pre 1974                Post 1974 
   
Presidential Change in Previous Year’s 
Appropriations  
-8.8366** 
(2.8392) 
26.8428** 
(4.6094) 
   
Democratic President -3.7752** -4.914 
 (1.6678) (2.6594) 
   
Democratic House  10.8704** 10.4682 
 (4.0719) (7.2466) 
   
Democratic Senate  -0.3792 -1.9373 
 (0.5207) (3.5115) 
   
Total Federal Spending -0.1318 0.0381 
 (0.1298) (0.0307) 
   
Election Year -1.271 1.6507 
 (3.0671) (1.8796) 
   
Deficit 0.0998 -0.0306** 
 (0.1321) (0.0161) 
   
Conflict -0.2411 1.582 
 (2.2155) (3.8142) 
   
Unemployment Rate -0.4009 1.754 
 (0.9407) (1.5802) 
   
Inflation Rate 1.4172 -0.2434 
 (1.018) (0.2552) 
   
Constant -56.6422** 4.4508 
 (18.1801) (18.4472) 
*= p < 0.05   
**= p < 0.01   
 
Note:  The following analysis represents the results of a random effects pooled time series 
regression model. The cell entry represents the effect of the independent variables on the percent 
change in the president’s budget request from the previous year’s final budget. The number in 
parentheses represents the standard error. The sample size is 234 observations pre-1974 and 312 
observations post-1974.  Robust standard errors were run in this model. The overall R-squares of 
the models are 13.07 and 12.19 respectively
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t = 0.65 
 
*= p < 0.05 
**= p < 0.01 
 
Note: The t-test is measuring whether the difference between Democrats and Republicans for the 
average percent change in House floor appropriations requests is statistically significant. The 
figures in parentheses represent standard errors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4.7  MEAN NORMALIZED PERCENT CHANGE IN HOUSE FLOOR REQUEST FROM THE HOUSE 
COMMITTEE ON APPRORPAITIONS REQUEST, FISCAL YEARS 1948-2006 
 Party Control of the House 
 Total Republican Democrat 
Change in House Floor Request -1.6 % -1.1 % -2.2 % 
 (21.1) (8.3) (25.4) 
 N = 553 N = 129 N = 437 
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TABLE 4.8 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE SUMMARY TABLE FOR CHANGES IN HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES REQUEST FROM  HOUSE COMMITTEE REQUEST, FISCAL YEARS 1948-2006 
Stage in Budget Cycle Direct Effect: 
Party Control of 
House 
Indirect Effect: 
Party Control 
of Presidency 
Indirect Effect: 
Party Control of 
the Senate 
 
House Change in House 
Committee Appropriations 
Request  
 
 
F= 5.58 
p = 0.02 
 
 
F= 0.2 
p= 0.65  
 
F= 7.52 
p= 0.01 
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Note: The table cell entries represent the percentage change in House Floor appropriations recommendations from House Committee 
on Appropriations request across different partisan configurations of the federal government. Each cell entry includes the percentage 
change in appropriations, then the standard error in parentheses, and finally the number of observations.  The figures at the bottom of 
the table denote t-test scores of the relationship between the Republican and Democratic House control. 
TABLE 4.9  PERCENT CHANGE IN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FLOOR APPROPRIATIONS FROM HOUSE COMMITTEE APPROPRIATIONS 
REQUEST ACROSS DIFFERENT PARTISAN CONFIGURATIONS OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEARS 1948-2006 
  
Stage in Budget Cycle Party Control of Congress 
  House Republican House Democrat House Republican House Democrat Total 
  Senate Republican Senate Republican Senate Democrat Senate Democrat  
       
 Republican 0.01 -0.11 0.12 0.23 0.13 
  (3.2) (4.8) (0.11) (2.3) (2.11) 
House Floor   N= 35 N= 16 N= 13 N= 209 N= 273 
Change in House       
Committee Democrat -1.01 N/A N/A -1.7 -1.4 
Appropriations  (10.2)   (9.2) (9.4) 
Request  N= 76   N= 167 N= 243 
       
 Total -0.71 -0.1 0.1 -0.45  
  (8.4) (4.8) (0.11) (6.3)  
  N= 111 N= 16 N= 13 N= 376  
       
  t= 1.02 t= N/A t= N/A t= 2.8  t= -2.2 
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TABLE 4.10  MEAN NORMALIZED PERCENT CHANGE IN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FLOOR 
REQUEST FROM THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, FISCAL YEARS 1948-2006 
  
Independent Variables  House Floor Appropriations Requests 
  
House Committee Change to President’s  -7.7116 
Appropriations Request (6.1567) 
  
Democratic President -1.5323 
 (2.0869) 
  
Democratic House -10.0038 
 (6.5807) 
  
Democratic Senate 8.4795** 
 (4.0134) 
  
Deficit -0.041* 
 (0.0171) 
  
Total Federal Spending 0.002 
 (0.0288) 
  
Election 2.1471 
 (1.9526) 
  
Conflict -0.1468 
 (3.0361) 
  
Unemployment 0.4369 
 (1.0496) 
  
Inflation Rate -0.0427 
 (0.2482) 
  
Omnibus Bills -6.8721 
 (3.7811) 
  
Constant -1.24 
 (6.2932) 
*= p < 0.05 
**= p < 0.01 
 
 
Note:  The following analysis represents the results of a random effects pooled time series 
regression model. The cell entry represents the effect of the independent variables on the percent 
change in the president’s budget request from the previous year’s final budget. The number in 
parentheses represents the standard error. The sample size is 560.  Robust standard errors were 
run in this model. The overall R-square of the model is 0.11.  
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TABLE 4.11  MEAN NORMALIZED PERCENT CHANGE IN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FLOOR 
REQUEST FROM THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, FISCAL YEARS 1948-2006 
  
Independent Variables  House Floor Appropriations Requests 
  
House Committee Change to President’s  -7.7116 
Appropriations Request (6.1567) 
  
Democratic President -1.5323 
 (2.0869) 
  
Democratic House Coalition Size -10.0038 
 (6.5807) 
  
Democratic Senate Coalition Size 8.4795** 
 (4.0134) 
  
Deficit 0.004 
 (0.0171) 
  
Total Federal Spending 0.002 
 (0.0288) 
  
Election 2.1471 
 (1.9526) 
  
Conflict -0.1468 
 (3.0361) 
  
Unemployment 0.4369 
 (1.0496) 
  
Inflation Rate -0.0427 
 (0.2482) 
  
Constant -1.24 
 (6.2932) 
*= p < 0.05 
**= p < 0.01 
 
 
 
Note:  The following analysis represents the results of a random effects pooled time series 
regression model. The cell entry represents the effect of the independent variables on the percent 
change in the House of Representatives’ floor request on the House Committee on 
Appropriations request. The number in parentheses is the standard error. The sample size is 560.  
Robust standard errors were run in this model. The overall R-square of the model is 0.143.  
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TABLE 4.12  MEAN NORMALIZED PERCENT CHANGE IN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FLOOR 
REQUEST FROM COMMITTEE APPROPRIATIONS REQUEST, FISCAL YEARS 1948-1974 AND FISCAL 
YEARS 1975-2006 
   
Independent Variables                   Pre 1974                Post 1974 
   
House Committee Change to President’s 
Appropriations Request 
-5.6278** 
(2.4081) 
-8.1851 
(10.0142) 
   
Democratic President -1.5009** -1.617** 
 (0.8165) (0.4871) 
   
Democratic House  -1.9276 -5.9735 
 (1.5116) (3.6691) 
   
Democratic Senate  -0.04506** 0.6734** 
 (0.026) (0.0887) 
   
Total Federal Spending 0.0595 0.0188 
 (0.0525) (0.0463) 
   
Election Year -0.7624 4.8347 
 (0.6618) (3.5273) 
   
Deficit -0.0348 -0.0114** 
 (0.0678) (0.00239) 
   
Conflict -1.1873 0.1977 
 (1.0952) (7.1262) 
   
Unemployment Rate -0.4009 1.2182 
 (0.9407) (2.4402) 
   
Inflation Rate 1.4172 -0.1479 
 (1.018) (0.4499) 
   
Constant -0.7671 -9.4223 
 (6.6821) (39.057) 
*= p < 0.05   
**= p < 0.01   
 
Note:  The following table represents the results of a random effects pooled time series 
regression model. The cell entry represents the effect of the independent variables on the percent 
change in the House of Representatives’ floor request to the House Committee on 
Appropriations request before and after the 1974 Budget Act. The number in parentheses 
represents the standard error. The sample sizes are 248 and 312 respectively.  Robust standard 
errors were run in this model. The overall R-squares of the models are 0.146 and 0.12.
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t= 0.32 
 
*= p < 0.05 
**= p < 0.01 
Note: The t-test is measuring whether the difference between Democrats and Republicans for the 
average percent change in State House appropriations requests is statistically significant. The 
figures in parentheses represent standard errors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4.13 MEAN NORMALIZED PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN STATE HOUSE REQUEST FROM 
THE GOVERNOR’S APPROPRIATIONS REQUEST, FISCAL YEARS 1975-2006 
 Party Control of the State House 
 Total Republican Democrat 
Change in State House Request -1.3 % -1.5 % -1.2 % 
 (4.1) (0.6) (0.6) 
 N = 956 N = 507 N = 449 
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TABLE 4.14  ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE SUMMARY TABLE FOR CHANGES IN STATE HOUSE 
APPROPRIATIONS REQUEST FROM THE GOVERNOR’S APPROPRIATIONS REQUEST, FISCAL 
YEARS 1975-2008 
Stage in Budget Cycle Direct Effect: 
Party Control of 
State House 
Indirect Effect: 
Party Control of 
Governorship 
Indirect Effect: 
Party Control of 
the State Senate 
 
House Change in 
Gubernatorial 
Appropriations Request 
 
 
F= 1.38 
p = 0.04 
 
 
F= 1.26 
p= 0.26   
 
F= 1.04 
p= 0.41 
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Note: The table cell entries represent the percentage change in State House appropriations requests from gubernatorial budget requests across 
different partisan configurations of the state legislatures. Each cell entry includes the percentage change in appropriations, then the standard 
error in parentheses, and finally the number of observations.
TABLE 4.15  STATE HOUSE CHANGE IN GUBERNATORIAL APPROPRIATIONS REQUEST ACROSS DIFFERENT PARTISAN  
CONFIGURATIONS OF STATE GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEARS 1975-2008  
  
Stage in Budget Cycle Party Control of the State Legislatures 
  House Republican House Democrat House Republican House Democrat Total 
  Senate Republican Senate Republican Senate Democrat Senate Democrat  
       
 Republican -0.2 -4.4 -1.7 -1.3 -1.5 
  (14.2) (18) (11) (15) (14) 
State House Change   N= 198 N= 16 N= 82 N= 207 N= 503 
to Gubernatorial       
Appropriations Request Democrat -2.9 -1.1 -2.1 -1.2 -1.8 
  (10.2) (5.7) (10) (6) (18) 
  N= 76 N= 48 N= 114 N= 178 N= 442 
       
 Total -1.2 -1.7 -1.9 -1.1  
  (14) (10.2) (11) (12.2)  
  N= 311 N= 64 N= 196 N= 385  
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TABLE 4.16  MEAN NORMALIZED PERCENT CHANGE IN STATE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS 
REQUEST FROM THE GOVERNOR’S APPROPRIATIONS REQUEST,  FISCAL YEARS 1975-2008 
  
Independent Variables  State House Appropriations Requests 
  
Governor’s Change in Previous Year’s  -23.9562 
Appropriations (3.4914) 
  
Democratic Governor -0.8069 
 (1.1323) 
  
Democratic House 0.6332 
 (1.4304) 
  
Democratic Senate -0.9766* 
 (0.153) 
  
House Term Limits -3.4991* 
 (1.9449) 
  
Legislative Professionalism -0.0007 
 (0.0004) 
  
Gubernatorial Approval Rating -0.1229 
 (0.2513) 
  
Gubernatorial Budget Powers 0.4328 
 (0.6341) 
  
Gubernatorial Veto Powers 1.0027 
 (1.1225) 
  
Inflation Rate 3.5529 
 (2.2644) 
  
Unemployment Rate 0.4014** 
 (0.0566) 
  
Constant 3.0655 
 (12.7958) 
*= p < 0.05 
**= p < 0.01 
 
 
Note:  The following table represents the results of a random effects pooled time series 
regression model. The cell entry represents the effect of the independent variables on the 
percent change in State House appropriations requests to gubernatorial budget requests. The 
number in parentheses represents the standard error. The sample size is 738.  Robust standard 
errors were run in this model. The overall R-squares of the model is 13.16. 
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TABLE 5.1 MEAN NORMALIZED PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN SENATE COMMITTEE ON 
APPROPRIATIONS REQUEST HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FLOOR REQUEST, FISCAL YEARS 
1948-2006 
 Party Control of the Senate 
 Total Republican Democrat 
Change in Senate Committee 4.62 % 3.59 % 5.1 % 
Request (1.8) (12.7) (0.5) 
 N = 553 N = 152 N = 437 
t = 1.26 
 
*= p < 0.05 
**= p < 0.01 
 
Note: The t-test is measuring whether the difference between Democrats and Republicans for the 
average percent change in Senate Committee appropriations requests is statistically significant. 
The figures in parentheses represent standard errors.  
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TABLE 5.2 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE SUMMARY TABLE FOR CHANGES IN SENATE COMMITTEE 
ON APPROPRIATIONS REQUEST FROM THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES APPROPRIATIONS 
REQUEST, FISCAL YEARS 1948-2006 
Stage in Budget Cycle Direct Effect: 
Party Control of 
the Senate 
Indirect Effect: 
Party Control of 
the Presidency 
Indirect Effect: 
Party Control of 
the House 
 
Senate Committee Change 
in House Appropriations  
Request 
 
 
F= 0.18 
p = 0.67 
 
 
F= 0.37 
p= 0.54   
 
F= 3.98 
p= 0.04 
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Note: The table cell entries represent the percentage change in Senate Committee appropriations recommendations from the House of 
Representatives’ appropriations recommendations across all partisan configurations of the federal government. Each cell entry 
includes the percentage change in appropriations, then the standard error in parentheses, and finally the number of observations.  The 
figures at the bottom of the table denote t-test scores of the relationship between the Republican and Democratic Senate control.
TABLE 5.3  SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS CHANGE IN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES APPROPRIATIONS REQUEST ACROSS  
DIFFERENT PARTISAN CONFIGURATIONS OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEARS 1948-2006 
  
Stage in Budget Cycle Party Control of Congressional Chambers 
  House Republican House Democrat House Republican House Democrat Total 
  Senate Republican Senate Republican Senate Democrat Senate Democrat  
       
 Republican 3.5 -0.11 0.13 4.9 4.7 
  (1.6) (4.8) (0.04) (8.9) (12.9) 
Senate Committee   N= 113 N= 60 N= 18 N= 288 N= 295 
Change in House       
of Representatives Democrat 2.5 N/A N/A 5.5 4.5 
Appropriations  (1.4)   (10.7) (8.9) 
Request  N= 76   N= 178 N= 243 
       
 Total 3.12 -0.11 0.13 5.2  
  (1.5) (4.8) (0.04) (9.7)  
  N= 189 N= 60 N= 18 N= 376  
       
  t= 0.44 N/A N/A t= -0.52 t= -0.12 
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TABLE 5.4  MEAN NORMALIZED PERCENT CHANGE IN SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE 
REQUEST FROM HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  APPROPRIATIONS  REQUEST,  FISCAL YEARS 
1948-2006 
  
Independent Variables  Senate Committee 
Appropriations Requests 
  
House Change in House Committees  -18.0873** 
Appropriations Request (1.9329) 
  
Democratic President -0.4268 
 (0.0961) 
  
Democratic House  1.3392** 
 (0.3089) 
  
Democratic Senate 0.3733 
 (2.0252) 
  
Total Federal Spending 0.0046 
 (0.0206) 
  
Election Year -1.5826 
 (0.8999) 
  
Deficit -0.081** 
 (0.0079) 
  
Unemployment Rate -0.0169 
 (0.5242) 
  
Inflation Rate 0.02355 
 (0.1845) 
  
1985 Balanced Budget Act -1.0339 
 (1.1815) 
  
Constant 3.7709 
 (3.6868) 
*= p < 0.05  
**= p < 0.01  
 
Note:  The following analysis represents the results of a random effects pooled time series 
regression model. The cell entry represents the effect of the independent variables on the percent 
change in the Senate Committee’s budget recommendation from the House of Representatives 
budget request. The number in parentheses represents the standard error. The sample size is 538.  
Robust standard errors were run in this model. The overall R-square of the model is 0.1646.   
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TABLE 5.5  PERCENT CHANGE IN SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS REQUEST  FROM 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES REQUEST, FISCAL YEARS 1948-2006 
 Senate Committee 
Independent Variables  Appropriations Requests 
  
House Change in House Committee  -18.0634** 
Appropriations (1.9271) 
  
Democratic President 0.2297** 
 (0.095) 
  
Democratic House Coalition Size -5.0658 
 (1.1035) 
  
Democratic Senate Coalition Size 0.0143 
 (0.0239) 
  
Total Federal Spending -0.004 
 (0.0167) 
  
Election Year -1.5057 
 (0.898) 
  
Deficit 0.0032 
 (0.0071) 
  
Conflict 1.2758 
 (1.4291) 
  
Unemployment Rate 0.2567 
 (0.5579) 
  
Inflation Rate 0.0018 
 (0.1546) 
  
Constant 7.0458 
 (5.8224) 
*= p < 0.05  
**= p < 0.01  
 
Note:  The following analysis represents the results of a random effects pooled time series 
regression model. The cell entry represents the effect of the independent variables on the percent 
change in the Senate Committee’s appropriations recommendations from the House of 
Representatives requests. The number in parentheses represents the standard error. The sample 
size is 538.  Robust standard errors were run in this model. The overall R-square of the model is 
0.1635.   
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TABLE 5.6  MEAN NORMALIZED PERCENT CHANGE IN SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 
REQUEST FROM THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES APPROPRIATIONS REQUEST, FISCAL YEARS 1948-
1974 AND FISCAL YEARS 1975-2006 
   
Independent Variables                   Pre 1974                Post 1974 
   
Presidential Change in Previous Year’s 
Appropriations  
-8.8366** 
(2.8392) 
26.8428** 
(4.6094) 
   
Democratic President -3.7752** -4.914 
 (1.6678) (2.6594) 
   
Democratic House  10.8704** 10.4682 
 (4.0719) (7.2466) 
   
Democratic Senate  -0.3792 -1.9373 
 (0.5207) (3.5115) 
   
Total Federal Spending -0.1318 0.0381 
 (0.1298) (0.0307) 
   
Election Year -1.271 1.6507 
 (3.0671) (1.8796) 
   
Deficit 0.0998 -0.0306** 
 (0.1321) (0.0161) 
   
Conflict -0.2411 1.582 
 (2.2155) (3.8142) 
   
Unemployment Rate -0.4009 1.754 
 (0.9407) (1.5802) 
   
Inflation Rate 1.4172 -0.2434 
 (1.018) (0.2552) 
   
Constant -56.6422** 4.4508 
 (18.1801) (18.4472) 
*= p < 0.05   
**= p < 0.01   
 
Note:  The following analysis represents the results of a random effects pooled time series 
regression model. The cell entry represents the effect of the independent variables on the percent 
change in the president’s budget request from the previous year’s final budget. The number in 
parentheses represents the standard error. The sample size is 234 observations pre-1974 and 312 
observations post-1974.  Robust standard errors were run in this model. The overall R-squares of 
the models are 13.07 and 12.19 respectively.
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t = 0.31 
 
*= p < 0.05 
**= p < 0.01 
 
T Note: The t-test is measuring whether the difference between Democrats and Republicans for 
the average percent change in Senate floor appropriations requests is statistically significant. The 
figures in parentheses represent standard errors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 5.7  MEAN NORMALIZED PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN SENATE APPROPRIATIONS 
REQUEST FROM SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS RECOMMENDATIONS, FISCAL 
YEARS 1948-2006 
 Party Control of the Senate 
 Total Republican Democrat 
Change in Senate Committee 0.3092 % 0.3983 % 0.2752 % 
Request (0.1786) (0.5301) (0.1402) 
 N = 538 N = 152 N = 386 
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TABLE 5.8 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE SUMMARY TABLE FOR CHANGES IN SENATE 
APPROPRIATIONS REQUEST FROM THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS REQUEST, 
FISCAL YEARS 1948-2006 
Stage in Budget Cycle Direct Effect: 
Party Control of 
the Senate 
Indirect Effect: 
Party Control of 
the Presidency 
Indirect Effect: 
Party Control of 
the House 
 
Senate Change in Senate 
Committee Appropriations  
Request 
 
 
F= 8.82 
p = 0.00 
 
 
F= 0.16 
p= 0.69   
 
F= 20.65 
p= 0.00 
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Note: The table cell entries represent the percentage change in Senate Floor appropriations recommendations from the Senate 
Committee on Appropriations request across different partisan configurations of the federal government. Each cell entry includes the 
percentage change in appropriations, then the standard error in parentheses, and finally the number of observations.  The figures at the 
bottom of the table denote t-test scores of the relationship between the Republican and Democratic Senate control. 
TABLE 5.9  SENATE FLOOR CHANGE IN SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS BUDGET REQUEST ACROSS DIFFERENT PARTISAN  
CONFIGURATIONS OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEARS 1948-2006 
  
Stage in Budget Cycle Party Control of Congress 
  House Republican House Democrat House Republican House Democrat Total 
  Senate Republican Senate Republican Senate Democrat Senate Democrat  
       
 Republican 0.16 -1.2 1.01 0.07 0.1 
  (0.03) (7.5) (5.12) (2.11) (3.2) 
Senate Floor   N= 35 N= 16 N= 13 N= 209 N= 295 
Change in Senate       
Committee Democrat 1.6 N/A N/A 0.03 0.51 
Appropriations  (6.2)   (2.05) (2.4) 
Request  N= 76   N= 167 N= 234 
       
 Total 1.1 -1.2 1.01 0.05  
  (4.1) (7.5) (5.12) (2.08)  
  N= 111 N= 16 N= 13 N= 376  
       
  t= 0.44 t= N/A t= N/A t= -0.52  t= -0.12 
 215 
 
 
 
TABLE 5.10  MEAN NORMALIZED PERCENT CHANGE IN SENATE FLOOR REQUEST FROM THE 
SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, FISCAL YEARS 1948-2006 
  
Independent Variables  Senate Floor Appropriations Requests 
  
Senate Committee Change to House’s  -3.5464* 
Appropriations Request (1.611) 
  
Democratic President -0.1498 
 (0.372) 
  
Democratic House 0.2168 
 (1.2714) 
  
Democratic Senate 0.2416** 
 (0.0872) 
  
Deficit -0.084** 
 (0.0031) 
  
Total Federal Spending - 0.017** 
 (0.0082) 
  
Election 0.0463 
 (0.3516) 
  
Conflict 0.5599 
 (0.5717) 
  
Unemployment 0.0442 
 (0.2036) 
  
Inflation Rate -0.1309 
 (0.0718) 
  
Omnibus Bills 0.2046 
 (0.718) 
  
Constant -1.24 
 (6.2932) 
*= p < 0.05 
**= p < 0.01 
 
 
Note:  The following analysis represents the results of a random effects pooled time series 
regression model. The cell entry represents the effect of the independent variables on the percent 
change in the president’s budget request from the previous year’s final budget. The number in 
parentheses represents the standard error. The sample size is 560.  Robust standard errors were 
run in this model. The overall R-square of the model is 0.11.  
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TABLE 5.11  MEAN NORMALIZED PERCENT CHANGE IN SENATE FLOOR REQUEST FROM THE 
SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, FISCAL YEARS 1948-2006 
  
Independent Variables  Senate Floor Appropriations Requests 
  
Senate Committee Change to the House’s  -3.4827** 
Appropriations Request (1.6047) 
  
Democratic President -0.2045 
 (0.3672) 
  
Democratic House Coalition Size 4.9048 
 (4.3035) 
  
Democratic Senate Coalition Size -0.002 
 (0.0097) 
  
Deficit -0.0082** 
 (0.0028) 
  
Total Federal Spending 0.0179** 
 (0.0065) 
  
Election 0.0389 
 (0.3511) 
  
Conflict 0.5522 
 (0.5542) 
  
Unemployment -0.0389 
 (0.2173) 
  
Inflation Rate -0.1382 
 (0.0601) 
  
Constant 0.3036 
 (2.2159) 
*= p < 0.05 
**= p < 0.01 
 
 
  
  
  
 
Note:  The following analysis represents the results of a random effects pooled time series 
regression model. The cell entry represents the effect of the independent variables on the percent 
change in the Senate floor request from the Senate Committee on Appropriations request. The 
number in parentheses is the standard error. The sample size is 533.  Robust standard errors were 
run in this model. The overall R-square of the model is 0.107.  
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TABLE 5.12  MEAN NORMALIZED PERCENT CHANGE IN SENATE FLOOR REQUEST FROM SENATE 
COMMITTEE APPROPRIATIONS REQUEST, FISCAL YEARS 1948-1974 AND FISCAL YEARS 1975-2006 
   
Independent Variables                   Pre 1974                Post 1974 
   
Senate Committee Change to House’s 
Appropriations Request 
-18.0314 
(7.7685) 
-47.6734 
(7.7685) 
   
Democratic President -0.1168 -0.1168 
 (0.1266) (0.1266) 
   
Democratic House  -1.9276 -6.6024 
 (1.5116) (10.6619) 
   
Democratic Senate  -0.04506 0.014 
 (0.026) (0.0819) 
   
Total Federal Spending 0.0595 0.0513 
 (0.0525) (0.063) 
   
Election Year -0.7624 -1.0561 
 (0.6618) (0.7922) 
   
Deficit -0.0348 -0.1401** 
 (0.0678) (0.0819) 
   
Conflict -0.3942 1.0874 
 (0.1185) (1.3167) 
   
Unemployment Rate 0.1185 0.89 
 (1.0713) (0.5674) 
   
Inflation Rate 0.2424 -0.3915 
 (0.395) (0.4766) 
   
Constant 3.3889 -9.4223 
 (21.9873) (39.057) 
*= p < 0.05   
**= p < 0.01   
   
   
   
 
Note:  The following table represents the results of a random effects pooled time series 
regression model. The cell entry represents the effect of the independent variables on the percent 
change in the Senate floor request from the Senate Committee on Appropriations request before 
and after the 1974 Budget Act. The number in parentheses represents the standard error. The 
sample sizes are 248 and 290 respectively.  Robust standard errors were run in this model. The 
overall R-squares of the models are 0.174 and 0.207. 
 218 
 
 
t= -2.25** 
 
*= p < 0.05 
**= p < 0.01 
 
Note: The t-test is measuring whether the difference between Democrats and Republicans for the 
average percent change in State Senate appropriations requests is statistically significant. The 
figures in parentheses represent standard errors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 5.13  MEAN NORMALIZED PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN STATE SENATE REQUEST FROM 
STATE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS REQUEST, FISCAL YEARS 1975-2008 
 Party Control of the State Senate 
 Total Republican Democrat 
Change in State Senate Request -1.3 % -3.81 % 0.35 % 
 (12.4) (9.2) (12) 
 N = 928 N = 375 N = 553 
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TABLE 5.14 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE SUMMARY TABLE FOR CHANGES IN STATE SENATE 
APPROPRIATIONS REQUEST FROM STATE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS REQUEST, FISCAL YEARS 
1975-2008 
Stage in Budget Cycle Direct Effect: 
Party Control of 
State Senate 
Indirect Effect: 
Party Control of 
Governorship 
Indirect Effect: 
Party Control of 
State House 
 
Senate Change in State 
House Appropriations 
Request 
 
 
F= 6.46 
p = 0.00 
 
 
F= 0.03 
p= 0.85  
 
F= 0.53 
p= 0.99 
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Note: The table cell entries represent the percentage change in State Senate appropriations requests from State House requests across different 
partisan configurations of the state legislatures. Each cell entry includes the percentage change in appropriations, then the standard error in 
parentheses, and finally the number of observations.
TABLE 5.15  STATE SENATE CHANGE IN HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS REQUEST ACROSS DIFFERENT PARTISAN  
CONFIGURATIONS OF THE STATE LEGISLATURES, FISCAL YEARS 1975-2008 
  
Stage in Budget Cycle Party Control of the State Legislatures 
  House Republican House Democrat House Republican House Democrat Total 
  Senate Republican Senate Republican Senate Democrat Senate Democrat  
       
 Republican -2.1 1.2 2 0.5 0.3 
  (21) (4.8) (9.1) (6.8) (11.6) 
State House Change   N= 198 N= 16 N= 82 N= 190 N= 486 
to Gubernatorial       
Appropriations Request Democrat 1.2 -23 -1.4 0.5 -2.4 
  (20) (28) (15) (6.1) (16.3) 
  N= 76 N= 48 N= 103 N= 178 N= 442 
       
 Total -1.1 -17.1 0.02 0.5  
  (18) (26) (12.9) (6.5)  
  N= 311 N= 64 N= 185 N= 368  
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TABLE 5.16  MEAN NORMALIZED PERCENT CHANGE IN STATE SENATE REQUEST FROM STATE 
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS REQUEST,  FISCAL YEARS 1975-2008 
  
Independent Variables  State Senate Appropriations Requests 
  
House Change in Governor’s  -31.3328** 
Appropriations Request (3.8191) 
  
Democratic Governor -1.8139 
 (1.3416) 
  
Democratic House 0.0341 
 (1.5593) 
  
Democratic Senate 0.2634 
 (1.7199) 
  
Senate Term Limits -1.1677 
 (2.9003) 
  
Legislative Professionalism -0.0009 
 (0.0004) 
  
Gubernatorial Budget Powers 0.2061 
 (0.7145) 
  
Gubernatorial Approval Ratings -0.1284 
 (0.2593) 
  
Gubernatorial Veto Authority -0.0759 
 (1.2043) 
  
Inflation Rate 4.0395 
 (2.5098) 
  
Unemployment Rate 1.2137* 
 (0.6638) 
  
Constant -7.129 
 (13.8901) 
*= p < 0.05 
**= p < 0.01 
 
 
Note:  The following table represents the results of a random effects pooled time series regression model. The 
cell entry represents the effect of the independent variables on the percent change in State Senate appropriations 
requests to State House requests. The number in parentheses represents the standard error. The sample size is 
767.  Robust standard errors were run in this model. The overall R-squares of the model is 9.67. 
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FIGURE 1.1.  THE FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS11 
 
THE PRESIDENT SEND HIS BUDGET TO CONGRESS 
 
The Standing Committees of the House and Senate 
Recommend Budget Levels and Report Legislative Plans to 
 
HOUSE BUDGET COMMITTEE      SENATE BUDGET COMMITTEE 
  Initiates        Initiates  
 
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION ON BUDGET 
Levels for Total Receipts 
Levels for Budget Authority and Outlays 
Levels for Budget Deficit, Surplus, Debt 
 
House Vote on Resolution      Senate Vote on Resolution 
 
CONFERENCE COMMITTEE 
Resolve Differences Between House and Senate 
 
House Vote on Resolution      Senate Vote on Resolution 
 
April 15: Action Completed on Budget Resolution 
May 15: Authorizing Committees Report and Congress Votes on Authorizing Legislation 
 
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE     SENATE APPROPRIATIONS 
COMMITTEE 
Allocate Budget Authority and Outlays:     Allocate Budget Authority and 
Outlays: 
 
APPROPRIATIONS SUBCOMMITTEES     APPROPRIATIONS SUBCOMMITTEES 
Which Report Back to:       Which Report Back to: 
 
APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES     APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES 
Which Report Back for:       Which Report Back for: 
 
HOUSE FLOOR VOTES ON      SENATE FLOOR VOTES ON 
13 Appropriations Bills       13 Appropriations Bills 
 
CONFERENCE COMMITTEE 
Resolves Differences Between Them 
 
House Floor Vote        Senate Floor Vote 
 
THE PRESIDENT SIGNS OR VETOES APPROPRIATIONS BILL 
  
                                                 
11 This figure is largely a replication of Wildavsky (2004) page 6.  
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